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 I 
FUNDING MECHANISMS AND QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEMS  
IN HIGHER EDUCATION IN EGYPT  
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
by 
 
Alsaeed Alshamy 
 
ABSTRACT 
A comparative examination was undertaken of funding mechanisms and Quality Assurance 
Systems (QAS) in higher education in Egypt and the UK with the aim of identifying 
implications for reform in Egypt. These issues are examined by applying the concepts of 
autonomy, accountability, efficiency and equity as analytical and evaluative tools, chosen 
because of their central place in the analysis of the governance and finance of higher 
education. The principal sources of data are document analysis and semi-structured interviews 
with 47 academic and administrative staff in Cairo University and 29 at the University of 
Birmingham.   
The main findings show that different forms of funding and QAS differ in their 
consequence for the autonomy, accountability, efficiency and equity of universities. There are 
also contested perspectives between the expectations of policy pronouncements and the 
experience of those working in the sector. It was also found that there are overlapping 
contextual factors of governance and culture that contribute to the impact of funding and QAS 
so that they cannot be understood as stand-alone ‗objective‘ phenomena because they are 
shaped and re-shaped by the regulatory and cultural environment.  This leads to the 
conclusion that changes to funding and QAS in Egypt need to be reformed and developed in 
ways that address issues of governance and culture. A set of pilot projects is proposed to test 
their feasibility and build support for change. While the study has identified several 
fundamental systemic problems that need to be addressed, it is argued that these are best done 
through evolutionary pilot projects such as evolving a funding formula; cost-sharing; staffing; 
student representation systems and capacity building and training.  
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 1 
1 CHAPTER ONE 
      INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Rationale for the study 
The higher education (HE) system in Egypt faces multiple challenges. Already a large system 
with severe pressures on funding, there are demographic pressures for yet more expansion and 
concerns about equal opportunities. It also faces problems of administrative inflexibility, 
despite several enquiries and reports proposing reforms. This study explores these and other 
issues from the perspective of participants in the HE system in Egypt and, for the insights 
from a comparative perspective that can arise from a careful process of policy learning, also 
the HE system in the UK.   
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the system and its challenges and the 
potential benefits of policy learning. It then outlines the approach taken in this study and 
concludes with a section on the structure of the thesis. 
1.1.1 Key Issues in Higher Education in Egypt 
The HE sector in Egypt is comprised of a wide range of HEIs: 20 public universities including 
Al-Azhar University1; 17 private universities; 13 public non-university institutions made up of 
8 Technical colleges (used to be 45 two-year Middle Technical Institutes (MTI)), and 5 four 
or five-year higher technical institutes; 96 private institutions: only 8 of them are two-year 
MTI, 4 institutions offer both two and four-year degrees, while 88 institutions are four-year 
higher institutes; 11 non-university institutions established by other governmental entities (not 
the Ministry of Higher Education) or under special agreements, and 5 private foreign 
                                                 
1
 Al-Azhar University is a public university but does not follow the regulations of the Supreme Council for 
Universities, a governmental body for public universities. It is directly regulated by the Cabinet of Ministers.   
 2 
institutions: the American University in Cairo (AUC) established 1919, and the Arab 
Academy for Science and Technology and Maritime Transport (AASTMT) established 1972, 
the UNIVERSITÉ FRANÇAISE D'ÉGYPTE (UFE) established 2002, the German University 
in Cairo (GUC) established 2003 and the British University in Egypt (BUE) established 2005 
in addition to the Egyptian E-Learning University (EELU) established 2008 (Said, 2008; 
ICHEFAP, 2009; 4International Colleges and Universities, 2011 ; EUN, 2011; EUP, 2011). 
However, the focus of the current study is on public universities and the terms universities 
and HEIs are considered as synonyms across the thesis. The research in this study has been 
conducted at Cairo University (CU), as a state university, and thus the implications for policy 
and practice are meant for public/state universities only.  
As the main source of funds, the Government of Egypt has invested heavily in 
Education compared to other countries in terms of GDP. Public Higher Education Spending to 
total public education spending in Egypt is higher than OECD and lower middle income 
countries (as shown in Figure  1.1).  
Figure  1.1: Share of Higher Education Spending in the Education Budget (Per cent)  
 
Source: (Fahim and Sami, 2009; 2011). 
Although Egypt invested heavily in higher education, spending per student remains 
low compared to other lower middle income and OECD countries, which is detrimental to the 
quality of provision. Thus, while Egypt allocates equivalent resources as a per cent of GDP to 
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higher education as OECD and lower middle income countries, and even more in terms of per 
cent of public spending on education, expenditure per student is low because of the high 
enrolment levels2. The current level of funding of higher education in Egypt may be 
inadequate to deliver high quality education (Fahim and Sami, 2009; Farouk, 2008; OECD 
and World Bank, 2010).  
Options for increasing funds are limited in that by the terms of Egypt‘s constitution, 
HE should be provided at no direct cost to students so that any cost recovery is seen by the 
public as unconstitutional and a violation of their rights (World Bank, 2002a).   
Demographic change is adding to this pressure. The number of students entering HE 
grew by 17 per cent per year between 1992/93 and 1997/98 with over 1.5 million students 
contributing to decline in per student spending of around 40 per cent in real terms over that 
period. Moreover, the HE cohort is projected to continue to increase and be close to 6% 
(60,000 students) per year through 2009 (World Bank, 2002a). There is a continuous 
increasing demand for higher education with the participation rate assumed to rise from 28% 
to 35% over 2006-2021, which means that some 1.1 million additional participants will need 
to be accommodated at an average growth rate of 3% per year (73,300) over fifteen years 
(OECD and World Bank, 2010). Thus, Egypt faces the problem of making trade-offs between 
the desire, on the one side, to expand the higher education system and, on the other, face the 
problem of declining spending per student and its consequent threat to quality. Thus, the 
Egyptian Government is in need for sustainable diversified financing resources to finance 
expansion and improvement in a sustainable manner without compromising quality (World 
Bank, 2008b).  
                                                 
2 
As stated by Helal, ex-minister of higher education, (Khalid, 2010b).  
 4 
Free access does not lead to equal educational opportunities. Faim and Sami (2009; 
2011) found that public spending on higher education across different population quintiles 
favours the rich. The picture of education attainment broken down by poverty status (as 
shown in Figure  1.2) leads to the same conclusion. This finding is also reflected in a World 
Bank report (2002b) which states that the poor have less access to higher education than the 
non-poor as entrance to universities is constrained by very restrictive grade requirements 
which students from non-poor families have a better chance to attain because they are able to 
afford better quality secondary education as well as private tutoring which significantly 
improves the chances of a student receiving a high mark on the General Secondary Exam. 
While children from the poorest population quintile represent 25% of primary school 
students, they represent only 14% of secondary school students and 4% of higher education 
students (Ibid; World Bank, 2007).   
Figure  1.2: Enrolment Rates by Income Level, 2004/2005 
  
Source: (CAPMAS, 2005 cited in Fahim and Sami, 2009). 
Public Higher Education is part of Egypt‘s public sector and, therefore, is subject to its 
laws and regulations, contributing to an inflexibility and inefficiency in responding to the 
dynamics of student demand and labour market requirements (OECD and World Bank, 2010). 
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Moreover, universities receive their funding in the form of line-item budget which is believed 
to have negative impact on the autonomy and efficiency of universities (Said, 2001; OECD 
and World Bank, 2010).     
In response to these challenges, a national strategy to reform the sector was announced 
in 2000 (National Conference on Higher Education, 2000). Its agenda identified 25 initiatives 
to be implemented over a 15-year period with 12 given priority to be funded and implemented 
through a loan agreement between the Government of Egypt (GOE) and World Bank (IBRD 
Loan No. 4658EGT) through the Higher Education Enhancement Project (HEEP) (World 
Bank, 2002a). The 12 identified projects were bundled into six integrated projects that were 
given priority in the first phase of the strategic plan (2002 - 2007) (HEEP, 2007), namely:  
 FOEP: Faculties of Education Project 
 ETCP: Egyptian Technical Colleges Project 
 FLDP: Faculty-Leadership Development Project 
 ICTP: Information & Communication Technology Project 
 QAAP: Quality Assurance and Accreditation Project 
 HEEPF: Higher Education Enhancement Project Fund 
The titles of several of these projects indicate their focus and help inform the aims and 
objectives of this study. 
1.1.2 Policy Learning 
Given the multiple challenges facing higher education in Egypt, notably issues of finance, 
quality and governance, reinforced by massive numbers of students and demographic 
pressures for more expansion, it is also recognized that Egypt is not alone in facing these 
problems. Therefore, the literature component of the study drew upon wider international 
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experience of higher education reform and examined their implications for Egypt. For these 
insights from a comparative perspective, the empirical study also included comparative 
material, specifically the HE system in the UK. The purpose of the UK case study was to 
illuminate issues so as better to assist the analysis of the Egyptian system.  
One of the main reasons for choosing the UK is that HEIs are funded through a block 
grant mechanism, contrasting with line-item funding in Egypt, which many reports have 
recommended replacing with a block grant system to allow universities more autonomy and 
flexibility (Said, 2001, Fahim and Sami, 2009; OECD and World Bank, 2010). Thus, 
identifying the perceptions of UK participants on how funding affects universities is thought 
to be helpful in considering options for funding in light of the peculiarities of the Egyptian 
context.   
The second reason for choosing the UK is that British consultants have been involved 
in establishing QAS in higher education in Egypt (QAAP, 2007a) and thus QAS have many 
similarities with the system in the UK. Thus, identifying the perceptions of UK participants 
on how QAS affect universities is thought to be helpful as QAS are well-established in the 
UK whereas they are still in a transitional phase in Egypt. 
The main aim of this study, therefore, is to use the wider international experience of 
higher education reform, including the comparative study with the UK, to propose 
implications for policy and practice for enhancing funding and QAS in Egypt in light of the 
Egyptian context.  
Given the rationale for investigating the wider international experience of higher 
education reform, including the comparative study with the UK, it is clear that the study 
adopts a policy learning approach as it aims to support the development of tailored national 
 7 
policies rather than policies taken off-the-peg, as is the case with a policy borrowing 
approach which searches the international experience for examples of unique, transferable 
best practice (Raffe, 2011).  
Adopting a policy learning approach has served a broader range of purposes for the 
study, including using the comparative perspective to learn about the researcher‘s own 
country/system, learning from its history and context, illuminating its strengths as well as 
weaknesses, identifying common trends and pressures that affect all systems, identifying 
alternative policy options, testing their feasibility, understanding processes and dynamics of 
change and anticipating issues that possible options would raise and tailoring those policy 
options to suit national aims, needs and circumstances of the Egyptian context (Ibid; Chakroun, 
2008; Phillips and Schweisfurth, 2008). 
Rationales for the comparative perspective and the policy learning approach indicate the 
focus of the study and inform its aims and objectives.       
1.2 Aims, objectives and research questions 
The study is a comparative examination of funding mechanisms and Quality Assurance 
Systems (QAS) in higher education in Egypt and the UK with the aim of identifying their 
implications for Egypt. This aim can be divided into three objectives. 
1. Investigate how funding mechanisms affect higher education in Egypt and the UK. 
2. Investigate how quality assurance systems affect higher education in Egypt and the 
UK.  
3. In light of findings, propose implications for policy and practice on funding 
mechanisms and quality assurance systems for higher education in Egypt.  
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These objectives were developed into five research questions.  
1. What is an appropriate theoretical framework for examining the impact of funding and 
quality assurance systems on higher education? 
2. How do funding mechanisms affect higher education in Egypt and the UK? 
3. How do quality assurance systems affect higher education in Egypt and the UK? 
4. In the context of findings from the empirical enquiry, what are the implications for 
funding and quality assurance systems of higher education in Egypt? 
5. How do these implications meet key goals related to autonomy, accountability, 
efficiency and equity? 
Evidence presented in this study adds an original contribution to knowledge as it addresses 
problems of funding and QAS in HE in Egypt and proposes implications for enhancing them 
in light of international experience, including a comparative study with the UK. The 
implications proposed for Egypt, as a developing country, might have relevance for other 
developing countries facing similar problems in their HE sector. The international case study 
of the UK (UoB specifically) will be of interest nationally, within the UK, and internationally, 
especially for OECD countries adopting similar systems of funding and QAS. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is comprised of eight more chapters which are outlined as follows:     
Chapter 2 considers an appropriate theoretical framework - autonomy, accountability, 
efficiency and equity - for analysing issues of funding and quality assurance systems in the 
context of studies of higher education. Chapters 3 and 4 complement each other, the first 
examining the application of the concepts from Chapter 2 to issues of funding higher 
education and Chapter 4 applying them to systems of quality assurance. Chapter 5 considers 
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the methodological stance of the study and the approach taken. Chapters 6 and 7, respectively 
on funding and quality assurance, report the results of the empirical enquiry with Chapter 8 
integrating the findings from the earlier chapters. In Chapter 9, the implications of the 
findings are considered. 
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2 CHAPTER TWO 
CRUCIAL CONCEPTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION POLICIES 
2.1 Introduction 
Autonomy, accountability, efficiency and equity are concepts that recur in higher education 
policies and their analyses and form the framework for this analysis of reforms in funding and 
quality assurance systems in the sector. This chapter examines these concepts and their 
importance at a general level in society and, more specifically, in higher education with 
particular attention to their implications for funding and managing higher education. Much of 
the literature on the finance and governance of higher education in the last 25 years employs 
these four concepts (Johnstone et al., 1998; Holm-nielsen, 2001; Blondal et al., 2002; OECD, 
2003; Barr, 2004a; Brown, 2004; Dougherty, 2004; Goastellec, 2005; Leveille, 2006; 
Johnstone and Marcucci, 2007; OECD, 2008). There are compelling reasons why this is so.  
The expansion of the sector into a mass provider in many countries has meant a 
substantial increase in its overall share of public expenditure. Accompanied by greater 
ideological questioning of the role of the public sector, wider governmental fiscal constraints 
and competition from other public sectors (Johnstone, 2004a), HE since the mid-1980s has 
increasingly been concerned with accountability and value-for-money. The trend towards 
increased student payment also contributes to greater public scrutiny of how universities are 
organized, teach and relate to society (Stohl, 2007). Increased student contributions have also 
made concerns about equity more prominent and whether access is over-influenced by family 
background and wealth. Set against these demands for accountability, efficiency and equity, 
which lead to greater intrusion into the management of the sector by government, HEIs are 
believed to be more effective if they have autonomy in managing resources (OECD, 2008) 
with Vossensteyn (2004) advocating that HEIs should have greater autonomy and 
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responsibility to respond to their customers and environment. Nonetheless, there are those 
who recognize that this greater managerial freedom should be accompanied by greater 
accountability for their outcomes (OECD, 2008).  
The literature also recognizes that different forms of funding mechanisms and quality 
assurance systems have distinctive implications for what these concepts mean in practice. 
They are examined here at a general level and for the comparative analysis of funding and 
quality assurance systems in Egypt and the UK.     
2.2 Autonomy 
2.2.1 Understanding Autonomy                                
2.2.1.1 Initial definitions  
Autonomy can be defined as ―the right of a group of people to govern itself or to organize its 
own activities‖ and being autonomous means ―being independent and having the power to 
make your own decisions‖ (Cambridge Advanced Learner‘s Dictionary, 2003). It can also be 
defined as ―the possession or right of self-government or freedom of action‖ (Concise Oxford 
English Dictionary, 2004) and ―the freedom for a country… or an organization to act and 
make decisions without being controlled by anyone else‖ (Oxford Advanced Learner‘s 
Dictionary Compass, 2005).  
These definitions suggest that autonomy allows a freedom to act without 
accountability to others, whether as individuals, organizations or countries. It is doubtful 
whether this degree of freedom is so unconstrained: nation states are constrained by 
international law and provide a framework within which their decisions are taken. In this 
sense, autonomy is not freedom to unconstrained action but is bounded by laws, rules and 
conventions. This is apparent when we consider how autonomy is defined within education.                                
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The UNESCO Thesaurus (2010) indicates that ‗educational autonomy‘ means 
―arrangements giving educational establishments at any level a degree of autonomy in 
administrative and programme matters‖. In recognizing ‗degrees‘ of autonomy in managing 
and administering matters in their institutions, it is evident they are not free to do whatever 
they want, irrespective of consequences. Autonomy occurs within institutional limits that 
mean officials are answerable for their exercise of authority. As defined here, autonomy is 
linked to accountability, to government, society and consumers of their services and is 
compatible with a quality control and steering role for government (Johnstone et al., 1998).  
Autonomy is a pre-requisite for accountability. Giving institutions some autonomy is 
an essential condition to holding educational officials accountable for their decisions. Without 
discretionary authority, officials are functionaries undertaking routine and tightly defined 
tasks. Once roles become complex and cannot be tightly defined, some degree of autonomy 
exists with officials entrusted to undertake and accomplish responsible tasks. A consequence 
of granting this discretionary authority creates an accountability as to how this authority is 
used (Fenstermacher, 1979). It is argued that where no delegation of authority occurs, there 
should be no expectation of accountability (Heim, no date). Thus, it can be said that autonomy 
is not incompatible with accountability; rather, giving authority (autonomy) to others to 
accomplish some tasks is a precondition of their accountability for their decisions and their 
outcomes. 
2.2.1.2 Autonomy and freedom 
In its discussion of autonomy, the UNESCO Thesaurus identifies ‗academic freedom‘ and 
defines it as ―the liberty of educational institutions to decide courses and research, and of 
teachers to teach subjects, without outside coercion‖. In reconciling this statement on 
academic freedom with the link between autonomy and accountability, it is pertinent to note a 
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distinction between the place of individual academics and the institutions within which they 
work. 
Morgan (2006) argues that there is a difference between the notions of academic 
freedom and academic autonomy. Academic freedom is ‗the supposed intellectual, moral or 
natural right of a scholar to pursue a line of research or study without hindrance, and to 
espouse, profess or publish the results of that study without censorship‘. Even this freedom is 
not unfettered. Thus, certain types of research are regarded as inappropriate and unethical and 
what can be done is inevitably limited by available resources. As for academic autonomy, ‗it 
is an idea of freedom constrained: that is, it is the concept of a subject or discipline‘s self-
governance‘. He argues that academic autonomy holds that the judgment of value of a work 
belongs to the methodology and criteria of the relevant discipline. He means that a scholar is 
free to seek to publish any piece of work but might, nonetheless, find it difficult to gain space 
in a refereed journal subject to peer review. Thorens (1998) distinguishes academic freedom 
from freedom of expression; where the former is confined to members of the academic 
community, the latter is a right of each member of a society. If this locates academic freedom 
and academic autonomy for the individual academic, how do these ideas relate to academic 
institutions? 
Autonomy as a ‗self-governing‘ institution means providing a framework within 
which academic freedom and academic autonomy can be safeguarded (Morgan, 2006). He 
adds, though, that while academic freedom and academic autonomy are essential to the real 
academy and learning, the time is long passed when scholars governed their own institutions 
(Ibid). Thorens (1998) sees the concept of institutional autonomy as relative. Like academic 
freedom, its purpose is to promote the role of the university in expanding and passing on 
knowledge and providing other services but, he argues, for financial reasons the modern 
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university cannot be totally independent of the state and society. He notes that even the most 
famous private American universities could not continue to exist and carry out advanced 
research without subsidies and tax exemptions. As with other organizations, universities must 
also operate within the legal framework of its society. 
Harvey (2004) advocated that, ‗in higher education, autonomous institutions can 
establish their own programmes of study, have control over their own finances (once 
received) subject to normal auditing procedures, and grant their own degrees‘. However, he 
agrees with Thorens (1998) that this is relative not absolute autonomy, a view also taken by 
Snyder (2002) who argues that colleges and universities should seek reasonable not absolute 
autonomy as this is simply impossible. He adds that ‗questions of reasonable or relative 
autonomy arise even within the internal university setting,‘ framing discussion of academic 
freedom. 
What emerges from this is that institutional (University) autonomy can be defined as  
‗the degree of autonomy required, given the economic, political, social and 
cultural state of the society concerned, to enable the university to best fulfil the 
role that the society has assigned to it, experience demonstrating that the 
university cannot fully play this role if it does not have sufficient 
independence and freedom vis-à-vis society and particularly vis-à-vis the state‘ 
(Thorens, 1998).  
However, the university must be accountable for its finance especially and also for its role and 
its usefulness to society and the state as well (Ibid, 406).  
The position taken here is that concepts of absolute freedom or autonomy are not 
consistent with individuals and organizations that are a part of a wider society. Discussions 
about academic freedom and autonomy are, therefore, about relativities and such a discussion 
includes the wider benefits that universities bring to human beings and society. On this 
argument, both academic freedom and university autonomy are justified only if they are 
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useful and necessary conditions for enabling universities to continue to play the role that 
society assigns to them through teaching and research. In this sense, society and the state 
establish universities for the contribution they make to the social and economic development 
of humankind. That is why, even in authoritarian societies in the developed world, academic 
freedom and university autonomy are defended as much and sometimes more than free, 
democratic, pluralistic societies (Ibid, 402-3). 
What academic freedom means, therefore, is that members of the academic 
community should be provided with the freedom needed for research and teaching and being 
able to pursue these goals without jeopardizing their careers and their independence of mind 
(Ibid). Unresolved is the extent to which this freedom is contingent upon institutional self-
governance. As is examined in the next section, a feature of changes to university governance 
in some countries has been an erosion of self-governance and replacement with a more 
managed structure. While this can still occur within a framework of institutional autonomy 
where academic freedom is protected, it alters who makes decisions within institutions. 
Therefore, while there may be widespread agreement on the principle that the legal, 
intellectual and political autonomy of higher education is essential for the health of 
universities and the members of the academic community (Gungwu, 1996), there are different 
interpretations of the balance between types of accountability and types of autonomy. That is, 
there will be different mechanisms of accountability for different types of autonomy. 
2.2.2 Autonomy and higher education policies  
2.2.2.1 Motivation 
The importance of autonomy as a policy issue owes much to changes in policy-makers‘ 
beliefs about what motivates those working in higher education. Beliefs that professionals 
were more interested in pursuing their own interest than their clients‘ have made 
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accountability more prominent as a factor underlying policy with the importance of autonomy 
down-graded. In some countries, these changes found expression in what became known as 
the ‗new managerialism‘. 
2.2.2.2 The new managerialism 
It has been argued that the rapid expansion of the higher education sector at a time of fiscal 
constraint has contributed to the introduction of quasi-markets and a culture of audit and 
assessment that are together known as new managerialism (Deem, 1998; Deem and Brehony, 
2005).  
The term new managerialism, which is also referred to as neo-liberalism in the 
UK and total quality management in the USA, is a system of government of 
individuals invented during the Thatcher and Reagan years. ―It is characterized 
by the removal of the locus of power from the knowledge of practicing 
professionals to auditors, policy-makers and statisticians, none of whom need 
know anything about the profession in question‖ (Davies, 2003, 91). 
A principal characteristic is the removal of power from education professionals to auditors 
and managers, reflecting the view that education professionals were seen to be more knaves 
than knights (Le Grand, 2003). New managerialism also refers to the adoption by public 
sector organisations of organisational forms, technologies, management practices and values 
more commonly found in the private sector and these discourses of management have been 
encouraged by governments seeking to reduce public spending (Deem, 1998; Dixon et al., 
1998; Trowler, 1998; Deem, 2001; Kirkpatrick, 2006; Deem, 2006; Deem et al., 2007; 
Trowler, 2009).  
Linked to these changes were demands by governments for more outcomes from 
higher education institutions and the imposition of performance indicators for assessment and 
audit. Academics were unhappy with these changes, claiming it limited their academic 
freedom, putting them under inappropriate pressure and diverting their energy from their core 
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missions of teaching and research to managerial activity; moreover, academics were also 
under pressure to do more work with fewer resources. Deem (1998) concludes that these 
pressures come from outside and inside HEIs. Externally, they are exerted through quangos, 
such as higher education funding bodies and the Quality Assurance Agency, and internally 
from academic managers and administrators seeking to re-organise, control and regulate the 
work and conditions of academic staff. Thus, ‗control and regulation of academic labour seem 
to have replaced collegiality, trust and professional discretion‘ (Roberts, 2004).  
In the UK, a number of commentators criticize assessment as representing an 
interference with academic freedom whereby the government, through the Funding Council, 
attempts to substitute its preferred, economically relevant activities for the preferences of the 
academic community. From their perspective, such exercises violate academic autonomy and 
create a compliance culture. Others, however, see assessment as a vehicle through which 
higher education could be made to contribute to national economic well-being (Brown, 2004). 
For them, these are legitimate demands in the tension between autonomy and accountability. 
Others recognize that finding an appropriate balance in these tensions is difficult. Le Grand 
(2007) argues that public services such as higher education have processes and outcomes that 
are difficult for users, governments or even managers properly to monitor their quality and 
cost and, as a result have to invest some degree of trust that providers will deliver quality and 
efficiency. However, too much reliance on trust means clients are treated too much like 
pawns, whereas he advocates that ―the principle of autonomy requires that users are treated 
less like pawns, the weakest pieces on the chess board, and more like the most powerful piece, 
the queen‖ (Le Grand, 2003). In some respects, the re-balancing of autonomy and 
accountability has been devised by a combination of imposing more external controls while 
creating conditions that reduce academic self-governance and give managers within 
institutions greater control.  
 18 
2.2.2.3 New managerialism and the changing balance of autonomy 
The aim of many reforms is to encourage institutions to be more responsive to the needs of 
society and the economy. Some involve giving more autonomy to HEIs in some areas of 
activity but with clearer and stronger accountability, tied to performance indicators. While 
these changes alter the scope of institutional autonomy, they allow for greater responsiveness 
to others, such as students and employers (Ibid).  
Johnstone and Marcucci (2007) argue that there has been a shift in laws and 
regulations in the last decade or more towards greater managerial autonomy and flexibility to 
public universities, especially in Europe (e.g. the Netherlands and the UK), many Canadian 
provinces and American states, and, more recently, Japan. These trends, essentially moving 
toward models associated with private enterprise, are designed to maximize the outputs of 
teaching and research for the benefit of the public and taxpayers and create incentives for 
maximizing private revenues. Some European countries increasingly treat their public service 
sector organizations as corporate enterprises with the goal to increase their efficiency and 
effectiveness by giving them more autonomy and at the same time asking for more 
accountability (Jongbloed et al., 2008a; Sanyal and Johnstone, 2011).  
HEIs are believed to be more effective in achieving their mission if they benefit from 
autonomy in human resource management. For instance, institutions should have broad 
discretion over the setting of academic salaries, freedom to create academic positions in line 
with their strategy, the ability to determine career structures which reflect the distinct roles 
academics undertake, and the design of promotion, assessment and professional development 
strategies. In this context of autonomy over management of human resources, national 
legislation should be on principles rather than specific processes. The transparency of these 
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processes should be given particular attention, such as open competition for positions, 
selection on merit and external assessors for senior positions (OECD, 2008). 
To give universities more autonomy in human resources management, governments 
are increasingly adopting systems of ‗lump sum‘ or ‗block grants‘ instead of ‗line-item 
funding‘. Line-item funding limits autonomy whereas lump-sum and block grants allow 
greater flexibility as they allow freedom to allocate financial resources in response to 
institutional priorities (Bullock and Thomas, 1997). It is a form of autonomy which increases 
the flexibility of internal allocation and the discretionary authority of managers. To gain 
institutional autonomy, as against internal autonomy, requires increased self-reliance in 
funding so that universities can pursue diverse missions without the same level of 
accountability (Kaiser et al., 2001).  
A different form of autonomy is advocated by Vossensteyn (2004) who argues for 
greater responsiveness to customers and environment. This requires changes in the ‗steering‘ 
paradigm from central steering to greater autonomy. These changes do not necessarily 
contribute to greater autonomy; a more market-based system, for example, re-orders 
relationships of accountability and autonomy rather than returning to a less accountable 
sector. It highlights, however, that central to a discussion of autonomy is the nature of 
accountability and the relationship of trust between universities, academics and their diverse 
clients. 
2.2.2.4 New managerialism and professional accountability 
It was argued earlier that because the processes and outcomes of higher education are difficult 
to measure, it is essential to invest some degree of trust that providers will deliver quality and 
efficiency. A key issue, therefore, is whether or not the forms of institutional autonomy 
associated with the new managerialism achieve this. 
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Codd (2005) argues that the professionalism of academics is threatened by changes to 
performance assessment and external audits and that these also erode trust more widely. In 
addition to these concerns, he views the growing share of private funding and new approaches 
to institutional management as threatening academic freedom. He argues that the restoration 
of a culture of trust in the education sector requires a form of accountability which enhances 
rather than diminishes professionalism. This type of accountability enables professionals to 
‗communicate their values, interpretations and judgments to others, making public the reasons 
and evidence which provide the grounds for holding them‘. He adds that trust not only breeds 
more trust but also that markets can only prosper in societies that have elements of trust and 
reciprocity (see also Thomas, 2005; Floud, 2005). Thus, it can be said that professional 
accountability might be the appropriate kind of accountability to protect academic autonomy.  
It may be that academic freedom needs to be re-conceptualised and framed within a 
recognition of the obligations to society owed by academics and higher education institutions. 
Academics should pursue their objectives while being accountable for institutional goals. 
However, as part of this, they need autonomy in the design of their courses and freedom to 
select their research activity, possibly within priorities defined by the institution or system. 
They should not, however, be constrained in their interpretation of research results or 
prevented from publishing (OECD, 2008). If these approaches are to be implemented in ways 
that protect legitimate concerns about academic freedom and autonomy, it may require a 
system of governance that is sufficiently flexible to provide discretionary space but also a 
greater voice for academics in governance; it may also require more transparency through a 
readiness of academics to be answerable for their activities. 
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2.3 Accountability 
2.3.1 Understanding Accountability 
2.3.1.1 Initial definitions 
Accountability is sometimes used synonymously with responsibility while, at other times, it 
appears to refer to reporting to those with oversight authority or, more globally, to the general 
public. It can be used in the context of compliance with established laws, rules, regulations or 
standards; or to distributing rewards and sanctions that are tied to results (Heim, no date). It 
can also be merged with processes of evaluation, assessment, testing or quality (Lee and 
Knight, 1996).  
A dictionary definition of ‗accountability‘ indicates that someone who is accountable 
is completely responsible for what they do and must be able to give satisfactory reasons for 
it/to explain their action to the public (Cambridge Advanced Learner‘s Dictionary, 2003). It 
means being responsible for decisions or actions and being required or expected to justify 
them (Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 2004). The UNESCO Thesaurus (2010) indicates 
that ‗educational accountability‘ means being held responsible and answerable for specific 
results or outcomes of an activity over which one has responsibility. What is common in these 
definitions is responsibility and answerability for results, outcomes, decisions or actions 
together with a duty to give justifications for them. 
2.3.1.2 Accountability and responsibility 
Accountability constitutes a fundamental concept in democratic theory because its application 
is the means by which public policy is held responsive to public preferences. This 
responsiveness is achieved by ensuring that public officials, whether appointed or elected, act 
in accordance with the preferences and expectations of citizens and of those persons or 
entities, as defined by laws or constitutional processes, to which they are accountable. While 
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the terms accountability and responsibility are often used interchangeably, it is useful to 
distinguish between them and then indicate how they are related.  
While responsibility suggests an empowerment of officials to undertake certain 
functions, it includes an acceptance of the assignment of that responsibility and discretion to 
act on that authority (Dunn, 2003). Within the democratic process, responsibility and 
accountability are interrelated, as the responsibility of officials is not unfettered and carries an 
onus to consider the consequences of their actions when they exercise their discretion. 
Another aspect of this inter-relationship is the degree by which responsibilities are defined. 
One aspect of this is hierarchy, the more senior an individual, the greater the level of 
discretion in exercising authority. However, it can be that responsibilities are ill-defined, 
leaving officials with limited guidance for their actions. It can also be the case that those to 
whom officials are accountable may not have sufficient information to judge actions (Ibid). 
‗Rendering an account‘ of what one is doing in relation to responsibilities is linked to the 
availability of information to make judgments about the fitness or soundness of actions 
(Midddlehurst and Woodhouse, 1995 cited in Lee and Knight, 1996, 78).  
Key characteristics of accountability have been defined by Fenstermacher (1979) as 
having four features. First, there is a need for clarity in the relationship, such that ‗A‘ being 
accountable to ‗B‘ means that A is held accountable to B and B is holding A accountable. 
Second, accountability holds between persons. That is, he argues, taxpayers do not seek 
accountability from the ‗government‘, or from some ‗department‘ or ‗agency‘ of government, 
rather it needs to be expressed in relation to officials and agents of the government on the 
basis that it is these who exercise authority and should, therefore, be accountable. Third, he 
argues that accountability must be linked to specific performance that relate to stated or 
implicit standards, as in the way taxpayers hold public officials accountable for proper and 
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judicious expenditure of tax revenues. Fourth, the parties to an accountability relationship are 
obliged to provide or receive information that enables informed judgments to be made (330-
1).  
He also identifies trust, responsibility and discretionary authority as additional features 
of accountability. Trust is an important characteristic of the relation between A and B. When 
we trust others and are prepared to assign them responsible tasks, we confer on them the 
authority necessary to accomplish these tasks. The extent of trust contributes to whether the 
accountability relationship is weak or strong. With high levels of trust, responsibility and 
discretionary authority are extensive, whereas, when trust is low, discretion and responsibility 
is likely to be low (Ibid, 331-2; Leveille, 2006). The extent to which strong or weak forms of 
accountability occur depends not only on trust but also on context.  
2.3.1.3 Accountability and the public sector 
It can be argued that, through the market, the private sector provides accountability 
automatically with, in principle, people free to enter or leave a market, so that if a good or 
service is not wanted, the provider loses trade and goes out of business. This contrasts with 
publicly provided goods and services because service users cannot ‗exit‘; accountability has 
to be designed into the system of governance.  
This means addressing the question, accountable to whom and for what? In general 
terms, government is accountable to citizens and is ultimately reflected in voting, legislation 
and judicial interpretation (Young, 2002).  In practice, this needs to be taken further and the 
basic question, ―Who is responsible for what to whom?‖ has three elements: the focus of 
accountability ―For what?‖ may be on process or outcomes; the controlling party or recipient 
of accountability ―To whom?‖ and the provider ―Who is responsible?‖ (Heim, no date). 
Appropriate means that take account of these questions requires an understanding of context. 
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Thus, the nature of education makes accountability difficult as, for example, student learning 
depends on student input, making it more difficult to hold teaching staff accountable for 
performance. In addition, because one lecturer only teaches a fraction of an individual 
student, they cannot be responsible for the breadth of that student‘s ultimate performance 
(Thomas, 2006). Peston (1980) also notes that the product of the educational system is 
complicated, and cannot be measured satisfactorily by performance tests or crude estimates of 
productivity (i.e. graduates per teacher), although it is a mistake to go to the other extreme and 
argue that such measures are completely irrelevant.                                                                                           
However, certain principles can be applied. As elsewhere, accountability in education 
can be defined as ‗the responsibility that goes with the authority to do something‘ and the 
responsibility is to use authority justifiably and credibly (Heim, 1995 cited in Heim, no date). 
It involves at least two parties and a mutually acknowledged relationship between them that 
involves a delegation from one party to another of authority to take some action. As in the 
more general analysis, that authority is delegated conditionally, at minimum upon 
demonstrably credible performance, and this evaluative nature is an essential characteristic, 
distinguishing accountability from reporting (Ibid). This framework remains incomplete, 
however, as accountability in education must take account of multiple stakeholders and 
multiple goals. 
2.3.1.4 Multiple stakeholders and multiple goals 
Stakeholders include the providers of educational services (HEIs), funders (governments) and 
clients (students) and accountabilities and obligations exist between these groups. It is a 
limited list. Prospective employers have a legitimate interest in the quality of higher education 
and Le Grand (2007) argues that a good public service should not only be responsive to the 
needs of its users, who in most cases are not paying directly for the service, but also to the 
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needs of those who are paying for it, the taxpayers. While they are likely to want services 
provided at a high standard, efficiently run, and responsive to the needs and wants of the 
users, their preferences may differ from direct users, which will not always be easy to 
integrate. Thus, providing a public service is likely to encounter some tensions between 
meeting the requirements of user responsiveness and taxpayer accountability.                                                                                           
Stakeholders may differ about the purposes of higher education. Academics may see 
its purpose is to develop critical skills in students and an ability to think reflectively as this 
enriches them as individuals in society. Employers may require more specific skills relevant 
to jobs and policy-makers may seek graduates who can maximize national economic 
performance. These different purposes lead to different goals and targets and hence to 
different views about what counts. Moreover, even if stakeholders agree on the purposes, 
goals and targets of higher education, they may have different views about the best ways of 
achieving these and, indeed, the best means of holding people accountable.  
Despite or perhaps because of these differences in preferences, it can be argued that all 
stakeholders share some responsibility for education and, arguably, its improvement. Heim 
(no date) agrees with Lin (2003) about the importance of shared responsibility among all 
stakeholders. He argues that accountability in public education must be developed through a 
process of negotiation among its participants and stakeholders. Accountability between 
students and teachers, teachers and parents, and students and parents, require some degree of 
mutually acknowledged relationships and responsibilities. 
2.3.2 Accountability and Higher Education Policies 
The expansion of higher education, sharp rises in per student costs, fiscal constraints and 
growing competition from other areas of the public sector (Johnstone, 2004a) mean that since 
the mid-1980s there has been increasing concern with accountability as value-for-money.  
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Peston (1980) argues that if resources are limited and are managed by people to whom 
they do not belong, they must be accountable to the owners or their representatives, and 
accountability is needed to avoid waste and fraud and to ensure that resources are used for the 
ends of education. The financial pressures arising from a mass-based system has led to 
concerns about satisfactory levels of quality so that quality assurance and quality 
enhancement have become a major focus (Holm-Nielsen, 2001).  
The development of formal quality assurance systems is one of the most significant 
trends in higher education in recent decades. From the early 1980s quality became a key topic, 
with expansion, expenditure, fiscal constraints and increased market pressures all fostering the 
focus (OECD, 2008). The demand for greater accountability has become stronger as growing 
dissatisfaction with inefficient utilization of public resources was identified as a problem in 
many countries and thus the public has a right to know what it is getting for its expenditure of 
tax resources. They have a right to know that their resources are being wisely invested and 
committed (National Governors Association, 1991, cited in Goastellec, 2005; Thompson et 
al., 1998; HEFCE, 1998). As a result accountability has become a prominent and crucial issue 
in funding reforms in higher education and its quality assurance systems (Cheung, 2003). 
There were also changes in policy-makers‘ beliefs about the motivation of those 
working in the public sector: ‗altruism‘ or ‗self-interest‘. There has been a gradual erosion of 
confidence in the reliability of the public service ethic as a motivational drive and a growing 
conviction that self-interest is the principal force motivating individuals, whether in the public 
or private sector. The Thatcher neo-liberal government from 1979 epitomized these changes 
in belief, the public sector, and public sector professionals in particular, being viewed with 
great suspicion. Professionals and other workers in the public sector were viewed as pursuing 
their own concerns rather than the public interest: more knaves than knights (Le Grand, 
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2003). These changes contributed to a shift away from supervisory regimes that were minimal 
and ‗light touch‘. This monetary emphasis on accountability may explain why there have been 
relatively few linkages between quality, policy and the encouragement of innovative 
approaches to teaching and learning (Lee and Knight, 1996). 
Whilst initial concerns about universities were dominated by issues of cost, a focus on 
outputs gradually became more prominent and, consequently, a search for institutional 
performance indicators. Despite this, little attempt was made to develop indicators of student 
learning, and those that might appear to relate to learning are tenuous. In essence, in Britain, 
as in many other countries, the primary concern has been with accountability rather than 
improvement. Certainly, quality policy has not addressed transformative learning but has been 
preoccupied with other notions such as value for money and fitness for purpose (Ibid). 
The indicators that have been developed have attempted to introduce ―objective‖ 
measures of research and teaching competence (Davies and Thomas, 2002). Internal auditors, 
external auditors, the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE), demands for value for money 
and Teaching Quality Assessments are just a few examples of accountability exercises 
through which universities in the UK are expected to demonstrate returns on public 
investment. Of these, the RAE is most significant because it is a vehicle for allocating large 
sums of money to universities and affects the reputation of departments through the ratings 
allocated by the process. While some measures to audit teaching standards have been 
implemented, they are much more limited than those for research (Ibid; Bush, 2007; Neyland, 
2007).  
It has been argued that the RAE and greater control of research councils have 
contributed to a short-term, value-for-money, pragmatic approach to research funding dressed 
up as rewards for excellence, while there being little to suggest that it has obviously improved 
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research output. Impressions and anecdotal evidence suggest that rather than a transformative 
research culture, these policies have encouraged a compliance culture that has produced an 
over-reporting of underdeveloped research (Lee and Knight, 1996).  
Davies and Thomas (2002) add that there has also been a shift towards a competitive 
hostile culture of ―churning out the publications‖, accompanied by the feeling of being 
managed and measured. In their study, interviewees commented on having less freedom, both 
in terms of day-to-day activities and in the type and nature of their research. Many referred to 
increased monitoring of academic performance. The teaching quality audit, appraisal, RAE, 
student feedback questionnaires and internal academic audit were all seen as contributing to 
increased paperwork and monitoring which were narrowing academic roles around a focus on 
generating research/income. 
The introduction of tuition fees can also be viewed as an increase in accountability, 
whilst relatedly and simultaneously reducing the charge on tax payers. According to some 
writers, we have moved to a context where public universities receive less direct funds from 
government but find themselves under increasing scrutiny over their practices (Stohl, 2007). 
However, what this view overlooks is that financing higher education remains substantially 
dependent on public revenues in most countries, so that it is not surprising that governments 
retain a strong influence on the sector.  
Administrative accountability is an alternative to the market, as markets are seen to 
provide accountability automatically, in the sense that unwanted services would not be bought 
(Bullock and Thomas, 1997). Thus, it is argued that greater emphasis on students bearing the 
cost will make the students more demanding of quality in teaching. Even so,  market forces 
does not mean government has no role as it continues to engage with issues, such as funding, 
access, quality assurance and setting incentives. The government might also wish to 
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encourage subjects less able to flourish in a more market-oriented system, such as music, 
drama, or some languages (Barr, 2004a).  
That is, intervention still occurs when markets produce inconvenient results although, 
arguably, if quasi-markets are functioning effectively and central intervention designed 
carefully, unanticipated consequences should be avoided (Temple, 2006).   
2.4 Efficiency 
2.4.1 Understanding Efficiency 
2.4.1.1 Initial definitions 
Efficiency is ―the quality of doing something well with no waste of time or money‖ and at a 
technical or physical level, it is the relationship between the amount of energy that goes into a 
machine or an engine and the amount it produces (Oxford Advanced Learner‘s Dictionary 
Compass, 2005). The relationship between inputs and outputs is also evident in the UNESCO 
Thesaurus (2010) definition of ‗educational efficiency‘ as ―degrees to which educational 
systems are successful in optimizing the educational input/output relationship‖: the 
relationship between ‗what is put in‘ a system and ‗what is got out‘. The perspective offered 
by Vossensteyn (2004) views efficiency as ways institutions become responsive to the 
demands of their customers without increasing their budget and that, primarily it requires 
doing more within the existing budget. Responsiveness is also evident in Le Grand‘s 
discussion (2007) that an efficient service is one that delivers the highest possible quality and 
quantity of that service from a given level of resources. An OECD report (2003) relates 
efficiency to the least-cost means of achieving a specified objective or the maximisation of 
objectives given a specified level of costs.   
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2.4.1.2 From effectiveness to efficiency 
In distinguishing the concepts of effectiveness and efficiency in education, Thomas (1990, 26) 
states that: 
Effectiveness is inescapably linked to the outcomes of educational activity. 
Only through an evaluation of the extent to which an activity approximates the 
achievement of its goals is it possible to judge how effective that activity has 
been. 
According to this definition, an educational activity can be said to be effective if it achieves 
its pre-defined goals. He argues that efficiency involves two processes: first, establishing the 
technical specification of the desired output and, second, aiming to produce that output in the 
cheapest way. 
Common to definitions of effectiveness and efficiency are outputs. However, while 
outcomes are central to both concepts, resources are of explicit concern only within the 
framework of efficiency. In this sense, effectiveness is a narrower concept and, therefore, it is 
possible for an activity to be effective without being efficient but it is not possible to be 
efficient without also being effective (Ibid).                                
Efficiency, therefore, is concerned with ‗what is got out‘ as well as ‗what is put in‘: 
purposes, resources and achievement. This perspective is also reflected by Goastellec (2005) 
who relates costs to the results obtained: how much is invested for which results, which he 
defines especially in terms of length of studies, graduation rates and access to the market 
place.  
Finally, it is argued that the case for efficiency has a strong moral force, especially in 
the case of scarce and declining resources, and all the more in societies where such scarcities 
are acute (Bullock and Thomas, 1997; Belfield, 2000). The concept can also be applied to the 
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way education functions internally as a system and how education contributes to society, a 
distinction between internal and external efficiency.  
2.4.1.3 Concepts within economic efficiency 
Internal efficiency is about the internal production processes of an organization. It includes 
decisions whether money should be spent on more lecturers as against more blackboards or 
the other materials needed in a university. It can also be about choosing between more 
experienced (and more expensive) staff or less experienced (and cheaper) staff. It is also about 
using those resources as effectively as possible, so that, for example, lecturers are enabled to 
do those things they are best qualified to do and other staff are appropriately deployed in their 
support (Wobmann and Schutz, 2006). Barr (2004a) gives the example of management 
processes within an organization, as the quality of management can shape the efficiency of its 
internal processes. In summary, an education system is judged to be internally efficient if it 
produces the desired output at minimum cost or if it produces maximum output for a given 
input of resources (Mingat and Tan, 1988). While internal efficiency alone is not sufficient if 
students acquire knowledge of little use to them or wider society, without internally efficient 
processes, external efficiency would not be maximised (Ibid).  
External efficiency is the relationship between the outputs of the education system and 
the requirements of society for those outputs. A key economic function of education is the 
preparation of young people for productive roles in society. In this respect, the degree to 
which an education system is externally efficient depends on the level of ‗fit‘ between the 
production of schools and HEIs and the demand for graduates in the labour market. For 
example, too few plumbers and too many lawyers would indicate external inefficiency in the 
relationship between graduate output and the needs of the economy. Those with confidence in 
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markets for resolving these problems would predict an increase in the income of plumbers, 
leading to more people training or re-training in those trades (Ibid).   
Education systems can be internally efficient and externally inefficient where internal 
processes work well but it produces labour output that is not needed. Equally, education 
systems may be internally inefficient but those who are produced are in demand by the 
economy. Techniques for measuring efficiency are considered next. 
2.4.1.4 Measuring efficiency 
Terms related to internal and external efficiency include productivity, cost-effectiveness 
analysis and cost-benefit analysis. There are also terms such as efficiency of study or 
students‘ study progress that have some links with efficiency. Productivity, as in the ‗the 
productiveness of a factor of production, is measured by expressing output as a ratio to the 
input required to produce it and is a means for estimating average productivity. It is also 
possible to express the change in output as a ratio to the change in amount of input required to 
bring it about; this is the internal rate of return‘ (Bannock et al., 1972, 330).  
As for cost-effectiveness analysis, Levin (1995a) states that: 
Cost-effectiveness analysis refers to the consideration of decision alternatives 
in which both their costs and consequences are taken into account in a 
systematic way … The purpose of cost-effectiveness analysis in education is to 
ascertain which program or combination of programs can achieve particular 
objectives at the lowest cost (381-2).  
Cost-effectiveness analysis can only evaluate alternatives with the same goals and measures 
of effectiveness, such as improvement in student achievement. It has some relationship with 
cost-benefit analysis in that both represent economic evaluations of alternative resource use 
and measure costs in the same way. However, cost-benefit analysis is used to address 
alternatives where the outcomes can be assessed in monetary terms (Levin, 1995a; 1995b).  
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As for efficiency of study or students‘ study progress, Bevc and Ursi (2008) argue that 
efficiency of study refers to students‘ progress within the higher education system and rates of 
success in completing degrees. As a rule, this is observed at the individual level and is 
included in measures of internal efficiency. Where full-time study without stop-outs (also 
known as rates of drop-out or non-completion) is the national priority, efficient students are 
those who progress without interruption and finish their degrees within the minimum 
timeframe. Inefficient study includes repetition and dropping out (with or without stopping 
out) produces a lower output from that which is theoretically possible. This criterion of 
internal efficiency is one of many examples of performance indicators by which institutional 
and system efficiency can be monitored and assessed. 
2.4.1.5 Performance indicators 
Bevc and Ursi (2008) argue that indicators of internal efficiency include graduation rates, 
drop-out rates and duration of study, and can be based on cross-sectional or true cohort-data. 
The true cohort method using a longitudinal approach, where the progress of a group of 
students is tracked, is better than the cross-sectional approach but the required data for such 
an approach are unavailable in most countries. 
External efficiency can be measured using simpler and/or more complex approaches. 
Simpler approaches consider different indicators of economic benefits such as the relative 
employment rate, unemployment rate and earnings of university graduates compared with 
upper secondary education. Input indicators, such as the percentage of public expenditure on 
HE, can be considered as indicators of efficiency only when they are observed in relation to 
outputs (Ibid). More complex approaches to measuring external efficiency include: estimation 
of the contribution of HE to economic growth, using analysis of the aggregate production 
function; the relationship between HE and achieved economic development and calculation of 
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rates of return to investment in HE (Hicks, 1980; Psacharopoulos, 1984 and Rotkovic, 1983 
cited in Bevc and Ursi, 2008). 
2.4.2 Efficiency and Higher Education Policies 
As a result of the expansion of the higher education sector, fiscal constraints and competition 
from other tax supported sectors of the economy, there are substantial changes occurring in 
funding and QA regimes so that its impact on public revenues is reduced and the returns on 
expenditures are maximized. In this section, the broad nature of these changes is identified, 
leaving a more detailed discussion to chapters three and four.  
One approach designed to improve the operating efficiency of higher education is the 
devolution of spending authority from the central government/ministry to regional units of 
government and to HEIs. These policies arise from the view that those closer to an activity are 
better placed to make decisions about the most appropriate ways of allocating resources 
underlies many cases of decentralization. Block grants and other forms of incentive-sensitive 
budgeting are examples of means by which governments hope to improve the operating 
efficiency of higher education (Johnstone et al., 1998).                                
Efficiency, internal and external, can also be improved by improving the quality of 
teaching, learning experience and research. Relevant here are practices that improve the 
linkages between the learner and the labour market. Research and development more closely 
aligned to business and community development can also assist in improving the match 
between the outputs of higher education and the needs of an economy (OECD, 2008). Other 
measures designed to improve the quality of teaching and research are inspection systems, 
some of which examine the quality of teaching and others the quality of research outputs. In 
the United States, performance accountability has replaced traditional accountability to 
enhance the efficiency of the system. Where traditional accountability has focused on 
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measures of inputs, such as enrolments, or processes such as proper use of funds, teacher-
student ratios or levels of facility utilization, performance accountability shifts attention 
toward outputs, such as number of graduates or outcomes, such as number of students placed 
in jobs or how well students perform on licensing exams (Dougherty, 2004; Layzell, 1999). 
Finally, considerable attention has been given to increasing the contribution of the 
beneficiaries of higher education given the private benefits to recipients, and building on the 
fact that the beneficiaries of government spending on post-compulsory education tend to 
come from relatively well-off families who, therefore, benefit most from tax funding (Blondal 
et al., 2002; Greenway and Haynes, 2003; Goodman and Kaplan, 2003; Barr, 2004b; 
Psacharopolous and Patrinos, 2004; Chapman and Ryan, 2005; Wobman and Schutz, 2006; 
Johnstone and Marcucci, 2007; James, 2007). Examples of methods for making students pay 
for their higher education are considered in the next chapter. 
2.5 Equity 
2.5.1 Understanding Equity 
2.5.1.1 Initial definitions 
Equity is defined as ―the quality of being fair and impartial‖ (Concise Oxford English 
Dictionary, 2004) and ―a situation in which everyone is treated equally‖ (Oxford Advanced 
Learner‘s Dictionary Compass, 2005). These definitions are also apparent in the UNESCO 
Thesaurus (2010) which defines ‗educational opportunities‘ as ―the availability of educational 
provision‖ and ‗universal education‘ as ―a system of education extending opportunities to all‖. 
These definitions use equity synonymously with justice and fairness. For instance, the idea of 
an ‗equitable‘ distribution of income seems to have broadly the same meaning as a ‗fair‘ or 
‗just‘ distribution of income. However, they are not always used synonymously in the 
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academic literature. The term justice, for example, may have a different and broader meaning 
in political philosophy (Le Grand, 1991a).  
Internationally, equity is usually considered to be one of three fundamental measures 
of the effectiveness of a higher education system, alongside quality and efficiency (James, 
2007). Concerning opportunities for access to HEIs, it means asking questions about the 
distribution of education and its benefits between social groups (Bullock and Thomas, 1997) 
so that higher education should be accessible to all and based on merit, without discrimination 
on grounds of sex, race, language, religion… and physical handicap (World Conference on 
Higher Education, 1998; James, 2007; Wobman and Schutz, 2006; Le Grand, 2007). 
When analysis moves closer to policy, it becomes apparent that implementing polices 
based on equity raises issues that go well beyond requirements for resources. An important 
issue in this area is the difference between equity and equality.  
2.5.1.2 Equity and equality 
Mingat and Tan (1988) argue that equity in education concerns the provision of education to 
different population groups and its effect on the future distribution of income among those 
groups. It can be assessed by comparing the characteristics of students with those of the 
population in the relevant age group. They also note a linkage between their view of equity 
and equality, arguing that investments that help to equalise educational opportunities may 
help to equalise the distribution of income.  
Barr (2004a) also defines equity as a form of equality of opportunity. Thus, access to 
higher education should be based on a person‘s ability and talents, and not on family income, 
socio-economic status, gender or ethnicity. He adds that improved access contributes not only 
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to equity but also to efficiency, in that it minimizes the waste of talent. This indicates that 
equity and efficiency are related in that change in one may affect the other. 
While some use the words equity and equality as synonyms, Le Grand (1991a) differentiates 
between them, arguing:  
equality has a descriptive component, whereas equity is a purely normative 
concept. Partly as a consequence, equality does not necessarily imply equity, 
or equity equality. Equality of various kinds may be advocated for reasons 
other than equity; equitable outcomes may be quite inegalitarian (11). 
Walford (1994) also differentiates equity and equality, arguing: 
equity is not the same as equality. There may well be links between the two 
concepts, and measures of inequality are central indicators that can be used in 
making judgments about equity, but equity demands that judgments are made 
within a moral framework. It builds on the raw data of inequality (13). 
Bevc and Ursi (2008) note that ‗equity‘ and ‗equality‘ are often used synonymously but that it 
is possible for them to be distinguished. In most cases the latter concept is considered broader 
and linkage between them is emphasised. The term equity is undoubtedly complex, including 
different types such as equity in access; treatment; outcomes, and participation. David (2004) 
recognizes this complexity, noting that equity and/or equality in higher education are terms 
with increasing currency internationally but are conceptualized variously and range over 
different and often competing paradigms about social factors, diversity, race and ethnicity and 
gender. 
2.5.1.3 Equity, equality and choice 
Le Grand (1991a) adds another dimension to equity by relating it to choice. He argues that the 
social distribution of opportunities which are generally considered inequitable are those 
resulting from factors beyond individual control. By contrast, distributions that are the 
outcome of individual choices are not generally regarded as inequitable. In other words, if one 
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individual receives less than another as a result of her own choice, then the disparity is not 
considered inequitable but if it arises for reasons beyond her control, then it is inequitable. 
Thus, inequity is when a bright student from a poor family cannot continue her studies 
because of the cost of college fees. The college fees, here, is a factor beyond individual 
control and, thus, can be a possible source of inequity. Removing such barriers does not 
ensure equality of choice sets and therefore equity. Even if college fees are waived, bright 
students from poor families may have to stop their studies because they need to earn money to 
support their families. In this case, equality of choice sets may require positive discrimination, 
with poorer students receiving larger grants than those from well-off backgrounds (Ibid). 
As it is common to use the terms, equity and equality, interchangeably, that is the 
approach adopted in this study.  
2.5.2 Equity and Higher Education Policies 
While a concern for equity may stem from envy, Le Grand (1991a) is not alone in believing 
that it can also arise from a genuine empathy with the plight of others: an altruistic concern 
that others, as well as oneself, receive what they ought to receive. He adds that, even if the 
motivation for some people being concerned about equity is envy, this does not invalidate 
concerns about equity and the case for suitable policy prescriptions to address legitimate 
concerns.                                 
2.5.2.1 Existing inequalities 
Holm-Neilsen (2001) argues that although rapid enrolment growth has increased access to 
higher education for traditionally less privileged groups, it remains elitist with the majority of 
students coming from wealthier segments of society and benefitting from public funding. 
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Inequity arising from the public financing of higher education raises the question of 
‗who should pay for higher education?‘ Studies of rates of return imply that higher education 
is an investment with economic and social returns both for individuals, creating future 
benefits in terms of higher productivity, higher wages… and lower risk of unemployment. 
These future benefits for students justify that it is efficient and equitable that they carry some 
of its costs. While this is equitable in terms of outcomes, it does not take account of 
differences in the means available to different students to obtain higher education in the first 
place. This provides an important argument for some form of subsidy, an issue considered in 
the next chapter. 
2.5.2.2 Options for policy 
Inequity in access to higher education may arise from young people from certain backgrounds 
not attaining the qualifications needed for entry into higher education (OECD, 2008).  It 
suggests that intervention at earlier educational levels, when children‘s cognitive and non-
cognitive abilities are being developed, may be more effective in equalizing chances in post-
compulsory education. Options include limiting early tracking and academic selection, 
offering second chances to gain from education or providing systematic help to those who fall 
behind at school. Grants at upper secondary level for students from disadvantaged 
backgrounds to prevent dropout, targeting resources at the students with the greatest needs 
and strengthening school career guidance to shape their aspirations and expectations are other 
policy options (Ibid; Blondal et al. 2002).                            
Certainly, when governments shifts costs to students, it requires a system of financial 
assistance to maintain access and improve equity by reducing liquidity constraints faced by 
students. While the disproportionate numbers of children from wealthier backgrounds make 
some element of cost-sharing more equitable than free higher education, policy options 
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relating to tuition fees coupled with income-contingent loans may create some 
complementarily between efficiency and equity (Johnstone et al., 1998; Wobman and Schutz, 
2006; Johnstone and Marcucci, 2007).   
These examples show how efficiency and equity are not only crucial issues in higher 
education funding but are closely inter-related, including the different forms of financial and 
regulatory regimes that are available. For example, while some argue that quasi-markets may 
help solve problems of inefficiency and inequity through competition between universities for 
students and, moreover, encourage more economic use of resources and competing suppliers, 
it requires grant schemes to allow poorer students to access higher education and give them 
more economic power, leading to suppliers being more responsive to their wishes (Le Grand, 
1991b). 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter began by noting the prominence of autonomy, accountability, efficiency and 
equity in the literature on higher education and, therefore, their potential as evaluative 
concepts. Thus, the first research question concerning an appropriate theoretical framework 
for examining the impact of funding and quality assurance systems on higher education has 
been addressed.  
The discussion has highlighted that far from being distinct, these concepts are often 
inter-related. Thus, policies that give HEIs managerial autonomy also hold them accountable 
to government, society and their direct consumers. Policies seeking more efficient use of 
resources may be counter to those promoting greater equity in terms of access. Finally, we 
note the overriding position of accountability in relation to the concepts: those working in 
higher education are accountable for the way they use resources (efficiency); for who benefits 
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from provision (equity); and for how effectively HEIs use their discretionary authority 
(autonomy). These concepts and their inter-relationships will be evident in later stages of the 
study, how policies manifest themselves in practice and, particularly, how their interpretations 
differ.  
The discussion also recognizes the contested nature of these concepts in terms of their 
application as policies. The study will examine these contested perspectives further through 
the experience of those working in the sector. How these concepts manifest themselves in 
practice and how their interpretations differ will also be part of the study.   
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3 CHAPTER THREE 
GLOBAL TRENDS IN FUNDING HIGHER EDUCATION: THE 
CONTEXT OF EGYPT AND THE UK  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins by examining the reasons higher education is important in the policy 
agendas of many countries. It then considers the challenges for financing higher education 
and, in particular, the mix of public and private funding. This leads to sections on cost-
sharing, the different funding mechanisms available and options for providing financial 
support to students. The penultimate section is a brief account of funding systems in Egypt 
and the UK and then the chapter ends with a brief conclusion.  
3.2 The Importance of Higher Education 
The recognition that higher education is a major driver of economic competitiveness in the 
global economy has made its quality ever more important, contributing to social and 
economic development in four main ways. Firstly, it makes an economic contribution through 
the formation of human capital, primarily by training a qualified and adaptable labour force. 
Secondly, by building the knowledge base through research and development. A third way is 
through the dissemination and use of knowledge through interactions, such as consultancy, 
with the wider economy. Fourth, it contributes to the maintenance of knowledge via inter-
generational storage and transfer (OECD, 2008; Jongbloed, 2008; Johnstone, 2006a; 
Greenway and Haynes, 2003; Lee, 2003; Gardener, 2002; UNESCO, 1998a).  
While education raises people‘s productivity and creativity, and promotes 
entrepreneurship and technological advances, it also plays a crucial role in securing economic 
and social progress and can improve income distribution. By increasing the productivity and 
flexibility of the labour force, it helps ensure a country is competitive in world markets 
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characterized by changing technologies and production methods (Ozturk, 2001). The higher 
the level of education of the work force, the greater the overall productivity of capital because 
the more educated are more likely to innovate with spillover benefits for the productivity of 
others (Lucas, 1998 cited in Ozturk, 2001).  
Returns to investment in education show an average rate of return to additional years 
of schooling as 10%. These returns are useful indicators of the productivity of education and 
measures of private returns show the incentives for individuals to invest in their own 
education. In this sense, investment in education can be understood as similar to investment in 
physical capital and, in advanced industrial countries, returns to human and physical capital 
tend to be equal at the margin (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). The initial earnings 
advantage increases with time spent in the labour market, with the earnings of tertiary-
educated men and women increasing more sharply with age than those of less-educated 
workers (Blondal et al., 2002).   
Higher education is also associated with non-economic benefits (UNESCO, 2009; 
Blondal et al., 2002; Woodhall, 1967), enriching people‘s understanding of themselves and 
the world through promoting critical thinking and active citizenship and, thereby, improving 
the quality of their lives and leading to broader social and individual benefits. Higher 
education institutions also play a critical role in supporting knowledge-based growth 
strategies and constructing democratic, socially cohesive societies. Their activities provide 
support for innovation and, as repositories and conduits of information (e.g. libraries), their 
computer network hosts and internet service providers often constitute the backbone of a 
country‘s information infrastructure. In addition, the norms, values, attitudes, and ethics that 
HEIs impart to students provide some of the social capital necessary for constructing healthy 
civil societies (Lee, 2004; Gardner, 2002).  
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These public and private economic and social benefits come, however, at some cost and 
a critical issue is how these should be distributed between public (taxation) revenues and 
private and corporate sources.  
3.3 How Higher Education should be funded  
How higher education should be financed requires an assessment of its comparative private 
and social benefits and costs, thereby informing decisions on the distribution of costs between 
government and non-governmental sources. These questions are at the centre of efforts to 
improve the quality and effectiveness of funding mechanisms in higher education; they are 
much more than technical issues and affect societal values on the nature, purpose and 
importance of higher education. 
In the case of Egypt, for example, the current constitutional position is that higher 
education should be provided at no direct cost to students (Universities Regulatory Act - 
49/1972, 2009), so that any cost recovery is seen by the public as unconstitutional and a 
violation of their rights. Yet, the number of students entering higher education grew by 17 per 
cent per year between 1992/93 and 1997/98 with a total of over 1.5 million students. The 
consequence was a sharp decline in per student spending by about 40 per cent in real terms, 
enrolment increasing at a much faster rate than financial resources. Moreover, the cohort is 
projected to increase and be close to 6 per cent (60,000 students) per year through 2009, with 
the participation rate assumed to rise from 28% to 35% over 2006-2021 (OECD and World 
Bank, 2010). At best, this means significant efficiencies are needed just to maintain quality at 
its current inadequate level. Already, however, employers and students are displeased with the 
quality of education and attest to its limited relevance to their requirements, an issue being 
addressed by World Bank (World Bank, 2002a).      
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Through the Higher Education Enhancement Project (HEEP), the World Bank is 
supporting efforts to improve the market orientation of the sector by improving its quality, 
relevance and efficiency. The project aims to help restructure and change the system so that it 
produces the graduates needed to underpin a private-sector-led, export-driven economy, 
competitive in global markets (World Bank, 2002a). Given the already high budget effort to 
education, in its last supervision visit January 13-24, 2008, the World Bank education team 
strongly recommended that a proposal to diversify sources for funding should be developed 
(World Bank, 2008a). 
Thus, the problems facing higher education in Egypt are related to the rapid expansion 
of enrolments without adequate increases in financial resources (Sanyal, 1998). This 
expansion is part of an international trend. Globally, in 2004, 132 million students enrolled in 
higher education, up from 68 million in 1991. Average annual growth in enrolment over the 
period 1991-2004 stood at 5.1% worldwide (OECD, 2008). In the UK, in 1980 13% of young 
people were in full time higher education whereas by 1999 it was 34% and a target of 50% 
participation by 2010 was set, although not achieved. At the same time as student numbers in 
the UK have doubled, however, public funding per student has been halved (Greenway and 
Haynes, 2003). As elsewhere, it contributes to pressures to diversify sources of funding.   
A similar trend is evident in other EU countries. The current level of state funding, the 
main source of resources in most EU countries, is inadequate, partly because an increasing 
share of available resources are being directed towards the needs of the elderly (health and 
pensions) or to support basic education. As a result, there is a decline in (real terms) spending 
per student (Barr and Kemnitz, 2004). Thus, many and different countries face the problem of 
making trade-offs between the desire, on the one side, to expand the higher education system 
and, on the other, face the problem of declining spending per student funding. Therefore, 
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while expanding higher education requires more resources if quality is to be preserved (Ibid) 
and ―Increasingly, quality matters and quality cannot be dissociated of (sic) the level and uses 
of funding‖ (Goastellec, 2005, p.3), public sources seem inadequate to the task. It places at 
the forefront a debate about the mix of public and private sources of funding. 
3.3.1 The Public versus Private Debate and the Mix 
In many countries, the traditional answer to the question of who should pay for higher 
education? has been the government. These countries view higher education as a public 
service (Vossensteyn, 2004) and it is reinforced by international declarations, the World 
Declaration on Higher Education for the Twenty-first Century recommending that ‗higher 
education must be considered as a public service… accessible to all and shall be based on 
merit, without any discrimination…. If the diversification of private and public financing 
sources is necessary, public support for higher education and research remains essential so 
that the educational and social missions are assured in a balanced manner‘ (UNESCO, 
1998b). 
It is also a right recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNESCO, 
2003). While UNESCO considers higher education as a human right which should be 
accessible to all, it is treated by World Bank and multinational corporations, however, as an 
attractive booty3. From their perspective, the public institutions of education and research can 
be transformed through privatization into a juicy business that gives little consideration to its 
social nature and role. The World Bank explicitly states: ―higher education is a private and 
not a public commodity‖ (Delgado and Fernandez, 2005). 
                                                 
3 The comment about higher education as an attractive booty could refer to the social and economic benefits of 
higher education. It could also refer to the private benefits for individuals who obtain higher education, which 
therefore justifies cost-sharing mechanisms.  
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Thomas (1994, 46), however, argues that:  
If education fails the tests of what constitutes a pure public good, however, it 
may be regarded as a quasi-public good. This would be the case if there are 
substantial externalities associated with its production and consumption. 
Externalities are benefits which are associated with a good or service but are 
not directly obtained by the individual consumer. Thus, if we all benefit from 
the qualities associated with living in a more educated society; there is a case 
for subsidising the cost of education to individuals so that demand increases. 
In line with Thomas‘ argument of higher education as a quasi-public good, Bergan (2005) 
argues that higher education is probably situated somewhere between public and private 
goods, or has elements of both. Gradually, therefore, higher education has increasingly come 
to be regarded as a shared responsibility between students and society (Vossensteyn, 2004), 
viewed as an investment with economic returns for individuals but also for wider society and, 
therefore, costs should be shared between the individuals who benefit and wider society (Barr, 
1993; Cheung, 2003; Barr, 2004a; Woodhall, 2007). Demonstrating that higher education is a 
worthwhile investment for both individuals and society, many studies have contributed to the 
view that its costs should be shared between taxpayers, graduates, students and their families, 
employers and other stakeholders (Eicher and Chevaillier, 2002; Salerno, 2005; Rees Review, 
2005 cited in Woodhall, 2007). 
The debate on the appropriate levels of public and private spending is informed partly 
by an assessment of the social and private returns to investment in higher education. The 
theoretical rationale for these studies is Human Capital Theory founded by Schultz (1960) and 
Becker (1962; 1993). Its central idea is that each person‘s education is an investment in her 
human capital which allows her to contribute to her society in a productive way and, as with 
any investment, there are initial costs, in terms of direct expenditure and the opportunity cost 
of student time. These costs are carried in the belief that they will provide future monetary 
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and non-monetary benefits to individuals and society at large (Wobmann and Schutz, 2006; 
Johnstone and Marcucci, 2007). 
Monetary benefits for individuals include higher wages, lower risk of unemployment 
and improved working conditions and non-monetary benefits include a sense of well-being of 
individuals, job satisfaction … and better health behaviour (Wobmann and Schutz, 2006). A 
recent OECD study showed that the wage premium of graduates compared with individuals 
having only secondary schooling result in private rates of return to higher education ranging 
from 7 per cent in Japan, 12 per cent in the Netherlands, 15 per cent in the United States and 
about 18 per cent in the United Kingdom (Goastellec, 2005; Blondal et al., 2002, cited in 
Vossensteyn, 2004). In Egypt, there is also a positive relationship between income and 
educational level but compared to other developing countries, Egypt has a lower return to 
higher education, including the distribution of unemployment by education with 
unemployment among university graduates increasing (Fahim and Sami, 2009).      
Higher education also contributes monetary benefits to society. These include the 
impact of graduates on productivity, knowledge creation and transmission, facilitating 
research and development and the diffusion of technologies. As higher education raises the 
earnings of individuals, it also tends to increase the taxes they pay, contributing to the range 
of government expenditure (Barr, 2004a; Wobmann and Schutz, 2006; Woodhall, 2007; 
Santiago, et al., 2008).    
These benefits are part of the externalities that higher education contributes to 
economic growth, social cohesion and citizenship values, benefits such as mutual trust, social 
cohesion, social norms, civic mindedness and other connections between individuals 
contributing to social well-being (Wobmann and Schutz, 2006). It is these social as well as 
private benefits that underpin debates on how costs should be distributed.   
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Before exploring this issue further, it is important to recognize that there is a 
distribution problem within education, particularly how expenditures should be distributed 
between primary, secondary and higher education. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) show 
that in most countries, the social rate of return to primary education is considerably higher to 
higher education and, moreover, the private returns to HE were much higher than its social 
returns. They suggest that this may due to the public subsidization of higher education but it 
may also be that social rate of return estimates do not include all social benefits. Nevertheless, 
they point out that the degree of public subsidy increases with the level of education and that 
this has regressive implications for income distribution. Consequently, their recommendations 
include proposals for cost-recovery in HE and a re-allocation of public expenditure to primary 
education (Field et al., 2007).  
In effect, the evidence on the private benefits of a degree suggests that graduates 
should bear some of the cost of the services offered by HEIs, an argument all the stronger 
when limitations in the public funding of higher education lead either to rationing the number 
of students, decline of instructional quality or limited availability of funds for supporting 
disadvantaged groups. Thus, cost-sharing allows systems to continue to expand with no 
apparent sacrifice of instructional quality. They may also make institutions more responsive to 
student needs (OECD, 2008).   
While arguing that a ‗no charge‘ system suggests societal benefits are at least equal to 
the subsidy, Chapman and Ryan (2005) recognize there is little agreement on the size of 
higher education externalities and, therefore, the amount of the subsidy. A no-charge system 
is also unquestionably regressive and is related to equity issues. As university students are 
more likely to come from privileged backgrounds and graduates do well in the labour market, 
a no-charge system means the less well-off are subsidizing the more privileged; on this 
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argument, a shift towards a more equitable financial partnership with greater financial 
commitment from beneficiaries is justified (Greenway and Haynes, 2003; Dearden et al., 
2007). 
Another justification for subsidizing higher education is capital market imperfection 
which prevents students from borrowing against future human capital income. Subsidies 
therefore provide equality of chances to all students, no matter their family wealth but even 
these need to take account of the net benefit of higher education to graduates. Thus, if the 
average tax payer has a lower lifetime income than the average university graduate, such a 
subsidy from general taxation implies reverse lifetime redistribution (Garcia-Penalosa and 
Walde, 2000). 
Nonetheless, the external benefits justifies some level of taxpayer subsidy, as well as 
the social argument  for ensuring students from low-income families have a better chance of 
participating in higher education. This remains an argument for sharing, however, and not full 
subsidy (Goodman and Kaplan, 2003; Barr, 2004a). While economic reasoning backed by 
empirical analysis of private and social rates of return support the global trend towards greater 
cost-sharing in higher education, the problem is finding a balance that is efficient and 
equitable (Woodhall, 2007). 
3.4 Cost-sharing in Higher Education 
Cost-sharing is a shift of the cost burden from reliance on government and taxpayers, to some 
reliance upon parents and/or students, either in the form of tuition fees or of ―user charges‖ 
(Johnstone, 2004a, 2006; Johnstone and Marcucci, 2007). With public funds in most countries 
being limited, changes in the past 20 years include charges in countries where HE was 
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previously free and substantial increases in fees in countries where they already existed. Such 
changes have been the subject of controversy and debate (Woodhall, 2007). 
Supplementing governmental revenues with non-governmental ones has been very 
widely accepted and is supported by the World Bank in countries at different levels of 
economic and higher educational development. The costs of higher education are increasingly 
being shared with students and their families via mortgage-type student loans; income-
contingent loans; tuition fees; full cost recovery fees; means-tested grants and differential 
tuition fees in many countries (Johnstone et al., 1998; Barr and Kemnitz, 2004; Chapman and 
Ryan, 2005; Guest, 2006; Barr, 2006; Johnes, 2007).  
However, choice of terminology can be crucial. For example, The Australian 
government was astute to call its new financing system in 1989 the ―Higher Education 
Contribution Scheme (HECS)‖, a title that emphasizes the cost burden is shared by students 
(or graduates) and taxpayers. In the UK, on the other hand, the government aroused great 
hostility by using the term ―fees,‖ both in 1998 when they were first introduced and in 2003 
when variable, or ―top-up,‖ fees were proposed. In contrast, the Scottish Parliament won 
popular support when it announced it was abolishing fees in Scotland in 2001 and, instead, 
requiring a compulsory contribution to a Scottish Graduate Endowment Fund (SGEF). 
However, Johnstone D. - one of the leading authors on cost-sharing- is sceptical whether a 
change of name makes any difference, arguing that ―If it looks like a duck, and quacks like a 
duck, then it is a duck – whatever it is called.‖ Yet, in several countries the term cost-sharing 
seems to attract greater support than ―cost recovery‖ or ―user charges‖ and certainly than 
―tuition fees‖ (Woodhall, 2007, p.25).  
Whatever language is used to describe cost-sharing, the analysis has identified the 
many reasons why countries are pursuing such policies: the scarcity of governmental 
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resources; the increased financial needs of higher education systems; the dramatic increase in 
demand for higher education because of population growth; increasing secondary school 
completion rates; competition with other public services; and the private benefit of higher 
education. Cost-sharing may also function as a market device, stimulating quality in education 
and guaranteeing that students and governments receive greater value for their money through 
enhancing the effectiveness and responsiveness of HEIs. It is also suggested that if students 
experience some of the costs of higher education, they will make better enrolment decisions 
based on their abilities, interests, and aims. Sharing the costs of higher education may also be 
a greater incentive on students to study hard and graduate on time (Johnstone, 2001; 
Johnstone, 2003; Vossensteyn, 2004; Kemnitz, 2004; Jongbloed, 2004; Johnstone, 2004a; 
Johnstone, 2006b; Marcucci and Johnstone, 2006; Johnstone, 2009).     
Cost-sharing can also be related to the issue of university autonomy, particularly the 
ability to charge and retain fees. Also, unlike most forms of faculty entrepreneurship, fees do 
not divert faculty, academic staff, from the core instructional mission (Johnstone and 
Marcucci, 2007). Thus, policy orientations include the need to develop and work towards 
strategic visions to use cost-sharing between the state and students as the principle to shape 
the sector‘s funding (OECD, 2010a).  
3.5 Funding Mechanisms 
After discussing the concept of cost-sharing and its rationale, this section examines different 
mechanisms for funding higher education. They fall into several overlapping categories, 
mechanisms by which: (i) governments fund HEIs; (ii) governments fund students to attend; 
and (iii) how governments retrieve/recoup funding from students. Table  3.2 shows which 
mechanisms are associated with each category and, as noted, some appear more than once. No 
funding mechanism is ideal as such a mechanism does not exist but the goal is to have 
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mechanisms that are fit-for-purpose, seeking to match the goals of policy-makers (Jongbloed, 
2004; Jongbloed, 2008, Jongbloed, 2010). Moreover, mechanisms that work well in one 
country may not work in the structures and traditions of another, Johnstone (1986) arguing 
that solutions are rarely transportable although they can give some guidelines for application 
elsewhere.   
Nonetheless, it has been argued more generally that: 
a funding approach is more likely to succeed in steering the tertiary education 
system if it is transparent, flexible, predictable, fair (to institutions, students 
and taxpayers), ensures public accountability, permits freedom to innovate, is 
sensitive to institutional autonomy, is demand-driven, recognizes the missions 
of institutions, and is open to private institutions (in some circumstances) 
(OECD, 2008, 7).  
Implicit here and, in some degree, explicit are the four concepts of autonomy, accountability, 
efficiency and equity, and these guide this analysis of funding mechanisms. Mechanisms 
differ in their nature. Some are focused on alternative methods of channelling public funds, 
such as performance-based funding, competitive funding and demand-driven, input-based 
funding through clients (Jongbloed and Koelman, 2000; Jongbloed, 2004). Others are mainly 
cost-sharing mechanisms, such as tuition fees, pure loan schemes, graduate tax and income-
contingent loans (Garcia-Penalosa and Walde, 2000; Greenway and Hynes, 2003; Barr, 2003; 
Chapman and Ryan, 2005).  
3.5.1 Planned, input-based funding through providers 
Under planned, input-based funding through providers, funding can be given to HEIs either in 
the form of line-item funding or in the form of block grants.  
3.5.1.1 Line-item funding 
It is a centralized system of funding using a traditional type of budgeting, where allocations 
are based on requests (activity plans; budget proposals) submitted to budgetary authorities. 
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Sometimes known as negotiated funding, in practice allocations are often based on the 
previous year‘s allocation of specific budget items. Separate budget items are negotiated 
between representatives of HEIs and the funding authorities (the ministry, or funding 
council). It is line item-based with categories such as staff salaries, material requirements, 
building maintenance costs, and investment. The German and French funding systems still 
retain much of these characteristics (Jongbloed, 2004). 
From the description of this funding mechanism, it can be argued that the 
centralization and excessive control of HEIs worsens the dialogue of accountability between 
government and HEIs as it restricts institutions‘ autonomy over the management of their 
human resources, creating inflexibilities and limiting them in finding responses to challenges 
they face which thus provides no incentive for efficiency gains and improvements. Given the 
fact that government is the main source of funding with no cost-sharing mechanisms in place, 
this funding type might make HE systems less fair as the beneficiaries of government 
spending on higher education tend to come from relatively well-off families who therefore 
benefit most from tax funding.    
3.5.1.2 Block grants 
To resolve the problems of inefficiency and inflexibility, some governments have tried to give 
more autonomy to HEIs by replacing line item budgets with block grants or lump sums. 
However, it is argued that block grants can only increase the flexibility of internal allocation 
of funds; they do not provide HEIs with the ability to decide their own directions. System 
planners argue greater institutional autonomy will, in return, promote transparency and 
enhance efficiency because those who use the resources are in the best position to determine 
how they should be employed (Johnstone et al., 1998; Cheung, 2003; Salerno, 2005). 
Allowing HEIs greater autonomy to spend their budgets according to their priorities to 
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achieve their targets is expected to enhance the dialogue of accountability between funders 
and HEIs. Allocating block grants to universities according to a funding formula for teaching 
and research also enhances transparency and makes the system fairer. In a number of OECD 
countries, governments have attempted to separate their support for teaching and research by 
providing block funding for each activity (Jongbloed, 2004; Jongbloed et al., 2008b). 
There has also been a move away from line-item funding towards outcome-based and 
formula-driven schemes. There is also a tendency to replace block funding for research with 
competitive funding mechanisms, or performance-based funding mechanisms (Salerno, 2005).       
3.5.2 Performance-based funding of providers 
In this funding system, a formula is used that allocates funds for institutions that are 
successful in achieving previously established goals or outcomes, such as the number of 
students passing exams. For instance, in Denmark, funds are allocated to HEIs depending on 
the number of credits accumulated by their students, while in Sweden a mix of enrolment 
numbers and credits determine the funds allocated to HEIs. In the UK, research is also funded 
in proportion to a measure of research quality which is periodically assessed in Research 
Assessment Exercise (Jongbloed, 2004; Herbst, 2007) and policy interest in performance-
based funding for research is growing (OECD, 2010b).  
This type of funding is supposed to improve the dialogue of accountability between 
funding bodies and universities as funding is allocated to HEIs according to their success in 
achieving the agreed upon goals or outcomes. HEIs are autonomous to decide their own 
direction to achieve the previously established targets, which therefore improves the 
efficiency of the system as it provides incentives for improvement and make universities more 
responsive. Finally, allocating public revenues to HEIs according to established criteria is 
supposed to improve equity of spending.  
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This argument is supported by Frolich (2008) who sees improved efficiency, 
accountability and quality as the primary objectives as well as the main justifications for 
performance-based funding. However, linking quality to funding is a controversial issue, 
which has pros and cons. The pros are: (a) linking quality to funding is important for 
accountability and is an incentive to improvement; (b) linking quality in research to funding is 
widely accepted; (c) risks of compliance exist under any evaluation system. The cons are: (a) 
linking performance to funding undermines improvement and incites hiding weaknesses, 
game playing and manipulation of data; (b) difficulties in measuring quality and linking it to 
funding; (c) and links to funding create compliance culture among higher education 
institutions (Kis, 2005). 
Proponents of performance-based funding believe that budgeting by enrolment can 
lead an institution to over-enrol at the detriment of quality while performance budgeting 
drives public revenues by criteria other than, or at least in addition to, enrolments. These 
criteria can be degrees awarded; average time to degree completion; performance of graduates 
on postgraduate or licensure examinations; success of faculty in winning competitive research 
grants; or peer-based scholarly reputation of the faculty (Johnstone et al., 1998). 
3.5.3 Purpose-specific purchasing from providers 
In this market-oriented funding system, HEIs are invited to submit tenders for a given supply 
of graduates or research activities and those selected are those that are most price-competitive. 
In this process, HEIs are encouraged to compete with one another to provide education, 
training and research to meet national needs. Another example is research funds awarded by 
research councils through contracts that are signed between the funding agency and HEIs. In 
the contract, both parties should obey certain criteria. Only if these criteria are fulfilled, the 
HEI will receive core funding. In most OECD countries, there is a tendency to replace block 
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funding for research to competitive funding mechanisms, or performance-based funding 
mechanisms (Jongbloed, 2004). Much governmental funding is disbursed on the basis of 
competitive research funding exercises, as in the UK, or according to competitive, peer-
reviewed proposals, as in the United States (Johnstone and Marcucci, 2007). 
It is argued that well designed competitive funds greatly stimulate the performance of 
HEIs and can be powerful vehicles for transformation and innovation. In Argentina, the 
Quality Improvement Fund has encouraged universities to engage in strategic planning for the 
strengthening of existing programmes and the creation of new interdisciplinary Master 
programmes. In Egypt, the Engineering Education Fund was instrumental in introducing, for 
the first time, the notion of competitive bidding and peer evaluation for the allocation of 
public investment resources. The Fund promoted the transformation of traditional engineering 
degrees into more applied programs with closer linkages to industry. However, a fundamental 
prerequisite for the effective operation of competitive funds, as well as one of their significant 
benefits, is the establishment of transparency and fair play through clear criteria and 
procedures and an independent monitoring committee (Holm-Neilsen, 2001).  
Competitive funding, similar to performance-based funding, is supposed to enhance 
accountability as HEIs get core funding only if they fulfil certain criteria. This funding type is 
also reckoned to enhance efficiency of the system through raising competition between HEIs, 
which drives up the quality of provision. Concerning equity, Holm-Neilsen (2001) argued that 
it can be equitable if compensatory mechanisms are set to create a level playing field between 
strong and weak institutions, as happened in the latest higher education project in China and 
in the Competitive Fund in the Engineering Education Reform project in Egypt through 
forming partnerships between strong and weak institutions.    
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3.5.4 Demand-driven, input-based funding through clients   
This funding system makes use of vouchers. The potential for using vouchers or learning 
entitlements has been debated for a long time, though largely in the context of primary and 
secondary rather than higher education (Greenway and Haynes, 2003, Lee and Wong, 2002). 
A voucher system is a method that allows money to move with students, a clear market-
oriented process (Cheung, 2003). In this system the consumer ‗drives‘ the system. Students 
(clients) who have satisfied entry requirements receive a voucher to a given value to use at a 
university of their choice. It is intended to give students more choice in education and to 
incorporate market mechanisms into higher education. Another goal of such student-centered 
funding is to increase competition among institutions so as to provide incentives to improve 
quality and efficiency as unpopular programmes will not receive sufficient funding (Le 
Grand, 1991b; Albrecht and Ziderman, 1992; Middleton, 2000; Jongbloed, 2003; Jongbloed, 
2004; Jongbloed, 2006). 
Vouchers are, therefore, a potentially flexible instrument for distributing public 
monies but in themselves do not alter the overall level of funding going to higher education. 
In effect, one is disbursing public funds via the individual rather than via institutions. The 
only way vouchers could bring in additional resources is if students were able to top up their 
value, which they would need to do were vouchers used as a device for distributing public 
subventions to students in an environment where universities were permitted to set differential 
fees. It is argued that charging fees will make students pay attention to the quality of the 
service they get from HEIs. So, combining vouchers and fees may result in a system which is 
responsive to individual students‘ demand (Greenway and Haynes, 2003; Jongbloed, 2004). 
Jongbloed and Koelman (2000) conclude the advantages and disadvantages of demand-driven 
funding system in Table  3.1. 
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Table  3.1: The pros and cons of demand-driven funding system. 
Pros Cons 
-strengthening student choice 
-strengthening responsiveness to customers 
-increase in diversity of educational services     
(both in delivery methods and range of programs) 
-strengthening flexibility in learning routes 
-increase in efficiency of provision 
-increase in quality of provision 
-increase in private contribution to cost of 
education (‗topping up‘ the voucher) 
-greater opportunities for lower income families 
and minorities 
-inability of clients to assess information on the quality 
of education 
-geographical factors will limit choice 
-over-subscription will require rationing (selection) and 
favour high-income families 
-high administrative complexity (and costs) 
-need for government regulations to protect subjects, 
individuals, quality and equity 
-large variations in enrolment and funding may lead to 
under-utilisation of capital and insecure jobs for teachers 
-programs with high cultural value but with small 
enrolments will be forced to close 
-if used to the full, vouchers lead to additional 
government expenditures 
Source: Jongbloed and Koelman (2000, p.28). 
Indirect funding models have been used extensively in the form of student grants and loans, 
but very little use has been made of vouchers. In some countries, e.g. Finland and Australia, 
plans were made but were not submitted or implemented due to the high level of resistance 
from the higher education field to the far-reaching proposals (Cheung, 2003). 
The voucher system is supposed to allow universities greater autonomy as there is no 
direct control form the government. It also increases the autonomy of students through 
allowing them more choice. HEIs are more accountable and responsive to students‘ needs as a 
result of the tense competition between them, which is supposed to enhance efficiency and the 
quality of provision. If this mechanism is put in place, it would be fairer as all eligible 
students are treated the same way, regardless of their socio-economic backgrounds.    
Having discussed the typical mechanisms for allocating public funding to HEIs, the 
next sections examine cost-sharing mechanisms as a way of recouping public spending, or 
part of it, on HE.  
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3.5.5 Tuition Fees 
Under this system universities are financed from a mix of taxation and tuition fees. Fees give 
universities more resources to improve quality and, through competition, help improve the 
efficiency with which those resources are used. Fees are fairer since they reduce the 
regressiveness of a system based on tax finance. The obvious argument against fees is that 
they deter students from poor backgrounds. That argument is only true for up-front fees, 
however, as prospective students without sufficient resources to cover fees will not be able to 
enrol. But, when students go to university for free and make a contribution only after their 
graduation, in principle, tuition fees will not harm access. Thus, it is suggested that fees 
should be covered by a loan with income-contingent repayments (Barr, 2004b; Barr, 2005).  
Tuition fees are becoming the international rule and not the exception. International 
perspectives suggest that higher differential fees can be introduced without adversely 
affecting the participation of students from less well-off families, particularly when backed by 
fee deferral arrangements (Department for Education and Skills, 2004). Evidence shows that 
equity is not at stake in the majority of the countries that have introduced tuition fees (OECD, 
2006). 
Tuition fees can be argued to improve institutional autonomy as it enables HEIs to 
diversify their sources of funding without much reliance on the government. HEIs are 
accountable for the quality of students‘ education and for taking them to graduation and to the 
market place. Charging differential tuition fees raises competition between universities which 
is for the benefit of enhancing the quality and efficiency of the system. Deferred fess, in 
contrast with up-front fees, are fair for students as they reduce the regressiveness of a system 
based on tax finance. What follows are three different mechanisms of deferring fees.             
 61  
3.5.6 Pure Loan Schemes  
Traditional tax-subsidy system threatens reverse income distribution and a trade-off between 
the various policy goals, efficiency and equity. A pure loan scheme, which is a public loan 
with mortgage-type repayments has the benefit that it is not a charge on public revenues, and 
removes the constraints imposed by imperfect capital markets without generating reverse 
redistribution. Under this scheme, each student pays back exactly the amount she has 
borrowed plus interest (Garcia-Penalosa and Waldet, 2000). This solution, however, neglects 
the problem of the uncertainty related to investment in human capital. 
Pure loan schemes, as a cost-sharing mechanism, increases the autonomy of HEIs as 
the government is not the main source of funding. The fact that students (clients) pay for their 
education make HEIs more accountable for their education as students become more 
demanding. It does not improve efficiency so much as students who are risk-averse will be 
reluctant to invest in higher education. In that sense, it is inequitable as uncertainty affects 
investment decisions when individuals are risk-averse.      
3.5.7 Graduate Tax 
The difficulty whereby pure loan schemes fail to overcome the problem of uncertainty in 
investment decisions are intended to be addressed by a graduate tax (Ibid). A graduate tax is a 
supplement which applies only to graduates rather than a levy on all taxpayers. Thus, 
additional funding could be secured from the primary beneficiaries of HE, its obvious 
attraction. Moreover, because the revenue is generated from future earnings, payment is 
deferred and HE continues to be free at the point of consumption. In principle the collection 
mechanism is straightforward and administration costs could be very low, which is a further 
attraction (Greenway and Haynes, 2003). Graduates who do not obtain a skilled job do not 
have to meet the education costs they have incurred while those who end up working as 
 62  
skilled workers pay both their own education costs and an amount used to cover the subsidies 
to those who have failed (Garcia-Penalosa and Waldet, 2000). A Department for Education 
and Skills‘ report (2004) states that, ‗graduate tax is a theoretical possibility but in practice is 
non-existent in the OECD countries or beyond‘.  
Like Pure loan schemes, graduate tax boosts the autonomy of HEIs as the government 
is not the main source of funding. Students (clients) become more demanding as they pay for 
their education which makes HEIs more accountable for their education and more responsive 
for their needs. Such a system provides partial insurance. Hence, if students are risk-averse, 
insurance persuades more individuals with low wealth to invest in education, thus, increasing 
efficiency (Garcia-Penalosa and Waldet, 2000). One can argue that, although this system 
increases efficiency by providing partial insurance, it is unfair for successful students to pay 
both their own education costs and a portion of the costs of unsuccessful ones. 
3.5.8 Income-contingent Loans  
Under this approach, students are provided with a loan with income-contingent repayments. 
The loan entitlement should be large enough to cover fees and, in richer countries, living 
costs, with an interest rate broadly equal to the government‘s cost of borrowing. Students pay 
nothing at the time they go to university. In this case, higher education is free at the point of 
use. Part of the cost is paid through taxation and part through income-contingent repayments 
(Barr, 2005; Chapman and Rayan, 2005). This type of loan is currently in place in several 
countries such as Australia, Sweden, Ghana, New Zealand, South Africa since 1996 and, 
since 1998, in the UK. It makes repayments conditional on whether the income of the student 
exceeds a pre-specified level and computes repayments as a percentage of weekly or monthly 
earnings (Garcia-Penalosa and Walde, 2000; Steier, 2003; Johnstone, 2004b; Chapman, 2005; 
Johnstone, 2005; Chapman, 2006).    
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With income-contingent loans, unlike mortgage-loans, repayments take the form of X 
per cent of the borrower‘s subsequent earnings until the loan plus interest has been repaid. 
Thus, the duration of repayment is variable. With a graduate tax, repayments continue for life, 
or until retirement. With income-contingent loans, in contrast, students only repay what they 
have borrowed. Thus, income-contingent loans are logically equivalent to a grant financed by 
an income-related graduate contribution (Barr, 2003; Greenway and Haynes, 2003; Barr, 
2004a; Tulip, 2007).  
The fact that tuition fees are paid to universities in advance and students, graduates, 
have to pay back in the form of income-contingent loans allows universities more autonomy 
as it reduces the dependency of universities on the government. HEIs are accountable for the 
quality of students‘ education and for taking them to graduation and to the market place. 
Backing tuition fees with income-contingent loans enhances the efficiency and equity of the 
system as argued by Barr (2003) and Garcia-Penalosa and Waldet (2000). Collecting 
repayments as a payroll deduction alongside income tax means they match ability to pay, 
which enhance equity. Repayments automatically and instantly track changes in earnings. 
Borrowers with low current earnings make low (or no) repayments; borrowers who do well 
repay in full, those with low lifetime earnings do not. Thus, the loan has built-in insurance 
against inability to repay which makes the system more efficient as it reduces the uncertainty 
facing students.       
Having investigated the different funding mechanisms for higher education, Table  3.2 
sums up how such funding mechanisms might affect universities in terms of autonomy, 
accountability, efficiency and equity. 
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Table  3.2: The impact of different funding mechanisms on autonomy, accountability, efficiency and equity 
The Four   
Evaluative  
Concepts 
 
Funding  
Mechanisms 
Autonomy 
 
Accountability Efficiency Equity 
Line-item funding 
This mechanism delimits universities autonomy 
over the management of their human resources.  
Governments exercise tight fiscal control over 
HEIs’ day-to-day operations. Thus, the dialogue 
of accountability is worsened under this 
mechanism. 
It provides no incentive for efficiency gains and 
improvements.  
It makes higher education system less fair as the 
beneficiaries of government spending on higher 
education tend to come from relatively well-off 
families who therefore benefit most from tax 
funding. Lack of a funding formula also makes the 
system less transparent. 
Block Grants 
It allows universities greater autonomy to spend 
their budgets according to their priorities to 
achieve their targets. 
It enhances the dialogue of accountability 
between funders and HEIs. 
It enhances efficiency because those who use the 
resources are in the best position to determine how 
they should be employed. 
Allocating block grants to universities according to a 
funding formula for teaching and research enhances 
transparency and makes the system fairer. 
Performance-
based funding of 
providers 
 
It gives HEIs’ more autonomy to decide their own 
directions to succeed in achieving the previously 
established goals or outcomes. 
It improves accountability as funding is allocated 
to HEIs’ according to their success in achieving 
previously established goals or outcomes. 
 
It improves efficiency as it provides incentives for 
improvement and makes universities more 
responsive.  
It improves equity as performance budgeting drives 
public revenues by criteria other than, or at least in 
addition to enrolments. 
Purpose-specific 
purchasing from 
providers 
 
It improves HEIs’ autonomy as there is no direct 
control from governments on their day-to-day 
operations. 
It improves accountability as HEIs receive core 
funding only if they fulfilled certain criteria. 
It improves efficiency as it encourages competition 
between HEIs and can be a powerful vehicle for 
transformation and innovation.  
 
It can be equitable if compensatory mechanisms are 
set to create a level playing field between strong and 
weak institutions. 
Demand-driven, 
input-based 
funding through 
clients 
 
It increases the autonomy of learners as it gives 
students more choice in education. 
Universities are accountable to be responsive to 
students’ needs. They are responsible for taking 
students to graduation and to the market place. 
It increases competition among HEIs so as to provide 
incentives for improving quality and efficiency of 
provision.  
If this mechanism is put in place, it would be fair as 
all students who have satisfied entry requirements 
receive a voucher to use at a university of their 
choice. 
Tuition fees 
 
Fees improve institutional autonomy as they 
enable HEIs to diversify their sources of funding 
and, thus, become less dependent on government 
funding.   
HEIs are accountable for their students’ learning 
and for taking them to graduation and to the 
market place. 
Fees give universities more resources to improve 
quality and, through competition, help improve the 
efficiency with which those resources are used.   
Deferred fees are fair as they reduce the regressivity 
of a system based on tax finance. Up-front fees, in 
contrast, deter students from poor backgrounds to 
enrol, which is unfair.  
Pure loan 
schemes 
 
It increases the autonomy of HEIs as the 
government is not the main source of funding. 
 
HEIs are responsible for their students’ learning 
and for taking them to graduation and to the 
market place.  
It does not improve efficiency so much as students 
who are risk-averse will be reluctant to invest in 
higher education. 
It is inequitable as uncertainty affects investment 
decisions when individuals are risk-averse. 
Graduate Tax 
 
It increases the autonomy of HEIs as the 
government is not the main source of funding. 
HEIs are accountable for their students’ learning 
and for taking them to graduation and to the 
market place. 
The partial insurance included in this mechanism 
increases efficiency as it persuades more individuals, 
who are risk-averse, with low wealth to invest in 
education. 
It is unfair for successful students to pay both their 
own education costs and an extra amount to cover 
the subsidies of the costs of the unsuccessful ones.  
Income-
contingent loans 
 
It increases the autonomy of HEIs as the 
government is not the main source of funding. Part 
of the cost is paid through taxation and part 
through graduates’ subsequent income-contingent 
repayments. 
The new trend in loans repayment increases the 
degree of responsibility borne by HEIs regarding 
the kind of degrees they offer to students and its 
link with the needs of the market place.  
The loan has built-in insurance against inability to 
repay. Thus, it makes the system more efficient by 
reducing the uncertainty facing students. 
It makes the system fairer as higher education is free 
at the point of use. Besides, Collecting repayments as 
a payroll deduction alongside income tax means that 
they match ability to pay, which enhance equity.  
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It is clear that the table shows three main categories of funding. The first four funding 
mechanisms form the first category through which governments channel public funds to 
HEIs. As line-item funding is an overly centralized system with too much intervention of 
governments in HEIs‘ day to day operations, the international trend of allocating public 
funding to HEIs moves to block grants to allow more autonomy for HEIs. It is also 
increasingly characterized by greater targeting of resources through performance-based 
funding and competitive funding procedures (Santiago et al., 2008).  
The fifth funding mechanism forms the second category through which governments 
channel public funds to HEIs through students, a more market-oriented mechanism, vouchers. 
Although very little use has been made of vouchers, it can be argued that tuition fees in the 
UK, for example, can be considered as a form of vouchers as money moves with students. If a 
student decides to go to X university rather than Y university, the government pays tuition 
fees to the university of the student‘s choice. However, in a sense, it is a voucher in a more 
regulated market as there are caps on student numbers and tuition fees and it is a repayable 
voucher through income contingent loans.  
The last four funding mechanisms form the third category through which governments 
recoup/retrieve funding from students. There is an international trend to use cost-sharing 
between the state and students as the principle to shape the sector‘s funding (OECD and 
World Bank, 2010). Despite the international shift to cost-sharing and the fact that tuition fees 
are becoming the international rule, there remain systems of financial assistance to support 
access and provide equity. As up-front fees were found to deter students from poor 
backgrounds to enrol, the international trend is to defer fees or devise student financial 
support mechanisms to counterbalance the effect of tuition fees on access and equity 
(Johnstone et al., 1998).   
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The counterbalance to tuition fees can take two main forms: grants, fellowships or 
scholarships which are not to be repaid, and loans which are to be re-paid (Goastellec, 2005). 
Woodhall (2007) advocates that changes in the finance of higher education in the past twenty 
years include changes in student aid systems with a shift towards student loans to supplement 
or replace grants. Economic logic suggests that loans are the preferred form of student 
support, since HE is a profitable private investment.  
What are the consequences of the shift in student aid system towards student loans to 
supplement or replace grants? Dougherty (2004) argues that there is evidence that the shift 
from grant based student aid to loans in the United States has negative consequences for 
college access and retention for minority and low-income students because they fear that they 
will be unable to repay the loans after they graduate, in good part because they expect lower 
returns to their education. Holm-Nielsen (2001) advocates that the concurrent establishment 
of tuition fees and elimination of the maintenance grant in Scotland in 1998 resulted in a 
decline in enrolment among low income students. Blondal et al., (2002), in contrast, 
concludes that in the United Kingdom, the replacement of grants by loans and the 
introduction of tuition fees in the 1990s had no obvious effect on participation rates. In New 
Zealand, the replacement of grants by a loan system in 1992 had no marked observable effect 
on the growth rate of participation in higher education as well. Thus, the experience of 
countries that have combined an increase in tuition fees and an increase in student loan 
facilities suggest that there are no significant adverse effects on participation. 
Overcoming the possible impact of the shift in student aid system toward student loans 
requires the overall funding approach to be backed with a comprehensive student financial 
support system which facilitates access by reducing liquidity constraints faced by students and 
their families. Students enrolled in public and private institutions should benefit from the 
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same basic financial support to cover living costs and tuition fees in order to facilitate 
students‘ freedom of choice. In many countries student support systems need to be expanded, 
diversified and place extra-emphasis on the financial needs of students. A solid student 
support system could be founded on a universal, income-contingent loan system 
complemented with a means-tested grants scheme. It would represent an important 
component in a system based on the principle of cost-sharing as it could offset the effects of 
high fees for poorer students as the income contingency creates a built-in insurance against 
inability to repay the loan (OECD, 2008; Wobmann and Schutz, 2006; Blondal et al., 2002). 
Unlike pure loan schemes and graduate tax, income-contingent loans are logically equivalent 
to a grant financed by an income-related graduate contribution which might advance equity 
objectives without compromising efficiency goals.   
Thus, the international trend to conciliate the financial needs of higher education 
systems and meet efficiency and equity objectives consists in organising a loan framework 
with later repayment, once the former student is active in the labour market. This trend in 
loans repayment also increases the degree of responsibility borne by institutions, regarding 
the kind of degrees they offer to students and its links with the needs of the market place 
which is supposed to drive up the quality of provision (Goastellec, 2005). Moreover, to 
prevent the fear of debt deterring some social economic groups to enrol, the government 
should also target some of its efforts (communication and grants) to students from 
disadvantaged groups in society for whom access is fragile. In that sense, financial support for 
students will guarantee equal access of opportunities for all (Jongbloed, 2004). 
To sum up, there have been significant reforms/changes in funding arrangements in the 
last three decades in almost all countries based on the belief that the level, composition and 
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method of funding matter when it comes to the performance of higher education systems 
(Jongbloed et al., 2008a). 
3.6 An Overview of Funding Mechanisms in Egypt and the UK 
This section briefly discusses the funding systems in Egypt and the UK. Table  3.3 gives an 
overview of their funding models.   
Table  3.3: An Overview of the Funding Systems of Higher Education in Egypt and the UK 
                 Country  
                
Comparison     
Egypt The UK 
Funding model Line-item based Block Grant 
Funding teaching No funding formula Student-based 
Funding research No funding formula Quality-driven 
Diversification 
Universities are allowed to diversify their 
sources of funding. 
Universities are allowed to diversify their 
sources of funding. 
Tuition Fees 
Students pay very modest token 
registration fees and universities are not 
allowed to charge students higher tuition 
fees. 
Universities are allowed to charge 
undergraduate students higher tuition 
fees up to a certain cap decided by the 
government. There are no caps on tuition 
fees for postgraduate studies so 
universities can charge variable tuition 
fees. 
Student Financial 
Support 
Mechanisms 
Financial incentives for students based on 
merit. Other social and financial support 
for needy students from the Social 
Solidarity Fund. 
 
Income contingent loans for both tuition 
fees and living expenses. 
3.6.1 Funding Mechanisms in Egypt4  
Egypt has a line-item based funding where the budget should be spent according to certain 
categories. Although Egypt has recently made use of competitive funding under the 
Engineering and Technical Education Project (ETEP), 1991-1998, and the Higher Education 
Enhancement Project (HEEP), phase 1 2002-2007 (Holm-Neilsen, 2001; World Bank, 2009), 
                                                 
4
 For more information about finance and governance of higher education in Egypt, see (MoHE, 2007, SPU, 
2008; Said, 2008; OECD and World Bank, 2010).  
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the main resource allocation system is still line-item funding. Both projects have been 
beneficial in spreading the culture of competitive funding and preparing academic and 
administrative staff to operate in a competitive environment. Competitive funding was meant 
to be a complementary funding system for higher education institutions, for investment, after 
the completion of the first phase of HEEP. However, without reforming the resource 
allocation system (line-item funding), a competitive funding mechanism could not be 
sustained (World Bank, 2009). There are other international funding sources, such as the 
World Bank; European Union; Agency for International Development, but the government is 
the main funding body.    
It is a centralised system with no funding formula for teaching or research as 
universities negotiate their annual budgets, directly or through the Ministry of Higher 
Education (MoHE), with the Ministry of Planning (MoP) and MoP together with the Ministry 
of Finance (MoF) decide budgets for each individual university. In practice, allocations are 
often based on the previous year‘s allocation with small incremental changes. The sector‘s 
budget was around 8.5 billion Egyptian pounds in 2008. However, more than 70% of the 
budget goes to wages because of the huge numbers of administrative staff which means that 
less than 30% of the budget is allocated for operational costs, which weakens the efficiency of 
the system. In 2006-07 there were 2,542,739 undergraduates and 210,022 graduates in 
Egyptian HE. Around 28% of the age group 18-23 year old are in HE (Said, 2008; Farouk, 
2008, Fahim and Sami, 2009).   
Universities are not allowed to charge students higher tuition fees as HE must be free 
(Universities Regulatory Act - 49/1972, 2009). However, in 1994-95, the state‘s share of 
finance for universities was reduced to 85 per cent, leaving universities to generate funds 
through various revenue diversification strategies including: a) higher tuition fees for 
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alternative academic programs that are perceived to be of high quality, e.g. foreign language 
programs, where students pay up to 5000£E a year; b) nominal fees for all students, Egyptian 
students pay between 30£E -150£E per year as a token registration fee for non-instructional 
services in the general programs in government funded universities (they also pay for 
necessary equipment, books, transportation, and residence fees); c) Dual Track Policies: in 
1995-96, the government introduced a new admission criterion that applies to the faculties of 
Law, Commerce, and Arts and allows less qualified students to obtain places by paying 
360£E in addition to the nominal fees paid by regularly admitted students; d) the running of 
Open Learning Centers, which are considered as private units owned by public universities; e) 
diversifying educational products; f) income generation by specialized university centers from 
cooperation with industry, patent rights, provision of continuing education to industrial 
employees, access to laboratory and scientific equipment, manufacturing intermediate 
industrial products, extension services, language instruction and private donations, especially 
for student fellowships (ICHEFAP, 2009; TEMPUS, 2010).   
OECD and the World Bank (2010) argued that the increase in private higher education 
enrolment and the growing segmentation, within public institutions, between students who 
study free-of-charge and those who pay fees in various forms (such as foreign language 
programs, dual track programmes), could result in serious social disparities in terms of access 
to higher education and labour market outcomes. Moreover, despite significant progress in the 
past decade, gender and regional inequities still require special efforts.  
Students are given aid through financial incentives based on academic merit. Social 
and financial support for needy students is provided from the Social Solidarity Fund in each 
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university and students are also offered university accommodation5, including stay and meals, 
for nominal fees (MoHE, 2007; Universities Regulatory Act - 49/1972, 2009). In 1998, the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) conducted an extensive feasibility study on the 
market for student loans and recommended against launching a student loan program due to 
the following reasons: (a) limited market size; (b) underdeveloped debt/credit market; (c) a 
cultural attitude uncomfortable with personal debt and loans; and (d) absence of a consumer 
credit agency (World Bank, 2000). However, by 2000, the Government had established a 100 
million Egyptian pounds loan program for needy university students. Under this scheme, 
students who can prove they are in need of financial assistance for education-related expenses 
were eligible to receive up to 1000£E per year in government loans. Loans were to be interest 
free and repayment to be spread over 40 years after graduation. However, the program lasted 
only for one year and existing loans were cancelled (ICHEFAP, 2009). 
Fahim and Sami (2009) argued that the recommendations of the IFC no longer apply 
as the financial institutions have developed over time with the presence of foreign banks, new 
financial products such as car loans, personal loans and mortgage finance. The market has 
thus changed drastically since 1998.      
3.6.2 Funding Mechanisms in the UK 
Universities in the UK are unlike the majority of universities in other European countries or in 
the United States in one major respect. They are all formally private institutions/corporations 
or enterprises, though established as charities serving a public benefit (Floud, 2005, Harris, 
2011).  
                                                 
5
 University accommodation is offered for students living outside the governorate/city, or its suburbs, where the 
university is located. The rules for joining university accommodation also include the grades students get in the 
General Secondary Certificate (new students) or the grade they get in the university (current university students). 
A certain per cent of the available places is allocated for students from disadvantaged backgrounds, students with 
disability and students living in remote areas.        
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Funding in the UK is more devolved as universities are given block grants for both 
teaching and research with funding for teaching student and subject based, and funding for 
research is quality-driven, which is assessed in RAE. Universities are autonomous to spend 
that grant according to their own priorities and, thus, each university has its own financial 
mechanisms. Universities can diversify their sources of funding through different public and 
private activities. There is strong competition between universities as they are allowed to 
charge students higher tuition fees up to a cap decided by the government. Students are given 
loans for tuition fees and living expenses and these are repayable by graduates through the tax 
system once their income reaches a threshold of £15,0006 per annum. A specific means is 
dedicated to students from low-income families, who should be exempted from tuition fees 
and entitled to means-tested grants. Universities have bursary schemes and other financial 
measures, such as need-based fellowships (Goastellec, 2005; Clark, 2006; HEFCE, 2008).   
Research Councils UK (RCUK)7 also distribute public funds for research to 
universities and colleges to support projects and some postgraduate students. These are 
funded by government (HEFCE, 2008; RCUK, 2011). 
It is clear that the UK has a mixed economy of mechanisms (block grants, performance-
based funding (RAE), competitive funding (RCUK), tuition fees and income contingent 
loans) with the bulk allocated as block grants, one for teaching and another for research. 
       
                                                 
6 Based on the Browne report (2010), this threshold will be increased to 21,000 starting from 2012 accompanied 
by increases in tuition fees.  
7 A strategic partnership of seven UK Research Councils investing, each year, around £3 billion in research 
covering the full spectrum of academic disciplines from the medical and biological sciences to astronomy, 
physics, chemistry and engineering, social sciences, economics, environmental sciences and the arts and 
humanities.  
 73 
3.7 Conclusion  
The analysis shows how funding mechanisms differ in their impact on universities in terms of 
autonomy, accountability, efficiency and equity and this would be reflected by assessment of 
the impact of the funding systems in Egypt and the UK in chapters six and eight.  
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4 CHAPTER FOUR 
GLOBAL TRENDS IN QUALITY ASSURANCE IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION: THE CONTEXT OF EGYPT AND THE UK  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins by discussing the meaning and complexities of quality and its importance 
in higher education. It then considers the emergence of QAS in higher education through 
drivers of change, delivery systems and the process for delivering change. The major 
elements of QAS are then discussed followed by a section giving a brief account of QAS in 
Egypt and the UK. It ends with a brief conclusion.   
4.2 Understanding Quality 
4.2.1 Quality as a Generic Term 
Quality as a generic term can be defined as something of high standard, a characteristic or a 
feature telling us how good or bad someone or something is (Cambridge Advanced Learner‘s 
Dictionary, 2003).  It can be seen as a standard, measured against similar things or defined as 
general excellence (Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 2004). An earlier term, Quality 
Control (QC), can be defined as a process assessing a production process to ensure goods are 
of an intended standard or acceptable standard (Cambridge Advanced Learner‘s Dictionary, 
2003; Collins COBUILD Dictionary, 2003). The more recent and broader term, Quality 
Assurance (QA) can be defined as an integrated system of activities involving planning, 
quality control, quality assessment, reporting and quality improvement to ensure a product or 
service meets defined standards of quality with a stated level of confidence (Quality 
Assurance Division, 1997).  
As these terms originated in industry and business before being applied to education, 
what do they mean in higher education? 
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4.2.2 Quality in Higher Education 
Quality in higher education includes interrelated concepts, such as quality assurance; quality 
assessment/review; quality control; quality management; total quality management; quality 
audit; quality culture … and quality enhancement (CHEA, 2001; Tempus, 2001; Vlãsceanu et 
al., 2007; Biggs and Tang, 2007).  
It can be argued that quality has always been part of the academic tradition and the 
change is the external interest in making quality more explicit, reflecting a change in the 
relationship between higher education and society (Vroeijenstijn, 1995). It is these changes 
which have led to the greater visibility of QA in higher education.  
Some argue that quality in higher education is too complex to define whereas others 
imply, or explicitly state, that it is something one knows when one sees or experiences 
(Harvey, 2004). For these observers, the external demands for greater attention to quality is a 
burdensome phenomenon referring to procedures, such as ‗quality visits‘, ‗preparing for 
quality‘ and government bodies, such as ‗the quality agency‘ which ‗takes time out from the 
real job of teaching‘. As with usage outside education, quality issues are closely related to 
issues of standards and, in debates about the nature and functioning of higher education, there 
is considerable overlap between the concepts of ‗quality‘ and ‗standards‘. Yet, quality and 
standards are not the same, as ‗standards‘ are specified and measurable while quality is 
something different (Ibid). 
Harvey and Green (1993) argued that quality in higher education is a relative concept 
in two senses. First, it is relative to the user of the term and the circumstances in which it is 
invoked. Thus, it means different things to different people and even the same person might 
adopt different conceptualisations in changed circumstances. Stakeholders in higher education 
(e.g. students, employers, teaching and non-teaching staff, government, etc.) are also likely to 
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have different perspectives on quality. Second, the benchmarks of quality are themselves 
relative. While some view quality in terms of absolutes, others see it judged in terms of 
thresholds that have to be exceeded to obtain a quality rating.  
In seeking to classify the many definitions of quality in higher education, Harvey and 
Green (1993) proposed a typology with five discrete but interrelated notions of quality as 
shown in Table  4.1. It has also been developed here to present similar definitions by other 
authors. 
First, the exceptional view of quality is linked to notions of excellence. Second, quality 
as perfection sees quality as a consistent or flawless outcome. However, Lomas (2001) argues 
that this is not suitable for higher education as it is an approach used by much of Japanese 
motor manufacture and is inappropriate because it is not the purpose of HEIs to ‗produce‘ 
uniform students. Watty (2003) agrees that HE does not aim to produce defect-free, 
standardised graduates.   
Quality as fitness for purpose can be linked either to external objectives as defined by 
an accreditation or QA body or internal objectives based on the ability of an institution to 
fulfil its mission or to fulfil the aims of a programme of study (Harvey and Green, 1993; 
CHEA, 2001; Tempus, 2001; Vlãsceanu et al., 2007). Quality as value for money sees quality 
in terms of returns on investment. Accountability seems to be central to this definition 
because of limited resources; the growing tendency for governments to require accountability 
reflecting a concern for value-for-money. Moreover, students and their families also 
increasingly require value-for-money from higher education. 
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Table  4.1: Different approaches to defining quality in higher education  
 Quality in 
             HE                    
Authors           
Exceptional Perfection Fitness for Purpose Value for money Transformation 
Harvey and 
Green, 1993 
Excellence. Consistent/ 
flawless 
outcome. 
The ability of an 
institution or 
programme to fulfil 
its mission, aims and 
objectives. 
Returns on 
investment with a 
focus on the notion 
of accountability. 
The enhancement 
and 
empowerment of 
students or the 
development of 
new knowledge. 
CHEA, 2001 - - 
Meeting generally 
accepted standards 
as defined by an 
accrediting or QA 
body. 
- - 
Tempus, 
2001 
- - 
Acceptability or 
suitability for a 
given purpose. 
- - 
Vlãsceanu et 
al., 2007 
The best 
standards of 
excellence. 
- 
Meeting generally 
accepted standards 
as defined by an 
accreditation or QA 
body or fulfilling the 
pre-defined mission 
and objectives of an 
institution or a 
programme. 
How the inputs are 
effectively and 
efficiently used by 
the processes and 
mechanisms 
involved. 
Continuous 
search for 
permanent 
improvement. It is 
student-centered 
focusing on 
adding value to 
students through 
their learning 
experience. 
Kemmenade, 
2008 
- - - - 
Are the learning 
results that are 
asked for by 
students and the 
world of work 
exceeded? 
Finally, quality as transformation focuses on the enhancement and empowerment of students 
and the development of new knowledge. Kemmendae (2008) see this definition doing justice 
to education as a process wherein learners are at the centre so they get the added value. 
Vlãsceanu et al., (2007) call it enhancement, rather than transformation, focusing on the 
continuous search for permanent improvement and stressing the responsibility of HEIs to 
make best use of their autonomy and academic freedom to add value to students through their 
learning experience. They add that achieving quality is central to the academic ethos and the 
idea that academics know this quality better than others.  
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Lomas (2001) argues that none of the definitions given by Harvey and Green (1993) is 
mutually exclusive, as quality is often viewed as a blend of two or more and Newton (2007) 
also argues that ‗quality is not a unitary concept; it is open to multiple perspectives‘.  
In relation to higher education, that greater focus is two notions, an accountability-led 
view, focused on fitness for purpose and value for money and an enhancement-led view 
focused on improving the quality of provision, and enhancing and empowering students 
through their experience of higher education.    
4.3 The Emergence of Quality Assurance Systems in Higher Education 
4.3.1 Drivers of Change 
For education as for industry, quality improvement is no longer an option, it is 
a necessity (Sallis, 2002, 5). 
Until relatively recently, QA in higher education was largely an implicit activity, a prevalent 
view being that quality could not be measured but could be recognized by academics when 
and where it existed. However, over the last two decades, this traditional view about quality 
and how it is assured has been challenged (Campbell and Rozsnyai, 2002) with pressures 
from organizations such as UNESCO and World Bank making QA ―a central objective of 
governmental policies and an important steering mechanism in higher education systems 
worldwide‖ (Van Damme, 2002, cited in Campbell and Rozsnyai, 2002, p.15). What have 
been the drivers for this change, the challenges which have led to concern about quality and 
the emergence of QAS (Campbell and Rozsnyai, 2002; Sallis, 2002; Amaral, 2007; Newton, 
2007; Altbach et al., 2009).  
- Massification of higher education. The increasing demand for higher education has led to 
substantially increased participation but it has not always been well planned or controlled.  
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- Financial austerity. The expansion in student numbers was accompanied by either constant 
or declining (public) funding which has been compounded by inefficient use of available 
resources.  
- Diversification of higher education. As traditional public HEIs cannot meet the increasing 
demand for places, new providers have appeared, sometimes in competition with traditional 
providers, as well as new modes of provision, such as on-line learning. These forms of 
provision make quality an international issue because, in some countries, traditional providers 
face competition from transnational providers as well as from local commercial providers. 
Through the internationalization of higher education, national systems, qualifications and 
individual institutions have become exposed to the wider world, stimulating demands for 
better information and transparency about quality and standards. 
- The emergence of markets in higher education. Diversification, the introduction of (or sharp 
increase in) tuition fees and competition for students, funds and research money have led to 
the emergence of markets with students being considered as clients or customers and HEIs as 
providers of an education product (OECD, 2004). ‗This represents a drastic shift in the power 
balance between the university and its clients, to which universities have to respond with 
more flexible and more resource efficient education and training programmes‘ (Meyer, 2002; 
Middlehurst, 1997). All these factors have led to increasing concern for quality with HEIs 
seeking to show they are committed to the needs of students by ensuring that both classroom 
practice and institutional management are operating to the highest standards. Focusing on 
satisfying the needs of the customer is seen as one of the most effective means of facing and 
surviving competition amongst HEIs (Brown, 2005).   
- Increasing demand for accountability and pressures for efficiency gains. Deregulation and 
increased autonomy to HEIs in regard to such matters as curriculum design, selection of 
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students, and appointment of staff has led to increasing demands for accountability. 
Moreover, the increasing cost of HE for governments, students and their families has also led 
to increasing demands for accountability, in terms of getting value for money spent on HE 
and for efficiency gains. HEIs are part of their communities and, as such, they must meet the 
public and political demands for education to be more accountable and publicly demonstrate 
high standards.   
- Addressing the employability agenda. Meeting expectations in terms of the ―employability‖ 
of graduates is accompanied by addressing demands from stakeholders for increased and 
improved information about programmes and institutions and the skills, competencies, and 
aptitudes which graduates possess. 
- Addressing social and political agendas. HEIs are under pressure to contribute to achieving 
social and political agendas on access, inclusion, and equity.  
All these challenges, accompanied by growing state and public interest in quality and 
increasing demands for accountability, have led to the establishment of national quality 
agencies. By the end of the 1990s, concern for quality and standards was global (Newton, 
2007).   
4.3.2 Delivery Systems 
The delivery systems for responding to these drivers are mainly focused around quasi-markets 
and new managerialism.              
The imperfections of markets in higher education, including students as immature 
consumers, means the government intervenes to protect consumers (students) and create what 
Le Grand and Bartlett (1993) call quasi-markets which, Amaral (2007) adds, have been 
associated with increased institutional autonomy. Increased autonomy, combined with 
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competition, may create difficulties for market regulation, as autonomous institutions might 
follow strategies aimed at their own development and survival, even if it is to the detriment of 
the public good or the government‘s objectives. The introduction of competitiveness, 
autonomy and user choice is inseparable from the provision of information through systems 
of evaluation made available to users and funders alike (Calero, 1998). So, through QAS, the 
government intervenes to preserve the public good and manage the rules of the game, using 
quality assessment as a compliance tool to regulate these markets.  
It can also be argued that the expansion of the sector accompanied by severe fiscal 
constraints and the introduction of quasi-markets have led to the advent of an audit and 
assessment culture which is  referred to as new managerialism (Deem, 1998; Deem and 
Brehony, 2005). The main characteristic of new managerialism is the removal of power from 
professionals to auditors and managers on the basis that professionals were seen to be more 
‗knaves‘ than ‗knights‘ (Le Grand, 2003). New managerialism also refers to the adoption by 
public sector organisations of forms, technologies, management practices and values more 
commonly found in the private sector. These discourses of management from the for-profit 
sectors have been encouraged by governments seeking to reduce public spending (Cutler and 
Waine, 1994; Cutler and Waine, 1997; Deem, 1998; Dixon et al., 1998; Deem, 2006; Deem et 
al., 2007; Trowler, 2009). Thus, new managerialism is associated with the emergence of 
quasi-markets or market regulation (Amaral, 2006). 
Under new managerialism (neo-liberalism, total quality management, new public 
management, etc.), students become customers or clients and QAS and accountability 
measures are put in place to ensure that provision meets clients‘ needs and expectations. Its 
emergence and demands for greater efficiency from public services is claimed to be a result of 
a loss of trust in public sector professionals and their institutions (Floud, 2005). However, it is 
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appropriate to recognize that the massification of higher education has also played a role in 
loss of trust with quality assessment and accreditation being used as a replacement for that 
trust (Amaral, 2007). In this way, ‗control and regulation of academic labour seem to have 
replaced collegiality, trust and professional discretion‘ (Roberts, 2004, 7).   
Governments are not wholly convinced that markets can deliver quality because 
markets for higher education and research are imperfect, which means they do not 
spontaneously produce the optimal solution (Weber, 2005). These market inefficiencies as 
well as concerns about equity provide the basis for government intervention (Schoenenberger, 
2005). Therefore, governments set performance targets, agreed contracts with providers to 
achieve them and then have performance monitoring systems in place. It helps explain why 
QAS have evolved in higher education over the last three decades across the world.  
4.3.3 The Process for Delivering Change 
The rapidly changing environment of higher education has seen the introduction of national 
QAS into many countries and its planned introduction elsewhere (Campbell and Rozsnyai, 
2002). These are interesting developments with QAS becoming the process for delivering 
change (Kemenade et al.,2008) as a major component of governance in higher education 
(Jacob and Rust, 2010). This leads the discussion to examining the major elements of QAS. 
4.4 Major Elements of Quality Assurance Systems in Higher Education 
Kis (2005) summarises the major elements of QAS as: approach; level; methods; data 
gathering instruments; components of the report; nature of QA; outcomes and the 
responsibility for follow-up. Figure  4.1 shows three main approaches to quality: accreditation, 
assessment and audit (the last two are both forms of evaluation). While accreditation and 
assessment monitor the quality of teaching and learning, audit focuses on the internal 
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procedures adopted by a HEI in order to achieve its objectives. Although the level of QA 
varies widely among countries, it focuses mainly on either the institutional level or 
programme level or both. 
QAS use three basic methods for quality review: self-review (or self-study, usually 
done by the institution) followed by peer-review (by other academics usually in the same 
discipline) and/or external review (by panels including non-academics and sometimes people 
from other countries, in addition to peers). The body of research into higher education quality 
assurance has established that while internal institutional self-evaluation serves the 
improvement rationale, the externally imposed accountability rationale is fulfilled by 
accreditation measures (Kohoutek, 2009). Generally, QAS use four major sources of data: 
self-review reports (which provide a foundation for peer or external review teams); site visits 
(widely used as a follow-up on the self-review reports); surveys (questionnaires or 
interviews); and performance indicators. QAS can serve two major purposes: improvement 
(formative approaches where the focus is on improvement not control) and accountability 
(summative approaches aiming at external oversight and control). The outcomes of QAS 
include reports (on an HEI or a programme). Follow-up procedures, where responsibility can 
lie with a government body, a QAA or the HEI itself and linking evaluation to funding, which 
is important for accountability and an incentive to improvement but is an area of considerable 
debate.    
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Figure  4.1: Major Elements of Quality Assurance Systems in Higher Education  
 
Source: Kis (2005, P.41). 
On the balance between the purposes/functions of QAS, it should be noted that some 
definitions confine QA to accountability to stakeholders whereas others see QA covering both 
accountability and enhancement. Some definitions also link QA with specified standards as 
shown in Table  4.2.   
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Table  4.2: Functions/Objectives of Quality Assurance in higher education 
                 Quality                                              
               Assurance 
                   in HE 
Authors 
Ensuring 
accountability to 
stakeholders 
Covering both 
accountability and 
enhancement 
Achieving specified 
standards 
Harvey and Knight, 
1996; Spanghel, 2001 
cited in Lomas, 2007; 
Biggs and Tang, 
2007; OECD, 2007. 
-accountability to 
stakeholders 
-value for money and 
fitness for purpose 
-ensuring that money 
has been well spent 
  
Vroeijenstijn, 1995; 
Quality Assurance 
Division, 1997; 
Woodhouse, 1999; 
CHEA, 2001; 
Campbell and 
Rozsnyai, 2002; 
William, 2002; Lenn, 
2004; Vlãsceanu et 
al., 2007, OECD and 
World Bank, 2010. 
 
-maintaining and developing 
the quality of higher 
education  
-maintaining and enhancing 
the quality of standards of 
education  
 
Tempus, 2001; 
HEQC, 2004. 
  
-standardization of 
products 
-ensuring that specified 
standards are met 
For the first group which confines QA to ensuring accountability to stakeholders, Harvey and 
Knight (1996) argue that, through its external quality monitoring systems, QA is mainly 
concerned with value for money and fitness for purpose and, in their view, the UK 
government is mainly concerned with these factors. Biggs and Tang (2007) and Spanghell 
(2001, cited in Lomas, 2007, p.403) agree with Harvey and Knight that QA is concerned that 
money has been spent well and services are fit for purpose. In their definitions, OECD (2007) 
also focused on conforming to established requirements and fitness for purpose while Billing 
(2004) argues that, in countries such as the UK, where there is considerable institutional 
autonomy, the focus is mainly on accountability.   
For the second group of definitions which sees QA covering both accountability and 
enhancement, the Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA, 2001) defines QA as a  
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Planned and systematic review process of an institution or program to 
determine that acceptable standards of education, scholarship, and 
infrastructure are being maintained and enhanced. They add that QA usually 
include expectations that mechanisms of quality control are in place and 
effective. Also (U.K.), the means through which an institution confirms that 
the conditions are in place for students to achieve the standards set by the 
institution or other awarding body.  
Campbell and Rozsnyai‘s (2002) definition of quality assurance also focuses on maintaining 
and developing the quality of higher education and William (2002) argued that QA is not the 
opposite of enhancement. Billing (2004) argues that this approach is typical of countries 
where the sector is subject to strong state regulation, as in continental Europe, and there is no 
need for further control through QA, hence the emphasis on enhancement.        
The third group of definitions links quality with achieving specified standards. 
Tempus (2001), for example, links quality with standardization of products and sees the main 
purpose of QA as ensuring final users get a standard quality service. Higher Education 
Quality Council (HEQC, 2004) also sees QA as a process of ensuring that specified standards 
or requirements have been achieved.   
This account suggests something in common between definitions of quality and 
quality assurance. They share a focus on both accountability (value for money and fitness for 
purpose) and enhancement (improving the quality of provision) as two main 
functions/objectives. Thus, quality assurance can be argued to be a blend of these two 
objectives/functions with a successful system striking a balance between them.     
As shown in Figure  4.2, it is helpful to distinguish between two types of applications 
of QA: External Quality Assurance Systems (EQAS), usually called quality audits or 
external/institutional audits, and Internal Quality Assurance Systems (IQAS) which are 
usually called Quality Control (QC) mechanisms. Vlãsceanu et al., (2007) argues that IQAS, 
or quality control mechanisms, are crucial to any QA system, defining Quality Control as ―the 
 87 
process of quality evaluation that focuses on internal measurement of the quality of an 
institution or a programme. It refers to a set of operational activities and techniques … 
elaborated and used to fulfil requirements of quality‖.  
However, Harvey (2004) argues that most of the definitions he reviewed state or imply 
that QA is something done to institutions by an external agency, although assurance of quality 
can be done by a self-regulatory process within an institution. The internal/external difference 
may also be distinguished on the basis that internal systems are concerned with monitoring for 
improving quality while external systems may be more focused on assuring quality and 
accountability.  
Figure  4.2: Types of Quality Assurance Systems 
 
In addition, quality assurance systems aim to ensure that institutions have sound internal QC 
systems in place, Vlãsceanu et al., (2007) arguing that quality audit, as an EQAS, looks at the 
system for achieving good quality and not at quality itself. Simply put, quality control is 
concerned with the quality of higher education products, services, or processes, with an 
emphasis on the assurance that a prescribed threshold of quality is met whereas quality 
assurance, through institutional audits, is process-oriented and designed to make sure 
processes and procedures of monitoring quality are appropriate and sufficient. That is, QA, 
through EQAS, is process-oriented whereas QC is product oriented. There is on-going debate 
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whether the emphasis of EQAS should be on accountability (value for money and fitness for 
purpose) or on improving teaching and learning (enhancing the student experience and 
empowering students as life-long learners).    
While Vlãsceanu et al., (2007) argue that quality assurance as a regulatory mechanism 
focuses on both accountability and enhancement, Biggs and Tang (2007) see its main focus 
on accountability so that Quality Assurance (QA) and Quality Enhancement (QE) are 
different. In their view, QA is concerned with maintaining the quality of work and is a 
retrospective process, assuring quality by requiring conformity to externally imposed 
standards. It aims to assure that ―appropriate accountability and fire-fighting mechanisms 
have been working well and that money has been well spent‖. QE, however, is concerned 
with reviewing not only how well the whole institution works in achieving its mission but 
how it may keep improving and, in this sense, is prospective in seeking continual 
improvement (p.263). Thus, QE aims to improve performance by disseminating good practice 
while QA is concerned with ensuring that university services are fit for purpose. It is also 
argued that the nature of QA tends towards greater standardization whereas QE provides for 
greater differentiation, diversity and distinctiveness (Spanghehl, 2001 cited in Lomas, 2007). 
Harvey and Knight (1996) see that quality assurance, through its external audits, are 
mainly concerned with accountability, value for money and fitness for purpose and not with 
service orientation, client empowerment and continuous improvement; enhancement is seen 
as a secondary function, a consequence or side effect.   
In examining a balance between the two objectives/functions of QAS, Campbell and 
Rozsnyai (2002) argue that much depends on context and circumstance. For instance, when 
addressing the rapid growth of unregulated private education or the introduction of new types 
of institutions or qualifications, it would be appropriate to put emphasis on accountability and 
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compliance. However, as institutions develop more effective and sophisticated internal quality 
assurance systems, the emphasis should move towards enhancement.  
Williams (2002) tried to explain quality assurance to academics by arguing it is not 
(necessarily) something that has to be done to them by malignant sadists or a self-reverential 
priesthood, that it is not the opposite of "enhancement" … and that it is not the enemy of 
academic freedom or integrity. Quality assurance is as much a route to self-assurance as to 
public reassurance, adding that institutional autonomy, academic freedom, accountability, 
intellectual development are, or should be, the stuff of dialogue between society and academy, 
as important as widening participation, employability and retention rates. On this argument, 
there is no contradiction between the different objectives of quality assurance. 
Kemmenade et al., (2008) concluded that the lack of acceptance of external evaluation 
systems in higher education by academia might be connected with too much control and too 
little improvement. The decline in use of the European Foundation for Quality Management 
(EFQM) model in higher education, for example, might be caused by its degeneration from 
continuous improvement to control, and some signs of increase of use of ISO9000:2000, as a 
QA model, might be caused by its greater focus on continuous improvement than its former 
versions ISO9000:1994 and ISO9000:1987.  
From this discussion, it is clear that much of the criticism of QA has been of EQAS as 
they are more concerned with control and accountability than enhancement. Thus, it could be 
argued that there should be a change in the steering paradigm of quality assurance with more 
emphasis on enhancement if it is to be accepted by academia and become well-embedded and 
activated for the benefit of the sector. This is reflected in recent OECD and World Bank 
reports which advocate that policy orientations should include the need to develop and work 
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towards strategic visions, to ensure that quality assurance serves both improvement and 
accountability purposes (OECD and World Bank, 2010; OECD, 2010a).       
How these different concepts are manifested in QAS in Egypt and the UK is examined 
in the next section. 
4.5 Quality Assurance Systems in Egypt and the UK 
4.5.1 Quality Assurance Systems in Egypt Higher Education 
4.5.1.1 A Historical Context 
It is worth mentioning that the emergence of markets in HE (through the introduction of - or 
sharp increase in- tuition fees, competition among HEIs, lack of trust in professionals and the 
increasing demand for accountability and efficiency gains) has been one of the main 
rationales behind the emergence of QAS in HE in the UK and many other western countries, 
whereas it is not the case in Egypt.   
During the last three decades, there have been several attempts to improve the quality 
of higher education in Egypt, some individual/semi-individual initiatives, such as establishing 
a Faculty of Medicine in Suez Canal University, the country‘s first community-oriented, 
problem-based, and student centred medical school. Others were institutional/semi-
institutional, such as establishing a system of credit hours in faculties in selected universities. 
One of the most important trials was an initiative from the Supreme Council for Universities 
(SCU), a governmental body for public universities, in 1989 which directly addressed the 
evaluation of institutional performance (Sliem, 2006).  
A committee for enhancing institutional performance was established in 1989 and its 
report suggested the adoption of self-evaluation for institutional performance. It also 
recommended accrediting academic programmes as a starting point for enhancing and 
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promoting quality. Institutions were to be asked to evaluate their performance and a list of 
steps was suggested so that self-evaluation could be implemented successfully (SCU, 1991 
cited in Sliem, 2006): 
- establishing a council for evaluating institutional performance and accrediting 
academic programmes; 
- setting academic standards for different disciplines; 
- establishing a unit in each faculty or institute which is fully aware of the dimensions 
of self-evaluation; 
- asking all academic departments to do programme specifications for its programmes 
and specifications for its courses; 
- joining similar departments together and into permanent academic committees and 
then linking them to committees of education sectors in the SCU; 
- and revising the laws of higher education to assist in implementing the proposed 
development. 
However, Sliem (2006) argues that a weakness of the proposal is that it linked the evaluation 
of institutional performance to a committee belonging to the SCU which is not independent of 
HEIs. Clearly, Sliem represents the view that such a body should be independent, a contested 
view depending on positions adopted in relation to the debate on professional autonomy and 
trust (Codd, 2005; Thomas, 2005; Le Grand, 2007).        
  In 2000, a National Conference on Higher Education Reform was held (National 
Conference on Higher Education, 2000) to discuss the national plan for enhancing higher 
education. This helped shape the reform agenda with 25 specific initiatives/projects to be 
implemented over a 15-year period, 12 given priority and funded through a loan agreement 
between the Government of Egypt (GOE) and World Bank (IBRD Loan No. 4658EGT) 
through the Higher Education Enhancement Project (HEEP) (World Bank, 2002a). These 12 
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projects were bundled into six and given priority in the first phase of the strategic plan (2002 
– 2007) (HEEP, 2007):  
 FOEP: Faculties of Education Project 
 ETCP: Egyptian Technical Colleges Project 
 FLDP: Faculty-Leadership Development Project 
 ICTP: Information & Communication Technology Project 
 QAAP: Quality Assurance and Accreditation Project 
 HEEPF: Higher Education Enhancement Project Fund 
QAAP is described further to show how a system of quality assurance has been established.   
Before discussing the major elements of QAS in Egypt higher education, I would like 
to give a brief summary about the progress in the QAAP project. QAAP is intended to support 
HEIs in establishing QA systems and preparing them to apply for accreditation from National 
Authority for Quality Assurance and Accreditation in Education (NAQAAE) which was 
established in 2006 upon a presidential decree (People‘s Assembly, 2006). QAPP‘s mission is 
assuring the quality, ongoing improvement and efficient performance of HEIs and, thereby, 
gain the confidence of society in the abilities, calibre and efficiency of graduates. QAAP 
activities were implemented from 2003 to 2008 and related to eight objectives (QAAP, 2007a; 
QAAP, 2008a; HEEP, 2010).  
QAAP Objective 1: Development of six pilot self-studies, as a role model. Six pilot studies in 
six faculties undertook a full self-study of their strengths and weaknesses with suggested 
corrective actions. This created awareness and disseminated basic ideas of quality assurance 
and clarified the actual situation, including potential developments and problems. All sites 
were also visited by external teams. 
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QAAP Objective 2: Establishment of QA centres at the universities. Sixteen quality assurance 
centers were established and monitored by QAAP. 
QAAP Objective 3: Establishing Internal Quality Assurance Systems and QA units at faculty 
level. One hundred and fifty quality assurance units were established in faculties at all public 
universities to support the establishment of Internal Quality Assurance Systems (IQAS). 
Equipped and managed by trained and qualified staff, their aim is to secure sustainable 
implementation of institutional quality assurance measurement and support communication 
between departments and administrations.   
QAAP Objective 4: Development of Strategic Plans for each university. All 17 government-
run universities8 have been funded to prepare strategic plans. This project was the first of its 
kind to assess the status of an institution via Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, 
and Threats (SWOT analysis) and to set up action plans targeting accreditation. Fifteen plans 
were submitted to QAAP, externally evaluated and finalised.  
QAAP Objective 5: Establishing National Academic Reference Standards (NARS) for the 
different sectors. QAAP has developed NARS for 10 academic sectors: Nursing, Agriculture, 
Engineering, Veterinary Medicine, Basic Science, Pharmacy, Home Economics, Medicine, 
Arts & Literature and Physical Education. These standards were prepared with expert 
members of each sector committee according to international standards and the needs of the 
labour market. The programmes of each sector were reviewed to ensure the applicability of 
the proposed standards. 
                                                 
8
 There were 17 government-run universities at that time (2007) but now they are 19, after two branches recently 
became independent.    
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QAAP Objective 6: Raising the awareness among HEIs and the community about the culture 
of quality in education and building their capacity through training on different quality 
assurance approaches. QAAP placed much effort into raising awareness and disseminating 
ideas through workshops on a range of methods and techniques for different groups 
Awareness campaigns included distributing publications, TV programmes and interviews 
along with newspaper articles.   
QAAP Objective 7: Conducting Developmental Engagement (DE) Visits to Egyptian faculties 
to support them to be ready to apply for accreditation. One hundred and fifty one faculties 
undertook self studies and submitted them to QAAP who sent monitoring and supporting 
teams prior to peer review site-visits. One hundred and twenty faculties received these DE 
visits and submitted their evaluation reports and 29 had follow-up visits in a programme of 
work that is continuing. These visits help in identifying the strengths and weaknesses of HEIs 
and has led some faculties to apply for participation in the second phase of the project, the 
Continuous Improvement and Qualifying for Accreditation Project (CIQAP).     
QAAP Objective 8: Participating in the establishment of the National Authority for Quality 
Assurance and Accreditation in Education (NAQAAE). QAAP is involved in preparing for the 
establishment of a national accreditation body, providing expertise on accrediting faculties, 
academic reference standards for 10 sectors and a data base of trained experts.  
Given the challenges ahead, much of the necessary groundwork has been laid: quality 
assurance documentation and manuals have been developed and made available to academic 
staff of higher education institutions; training and professional development opportunities 
have been provided; and indications have been given that good performance will be 
recognized and rewarded. However, important work remains to be done at the institutional 
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level in moving beyond compliance, and to mature the internal quality culture and 
management capacity (OECD and World Bank, 2010).      
4.5.1.2 An Overview of QAS in Egypt Higher Education  
Figure  4.3 shows the major elements of QAS in Egypt, representing its accreditation and 
evaluation roles. Both monitor: 
 the extent to which internal quality systems and processes are in place and are 
effective; and 
 the academic standards of the programmes, quality of the learning opportunities, 
research and other scholarly activity, community involvement and the effectiveness of 
quality management and enhancement (QAAP, 2007a, P.207). 
In the case of research activity, however, the procedure reviews the quantity of research, its 
contribution to institutional mission and impact on the educational programme(s) but does not 
attempt to assess its quality (QAAP, 2007a, P.4).  
The figure shows that QA is mainly focused on the institutional and the programme 
level but, for the purposes of quality assurance and accreditation, accreditation will initially 
be accorded to a HEI, a faculty or a college within a university (QAAP, 2007a). The methods 
of quality review include self-review followed by peer-review (by academics usually in the 
same discipline) and external evaluation which provides an independent professional opinion 
on the assessment of student performance and the academic standards achieved on graduation 
(QAAP, 2007a). There are three major sources of data: a self-review report, a site-visit and 
surveys.  
These mechanisms serve two major purposes: improvement and accountability. The 
outcomes include reports, follow-up procedures, where responsibility can lie with the 
National Quality Assurance and Accreditation Committee (NQAAC) or the National 
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Authority for Quality Assurance and Accreditation of Education (NAQAAE) or the HEI 
itself. Evaluation is also linked to funding under Continuous Improvement and Qualifying for 
Accreditation Project (CIQAP9), which is an important factor in improving the dialogue of 
accountability and also an incentive for improving efficiency; indeed, even an accredited HEI 
is expected to continue to improve. The HEI is responsible for preparing its action plan for 
further development, informed by its mission, the accreditation report and NAQAAE‘s 
criteria for accreditation. This may include any application for funding from CIQAP (QAAP, 
2007a, p.68; PCIQA, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 CIQAP (Continuous Improvement and Qualifying for Accreditation Project) was then called PCIQA (Program 
of Continuous Improvement and Qualifying for Accreditation) in the second cycle of the project.  
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Figure  4.3: Major Elements of Quality Assurance Systems in Higher Education in Egypt 
 
Figure  4.4 is an overview of the process, commencing in the HEI with the preparation of 
course, programme and faculty self-evaluation reports. A HEI may also prepare a periodic 
(five yearly) strategic report. After submitting its annual report to NQAAC, the HEI and 
NQAAC consider the timing of a site-visit and size and composition of the review team (Ibid, 
13; 35). The review team‘s site-visit report results in one of two decisions, that the HEI is 
either ready or not ready to receive an accreditation visit. 
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Figure  4.4: An Overview of Quality Assurance Systems in Higher Education in Egypt 
 
If the HEI is not ready to receive an accreditation visit, it will be responsible for preparing its 
action plan for further development and it may apply for funding from CIQAP to assist its 
work. A plan should be submitted to NAQAAC within eight weeks of receiving the review 
report and the NQAAC will continue to support and monitor progress and, if appropriate, 
arrange a further follow-up or monitoring visit until the HEI is ready to apply for 
accreditation. Unlike the accreditation site-visit report, the peer review site visit report is not 
published but NQAAC sends copies to the institution (QAAP, 2007a).  
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For HEIs which are ready to receive an accreditation visit, the site-visit report results 
in either accreditation, accreditation conditional upon satisfying relatively minor changes or 
an HEI is not ready to be accredited. An accredited HEI is listed in a published register for a 
period not exceeding five years and are invited to prepare for re-accreditation, normally every 
five years10. HEIs which need to make further improvement can re-apply when they satisfy the 
published criteria. In all cases, the accreditation report will be published and a copy sent to the 
HEI before publication (Ibid).  
4.5.2 Quality Assurance Systems in the UK Higher Education 
4.5.2.1 A Historical Context 
While the role of HEIs in assuring and improving the quality of teaching and learning is 
recognized, much of the debate in the UK in the 1990s has been about the arrangements for 
external quality assurance. A major impetus for altering arrangements for external quality 
assurance was the Further and Higher Education Act 1992 and its abolition of the binary 
divide in higher education, creation of  a unitary system of funding  and  the creation of 
quality assessment arrangements (Clark, 2006; Brennan et al., no date; Brown, 2004). 
The funding councils were given a statutory responsibility for assuring the quality of 
the provision they funded, to be fulfilled through a system of external peer review. 
Assessment focused on subjects and aimed to link quality to funding in order to improve 
quality and also provide information to users. Quality assessment reports were published 
containing a graded summative result. The process required a self-assessment by the 
institution and a three-day visit by a team of ―peers‖ from other HEIs selected by the funding 
                                                 
10
 It is worth mentioning that some faculties have recently been awarded accreditation from NAQAAE such as 
Faculty of Medicine, Suez Canal University; Faculty of Nursing, Alexandria University; Faculty of Pharmacy, 
Cairo University; Faculty of Science, Assiut University; Faculty of Engineering, Assiut University; and Faculty 
of Pharmacy, Mansoura University (NAQAAE, 2011).   
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council. Much of the assessment visit was spent observing teaching, meeting staff and 
students and reviewing course documentation (Brennan et al., no date).    
Such a system was entirely new to the old universities whose external scrutiny had 
come mainly from external examiners, while the former polytechnics had experienced these 
types of processes for many years through reviews by Her Majesty‘s Inspectors while their 
academic standards were accredited by an external Council for National Academic Awards 
(CNAA), intended to ensure similar standards across institutions. When a single system was 
created, the Government was determined to ensure the maintenance of quality in teaching and 
learning and not be neglected by more emphasis on research in the new sector (Clark, 2006; 
Brennan et al., no date).  
In addition to external assessment of teaching, the councils also assessed research, a 
process first introduced for the old universities in the 1980s. Although its methodology 
changed over the years, it also was based on peer review. The most significant feature of 
research assessment, however, was the strong link to funding as significant resources 
depended on the outcomes (Brennan et al., no date).  
A third form of external assessment was the quality audit process carried out by the 
Higher Education Quality Council (HEQC). HEQC was a creation of the institutions 
themselves and ―owned‖ by them through the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals 
(CVCP). Created in 1992 out of separate organisations in the previous sectors, its‘ audit 
procedure was adopted from the Academic Audit Unit of the CVCP, introduced in the ―old‖ 
universities in 1990. The process also used peer review and was focused at the institutional 
level. Audit assumed and emphasised the autonomy and responsibility of institutions and its 
function was to test whether institutions had their own internal quality systems and whether 
they were working properly (Ibid).  
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Thus, by the mid-1990s and for the first time, HEIs faced assessment of quality of 
three kinds: teaching, research and institutional management of quality. This system was 
initially unpopular, especially among the old universities, who prided themselves on their 
autonomy and felt it was threatened by what were regarded as over-intrusive systems (Brown, 
2004; Brennan et al., no date). Moreover, the subject reviews proved to be a massive 
logistical exercise and there were concerns about the amount of bureaucracy involved. While 
some academic staff believed this intrusion into academic affairs should be resisted at all 
costs, the majority recognized there should be some accountability for one of the main 
functions of universities. Many accepted that reviews served a useful purpose and some 
welcomed the increased attention being given to the quality of teaching and learning. But 
there was persistent concern about the resources needed and the time taken to participate in 
them. As a result, it was decided in 2000 that subject reviews should be regarded as complete 
at the end of the current round (Clark, 2006). 
Since 1993 there had been proposals for a single quality assurance regime, which  led 
in 1997 to the creation of a new Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) which took over 
responsibility for assessing teaching from the funding councils and institutional audits from 
the HEQC, while  responsibility for assessing research remained with the funding councils 
(Brown, 2004; Brennan et al., no date). QAA continues to audit quality control procedures 
and monitors quality, along lines adopted in many European countries, relying on institutional 
self regulation and imposing a significantly smaller resource burden on institutions (Clark, 
2006) as it has moved back from detailed forms of quality assessment, including of particular 
subjects, to a lighter touch (King, 2006).    
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4.5.2.2 An Overview of QAS in the UK Higher Education  
The QAA is independent of UK governments and owned by the organisations that represent 
the heads of UK universities and colleges (Universities UK, Universities Scotland, Higher 
Education Wales and the Standing Conference of Principals). Universities and Colleges are 
responsible for managing the standards and quality of their awards through Internal Quality 
Assurance Systems (IQAS) and the QAA carries out External Quality Assurance Systems 
(EQAS) in order to judge both how reliably institutions fulfil their responsibility and the 
effectiveness of their processes for doing this. QAA safeguards the public interest in relation 
to higher education qualifications and also encourages universities and colleges to keep 
improving their quality and its management (QAA, 2005a; QAA, 2005b; QAA, 2009) 
through:  
• conducting external reviews in universities and colleges at institutional level and at subject 
and programme level (academic review of HE delivered in FE colleges, major review of 
healthcare education in England, review of Foundation Degrees); 
• advising government on applications for degree awarding powers and university title; 
• describing clear academic standards through the Academic Infrastructure comprising the 
frameworks of higher education qualifications, the Codes of Practice for the assurance of 
academic quality and standards, and subject benchmark statements and programme 
specifications; 
• the licensing of authorised validating agencies to recognize Access to Higher Education 
programmes and award Access certificates; 
• offering advice on academic standards and quality.  
The switch to institutional-level reviews is the result of a desire to reduce the amount of 
external scrutiny and recognize institutional autonomy (QAA, 2005b), each approving its own 
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programmes using QA procedures, while QAA makes sure they do this satisfactorily. In 
addition, however, individual programmes that lead to professional or vocational 
qualifications are also accredited by professional, statutory or regulatory bodies, a form of 
accreditation designed to ensure that students are competent to undertake professional 
practice. For example, the General Medical Council accredits programmes in medicine and 
licenses doctors to practice medicine in the UK (QAA, 2005a; QAA, 2005b). The British 
Accreditation Council, which is independent of Government, is the national accrediting body 
for further and higher education outside the state sector (QAA, 2005b).  
Figure  4.5 sets out the major elements of QA systems in the UK. It shows external 
audit as the main approach for institutional level assessment. There are three basic methods of 
review: self-review followed by peer-review (by academics usually in the same discipline) 
and external evaluation (External Examiners) which provide an independent professional 
opinion on the appropriateness of the assessment of students‘ performance and standards 
achieved on graduation.  
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Figure  4.5: Major Elements of Quality Assurance Systems in Higher Education in the UK 
                               
There are five major sources of data: self-review reports (a key reference point for the peer 
review team); site-visits by peers (sometimes including professionals and students); surveys; 
students‘ written submission and external examiners‘ reports. The site-visit results in a 
judgment in the form of qualitative reports and these are published on the QAA website 
(QAA, 2009).  
QA systems in the UK serve two major purposes: improvement and accountability. On 
improvement, QAA reports to the audited HEI with recommendations for its further 
consideration, including identifying good practice. There are follow-up procedures to ensure 
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HEIs continue managing academic standards and quality. On accountability, the full report is 
published on QAA‘s website for the wider public and potential students. When a HEI receives 
a judgment of limited or no confidence, the report will be published with a programme of 
follow up action. If the institution does not progress satisfactorily after implementing the 
remedial plan, HEFCE reserves the right to withdraw some or all of its funding (QAA, 2009, 
PP.6-27). 
Figure  4.6 is an overview of the process, beginning with the preparation of an internal 
self-evaluation document. QAA then arranges a peer review site-visit. Institutional audit is 
intended to encourage self-evaluation and to offer opportunities for enhancing institutional 
management of standards and quality (QAA, 2009, QAA, 2005a; QAA, 2005b). These audits 
take place every six years and visits over five days where the audit team speaks to staff and 
students and reviews relevant documents. The team makes a judgment about the confidence 
that can be placed in the soundness of the present and likely future management of the 
academic standard of awards and the quality of learning opportunities. The judgment is either 
limited confidence, no confidence or confidence/broad confidence. The report is published on 
the QAA website and follow up procedures are taken when required. A mid-cycle follow up 
serves as a short check for the HEI and QAA on the continuing management of standards and 
quality, and is normally three years after an institutional audit, and is a paper-based exercise 
conducted by two senior QAA officers drawing upon institutional documentation and making 
limited demand on institutions (QAA, 2009, pp.25-26). 
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Figure  4.6: An Overview of Quality Assurance Systems in Higher Education in the UK. 
 
While QAA reviews include some postgraduate research programmes to see how research 
activity informs learning opportunities, the quality of research is reviewed through a Research 
Assessment Exercise (RAE), which allocates money on the basis of peer review and has 
serious impact on the reputation of departments through the published ratings (Bush, 2007; 
Neyland, 2007). 
Having presented an overview of QAS in higher education in Egypt and the UK, the 
main features of both systems are summarized in Table  4.3.  
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 Table  4.3: Quality Assurance Systems in HE in Egypt and the UK 
         Country               
Comparison 
Egypt The UK 
Approach External review/audit and accreditation External review/audit 
Level Programmes and institutions Institutions  
Quality of 
Teaching   
NAQAAE 
QAA and other professional bodies 
such as TDA for teacher training 
programmes 
Quality of 
Research 
No organisation is committed to evaluate 
the quality of research 
RAE 
Informing 
Funding 
Neither the quality of teaching nor the 
quality of research informs distribution of 
budgets among universities 
Quality of teaching does not impact 
distribution of funding whereas quality 
of research informs the distribution of 
quality related (QR) money among 
universities  
Nature of 
QAS  
Accountability  and Quality enhancement 
Accountability and Quality 
enhancement 
It is clear from the table that the approach to QA in Egypt higher education is done through 
external review/audits with the main aim of getting HEIs in Egypt accredited by NAQAAE. 
Although the approach to QA in the UK higher education is done through external 
review/audits, as well, the main aim is to make sure HEIs have sound internal quality 
assurance systems in place and are working properly. In Egypt, QAS are mainly focused on 
the institutional level and the programme level but, for the purposes of quality assurance and 
accreditation, accreditation will initially be accorded to a HEI, a faculty or a college within a 
university whereas in the UK, QAS are mainly focused on the institutional level. 
Whereas NAQAAE is in charge of assuring the quality of teaching in Egypt higher 
education, no organisation/agency is committed to evaluating the quality of research. In the 
UK, on the other hand, QAA and other professional bodies such as Training and Development 
Agency (TDA) are in charge of assuring the quality of teaching whereas the quality of 
research is assessed through RAE. Neither the quality of teaching nor the quality of research 
informs the distribution of budgets amongst universities in Egypt higher education. In the UK, 
the quality of teaching has no impact on the distribution of funding among universities 
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whereas the quality of research informs the distribution of QR money among universities. 
Quality assurance systems in both countries aim to cover both accountability and 
enhancement (enhancing the management of higher education and the quality of provision).     
4.6 Conclusion 
It is clear that there is much that is similar in QAS in higher education in Egypt and the UK. 
This is not surprising as the development of QAS in Egypt has been undertaken by NQAAC 
in collaboration with British consultants (QAAP, 2007a). Thus, it can be said that QAS are 
very similar in both countries but the UK has a well established system whereas QAS in 
Egypt are still in a transitional phase. While there is much that is similar in the QAS of Egypt 
and the UK, its novelty in Egypt may cause it to be viewed differently in terms of autonomy, 
accountability, efficiency and equity. It may also be that different cultural and historical 
contexts will influence how these concepts are understood in relation to QAS. Chapter seven 
examines perceptions of QAS in Cairo University and the University of Birmingham.  
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5 CHAPTER FIVE 
        RESEARCH DESIGN  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses conceptual and practical elements of the study. A brief introduction 
sets out the research problem and the research questions that arise. Subsequently, the research 
design is discussed and includes: the methodological stance and approach; methods of data 
collection; piloting and evaluating methods of data collection; approach to the analysis; 
followed by other issues such as validity, reliability and ethical considerations.  
5.2 Research Questions 
Earlier chapters have identified the multiple challenges facing higher education in Egypt, 
notably issues of finance, quality and governance, reinforced by massive numbers of students 
and demographic pressures for more expansion (Said, 2001; World Bank, 2009; OECD and 
World Bank, 2010).  
As Egypt is not alone in facing these problems, the study draws upon wider 
international experience of higher education reform and examines their implications for 
Egypt. The main aim of this study, therefore, is to consider options for funding and quality 
assurance in light of the Egyptian context and international experience, including a 
comparative study with the UK. 
Specifically, the study addresses five research questions:  
1- What is an appropriate theoretical framework for examining the impact of funding and 
quality assurance systems on higher education? 
2- How do funding mechanisms affect higher education in Egypt and the UK? 
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3- How do quality assurance systems affect higher education in Egypt and the UK? 
4- In the context of findings from the empirical enquiry, what are the implications for 
funding and quality assurance systems of higher education in Egypt?  
5- How do these implications meet key goals related to autonomy, accountability, 
efficiency and equity? 
5.3 Research Design 
In summary, this study is located within a broadly interpretive methodology, using a case 
study approach with document analysis and semi-structured interviews as methods of data 
collection, utilizing qualitative and quantitative data and approaches in all its components.   
Although mainly qualitative, document analysis, for example, uses both quantitative 
and qualitative operations on the text, taking account of the frequency of issues as well as 
their nature. In analysing interview data also, a limited amount of quantification is used, such 
as how many people make similar comments. It is argued that both approaches have strengths 
but greater strength comes from their appropriate combination. That is, they can be seen as 
complementary approaches. In addition, combined methods can have greater impact as 
numbers can be very persuasive to policy-makers whereas stories are often used by them for 
illustrative purposes (Gorard and Taylor, 2004).  
5.3.1 The Methodological Stance of the Study 
The recent history of educational research has been dominated by the apparent conflict 
between positivist and interpretivist paradigms perceived as mutually antagonistic ideal-types. 
Yet, both traditions are essentially concerned with understanding phenomena but through two 
different lenses (Cohen et al., 2007; Oakley, 2000; Ernest, 1994; Pring, 2000; Ritchis and 
Lewis, 2007; Thomas, 2009).  
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Bryman (2008) distinguishes between two main ontological positions: objectivism, 
which is closely linked to positivism and natural science disciplines, and constructivism, 
which is closely linked to interpretivism, sociological and social science research. This study 
adopts a constructivist approach as the researcher believes that people have an active role in 
constructing social reality and social structures and that categories and concepts within society 
are socially constructed, and these phenomena are in a state of flux as people and society 
change (Ibid). Located within an interpretive methodology, it seeks to understand the 
perceptions (different interpretations) of participants (academic and administrative staff) on 
the way funding mechanisms and QAS might affect universities in Egypt and the UK in terms 
of autonomy, accountability, efficiency and equity. The approach recognizes that participants 
may have different views or definitions of these four concepts as they seek to make sense of 
or interpret these phenomena.    
The interpretive methodology is viewed as suitable as it is believed that there are 
multiple interpretations of, and perspectives on, single events and situations (funding and 
QAS in Egypt and the UK) and that reality is multilayered and complex. An interpretive 
approach is primarily concerned with human understanding, interpretation and 
intersubjectivity, in essence lived experience or lived truth in its natural social context from 
the standpoint of individuals who are part of the ongoing action being investigated (Ernest, 
1994; Sparkes 1992, Randor, 1994; Usher; 1996; Smeyers, 2001; Robson, 2002; Mackenzie 
and Knipe, 2006; Alexander, 2006; Black, 2006; Cohen et al., 2007).  
However, precautions are required to overcome the risk of bias and subjectivity in 
largely qualitative forms of enquiry (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). These include data 
triangulation (through gathering multiple view points) and cross-referencing cases within the 
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sample together with other precautions to enhance validity and reliability and ensure rigour of 
the findings discussed later in the study. 
According to Usher (1996) researchers as interpreters must recognize their 
situatedness and must ‗bracket‘ (i.e. temporarily set aside) their meanings, suspend their 
subjectivity, and assume the attitude of disinterested observers. In contrast, Gadmar (1975, 
cited in Usher, 1996, p.21) argues that researchers cannot escape from their ‗pre-
understandings‘ even temporarily. Far from being closed prejudices or biases, their pre-
understandings, make them more open-minded as they are put at risk, tested and modified 
through the encounter with what they are trying to understand. So researchers should use 
them as the essential starting point for acquiring knowledge rather than bracketing them. 
Guba (1990) adds that knowledge is a human construction which is never certifiable as 
ultimately true but problematic and ever changing. If there are always many interpretations 
that can be made in an enquiry, and if there is no way by which the ultimate truth or falsity of 
these interpretations can be determined, so the researcher should take the position of a 
relativist, where relativism is the key to openness and the continuing search for generating 
one or a few constructions on which there is substantial consensus. Following Gadmar, the 
researcher has used his ‗pre-understandings‘ as the starting point for acquiring knowledge and 
was open-minded whilst conducting the study in the sense that those pre-understandings were 
put at risk, tested and modified through the study. Thus, the researcher here has attempted to 
recognize his pre-understandings and sought to ensure that the research was conducted in 
such a way to avoid those pre-understandings becoming a determinant of the study‘s findings 
(Thomas, 2009).   
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5.3.2 A Case Study Approach 
Case study has been chosen as the methodological strategy/approach and is the logic 
underpinning the research designed (Mason, 2002).       
This study is a detailed investigation of the perceptions of academic and 
administrative staff in two organizations (University of Birmingham/UK and Cairo 
University/Egypt) on funding and QAS. Interviews were conducted with staff with a view to 
an analysis of the context and processes involved in the phenomenon under study. The 
selected cases have enabled the researcher to develop detailed knowledge of the experience of 
participants on funding mechanisms and QAS and an examination of the strengths and 
weaknesses of existing systems, leading to an identification of the implications for alternative 
approaches for Egypt.   
There are several reasons for selecting a case study approach. Case studies examine 
relationships between cause and effect but do not claim to establish a direct causal link. A 
strength is that they enable researchers to observe effects in real contexts, recognizing that 
context is a powerful determinant of both causes and effects. Another strength is that they 
provide fine-grain detail (Cohen et al., 2007) and are a means for seeing situations through 
the eyes of participants. They are widely used in organizational studies in the social sciences 
(Meyer, 2001). Classified under flexible design research, they are preferred as they have the 
advantage of using mixed-methods, often yielding quantitative and qualitative data, although 
qualitative data are almost invariably collected (Robson, 2002). Lastly, the multiplicity of the 
variables and sources of evidence that characterise a case study inquiry are a holistic approach 
which investigates the case as a whole, recognizing its real-life context, rather than dealing 
with isolated factors (Yin, 2003; Denscombe 2007).  
 114 
After a review of the literature, initial analysis of policy documents on funding and 
QAS in HE in both countries and deciding the theoretical/conceptual framework of the study 
(autonomy, accountability, efficiency and equity), the research design operated in two phases: 
phase one focused on Egypt (CU) and phase two on the UK (UoB) with the intention of 
getting insights from a comparative perspective to propose appropriate implications for policy 
and practice in Egypt. It took the researcher around seven months to conduct the field work in 
both countries with Egypt field work conducted between April and July, 2009 and the UK 
field work conducted between July and October, 2009. This shows that case studies using 
interviews and document analysis are very time and resource intensive, however; the output is 
worthwhile in terms of the evidence and rich data generated from such an approach.    
5.3.2.1 Sampling 
The UK has been chosen, as HEIs are funded through a block grant mechanism, contrasting 
with line-item funding in Egypt which many reports have recommended replacing with a 
block grant system to allow universities more autonomy and flexibility (Said, 2001, Fahim 
and Sami, 2009; OECD and World Bank, 2010). British consultants have also been involved 
in establishing QAS in higher education in Egypt (QAAP, 2007a) and thus QAS have many 
similarities with the system in the UK. Thus, the researcher aimed to take the perceptions of 
UK participants on how funding and QAS affect universities in terms of autonomy, 
accountability, efficiency and equity. Identifying these perceptions is thought to be helpful as 
QAS are well-established in the UK whereas they are still new in Egypt. The intention is to 
use the UK experience to propose implications for policy and practice for enhancing funding 
and QAS in Egypt.      
Non-probability sampling was adopted as the researcher has deliberately chosen the 
two universities (CU and UoB) which are not representative of the overall population. This 
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choice is due to several reasons: (a) the researcher has chosen Birmingham because access to 
staff is easier as he is a doctoral researcher at the University; (b) Cairo University11 was 
chosen as it is one of the oldest universities in Egypt and has been subject to reforms relating 
to funding and quality assurance; (c) expense and time are limited on a  PhD programme and 
that is why only two cases were selected; (d) non-probability sampling is suitable for case 
studies as they do not aim to generalize to the whole population; (e) purposive sampling has 
been used to access ‗knowledgeable people‘, i.e. those with in-depth knowledge about 
funding and quality.   
The initial plan was to interview around 20 academic and administrative staff in each 
university. However, more interviews (47 in CU and 29 in UoB) have been conducted as the 
researcher decided continuing interviewing people as long as he finds himself getting new 
data. Snowball sampling was also utilized as participating deans of faculties (heads of 
schools) were asked to recommend academic staff involved/interested in funding and quality 
assurance (Cohen et al., 2007). In UoB, interviews were conducted in four schools, two of 
more theoretical disciplines nature and two of more practical disciplines. The same approach 
was adopted in CU with four schools: two theoretical and two practical. However, during the 
field work, the researcher was advised to take two more faculties (sub-cases) in CU to 
approach a sound/representative sample of massive faculties with up to 60,000 students; 
faculties with reasonable numbers of students (2,000 to 5,000 students); faculties that had 
participated in QAAP for some time and faculties only recently started. Finally, CU ended up 
with six faculties (sub-cases), three practical and three theoretical faculties.         
                                                 
11 Originally established as a private institution in 1908, it became the State University in 1925, was later 
renamed Fouad the First, in the name of the King of Egypt, and then became Cairo University after the 1952 
revolution (Farag, 2007). 
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A mixed sample of academics, senior manager academics and senior managers was 
approached for two main reasons. Firstly, to avoid a methodological problem identified by 
Stensaker (2003) and Kis (2005) concerning the possibility of managers having an interest in 
creating a successful image of quality management to show a good impression of their own 
efforts. Secondly, having a mixed sample allows for triangulating the data through comparing 
the perceptions of participants on issues under investigation. CU‘s sample is comprised of 47 
participants: 7 senior managers; 16 senior manager academics and 24 academic staff. UoB‘s 
sample is comprised of 29 participants: 7 senior managers; 9 senior manager academics and 
13 academic staff. It is worth mentioning that in both cases, senior managers held high posts 
in finance and quality management; senior manager academics included deans and vice deans 
of faculties in Egypt (which is similar to heads of schools and their deputies in UoB); 
academics included academics doing teaching and research with some heads of departments 
or directors of quality assurance units/committees at different levels.  
5.3.2.2 Generalisability  
The extent to which the findings of this study can be applied to people or settings more 
widely (Fraenkel and Wallen, 1993) may be questionable. Its main limitation is its limited 
ability to make generalizations, owing to non-probability sampling. While the purpose of 
‗generalization‘ is attached to the logic and power of probability sampling, ‗in-depth 
understanding‘ is attached to non-probability sampling (Patton, 2002). According to Patton, 
the proposals of this study could be implemented only in Cairo University as the case 
included in the study. 
However, the researcher argues that generalisation of the findings to the other 18 
public universities in Egypt is feasible as there are many similarities between Cairo 
University and Egypt‘s other universities. They are all funded publicly, follow the regulations 
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of the Supreme Council for Universities (SCU) and have been subject to the same reforms for 
funding and quality assurance. Moreover, the legislative framework for finance, governance 
and quality management is the same for all public universities. So, Cairo University might be 
a ―typical case‖, as proposed in Denscombe (2002), with similarities that warrant such 
generalisations.                   
5.3.3 Data Collection Methods 
Document analysis and semi-structured interviews have been used as the principal methods of 
data collection. The study has used triangulation of different methods to map out or explain 
more fully, the richness and complexity of human behaviour. The aim is to study phenomena 
from more than one standpoint as a way of gaining different insights into the same situation 
(Cohen et al., 2007; Yin, 2003; Lacey and Luff, 2007).  
5.3.3.1 Document Analysis 
Document analysis has been used as a secondary source to analyse policy documents and 
reports on funding and QAS in Egypt and the UK. These help address the research questions 
by giving breadth of data and triangulating data generated from interviews. The researcher has 
collected government policy documents; guidelines and reports on funding, and quality 
assurance and documents from the selected universities. Such data are analysed critically 
recognizing that not all material may be made available. Although document analysis can be 
time consuming, its advantages are that data are relatively inexpensive but can provide a good 
source of background information and identify issues not noted by other means. 
As a case study approach is mainly concerned with understanding phenomenon within 
its context; document analysis is helpful in clarifying context. Data generated from available 
documents have been grouped into three categories: the historical background/context and 
policies of funding mechanisms and QAS in both countries and both universities; the 
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strengths and weaknesses/challenges of the systems; and the reforms taking place in HE in 
both cases.  
5.3.3.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews have been used as a primary method of data collection on the 
perceptions of academic and administrative staff and a systematic approach has been adopted 
in their description, conduct and analysis (Breakwell, 2006) to maximize the chance of 
securing meaningful, valid and reliable conclusions. Although the interviewer using this 
technique has some established topics (questions) for investigation, the method allows for 
exploring emergent themes and ideas. The interviewer used a standardized schedule but was 
free to pursue and probe for novel and relevant information through additional questions (see 
Appendices ‗1‘ and ‗2‘: Interview Schedules) (Arksey and Knight, 1999; ESDS Qualidata, 
2007).   
A strength of face to face semi-structured interviews in this study is that they offered 
the possibility of modifying the line of enquiry, following up interesting responses and 
investigating underlying motives. Second, they provided non-verbal clues which helped in 
understanding the verbal response, possibly changing or even, in extreme cases, reversing its 
meaning. Third, they provide rich and highly illuminating material compared with other 
methods of data collection. Fourth, the interviewer could explain misunderstandings, as the 
same question may have different meanings for different people; they are better than 
questionnaires for handling more difficult and open-ended questions such as those included in 
this study (Robson, 2002; Cohen et al., 2007). Fifth, interviews enabled the researcher to 
gather information that could not be obtained by other methods. Surveys, for example, might 
offer mass data about a particular issue but they lack the depth of understanding that 
interviews provide (Tierney and Dilley, 2002). A final and major advantage of interviews is 
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their adaptability, as researchers can follow up answers to obtain more information as well as 
clarifying vague statements. They are also helpful in building trust and rapport with 
respondents, making it possible to obtain information that the interviewee probably would not 
reveal through other methods (Gall et al., 2003).  
There are disadvantages with interviews. They are money and time-consuming and 
require careful preparation. Notes have to be written up; tapes transcribed, taking much time, 
especially with 76 interviews. Analysis of these transcriptions is also time-eaters. There is 
also the reverse phenomenon with the interviewee glad to have a willing ear that the 
researcher cannot escape. However, the researcher had good closure skills and was able to go 
back to the questions on schedule. Although the main disadvantage of interviews is being 
time-consuming, it can be argued that time planning is a crucial skill of successful enquiry in 
all research (Robson, 2002) and that the rich data generated from this technique is worth the 
time, money and effort.  
On the argument that interviews are prone to subjectivity and bias on the part of the 
interviewer (Cohen et al., 2007; Gal et al., 2003), several precautions have been taken to 
avoid these. The researcher used standardized/established questions and questions have been 
asked in the same order. The fact that the interviewer is, to some extent, an insider in both 
places helped build trust and rapport between interviewees and the researcher and facilitated 
the flow of data. Finally, participants were assured that there is no wrong or right answer; it is 
their perceptions which matters.  
Great attention was paid to the construction of the interview schedule. First, I began to 
translate my research questions (e.g. How do funding mechanisms affect higher education in 
Egypt and the UK?) into a form (a series of questions) that can be used with interviewees (e.g. 
1- What is your understanding of the means by which universities are funded?; 2- What would 
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you identify as the main strengths and weaknesses of the existing system for funding higher 
education?). I began with a wide range of questions with a direct bearing on my research with 
questions about funding mechanisms and QAS. I listed all the questions I thought needed 
answering, compiling a total of 27, a very long schedule. Thus, I began to sort through them, 
deleting any unlikely to contribute towards answering my research questions. I grouped the 
remaining questions concerned with the same topic and then checked that the range of 
questions with which I am left was sufficient to cover the topic thoroughly. Having made sure 
the range of questions was sufficient, I revised individual questions (Lofland, 1971, cited in 
Arksey and Knight, 1999, p.90) so that the schedule used main questions to begin and guide 
the conversation with follow up questions to pursue implications. Probes were used, asking 
participants to clarify and explain and also prompts directed towards what may have been 
overlooked (Rubin and Rubin, 1995 cited in Warren, 2002; Drever, 1995). Overall, the 
schedule is intended to have a logical sequence to allow interviewees develop a coherent 
pattern of thought.  
5.3.3.3 Piloting and Evaluating Methods of Data Collection 
An early version of the interview schedule was piloted in April, 2008 with eight doctoral 
researchers from UoB, four of which were home (English) students; three international 
(Egyptian) and one European (Greek). I learned much from this experience, as Breakwell 
(2006, 241) argues ‗properly conducted pilot work pays off‘. It minimizes the risk of finding 
part-way through the study that a vital issue has been ignored or that certain questions cannot 
be understood. I learned that interviewing for collecting data is quite different from ordinary 
conversations, requiring skills of being an active listener, the ability of taking notes while 
listening and not impose his/her ideas on the interviewees. The interviewer should also have 
the ability to use probes and follow up questions to discover further information and follow 
up new emergent themes/issues. 
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Tape recording (5 interviews) and note taking (3) were used to decide on a preferred 
method for providing adequate data. Tape recording was found to be better as it was possible 
to gain insights into how interviewees handled questions and become aware of problems that 
escaped them during the interview itself (Gal et al., 2003). Its use did not eliminate the need 
for notes but did allow the researcher to concentrate on taking strategic and focused notes 
(Patton, 2002). Alongside strategic notes, tape recordings helped greatly, especially in 
categorizing and analyzing data.  
Piloting helped in devising my final interview schedule. Preliminary data generated 
through piloting gave some valuable insights which aided the preparation of the final 
schedule. Having that mix of respondents added value since their different cultures enriched 
the data and gave good insights to the researcher, as there are variations in the context of 
higher education between those countries.      
An updated version of the earlier version of the interview schedule was re-piloted with 
two academics in UoB (February, 2009) before conducting the actual field work and 
suggestions for possible changes (e.g. rewording; reordering, adding and deleting some 
questions) were addressed. The same process also took place in Egypt (March, 2009). The 
final version of the schedule was quite different from the first version used in April, 2008 
which had relied on the brief literature review which the researcher had done by that date. In 
contrast, the final version was prepared after a fuller review of the literature and initial 
analysis of policy documents on funding and QAS in both countries, which led to some 
changes in the direction of the study. This process reflects one of the main characteristics of 
qualitative research, which is its evolving nature.      
Re-piloting my interview schedule was beneficial in several ways (Teijlingen, 2002) 
developing and testing the adequacy of research instruments; identifying logistical problems 
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which might occur using proposed methods; collecting preliminary data; assessing the 
proposed data analysis techniques to uncover potential problems; and modifying the words 
and the order of the questions according to the provided feedback. Having reached the final 
draft of my interview schedule, interviews were conducted with 76 participants (47 in CU and 
29 in UoB).  
5.3.4 Data analysis Procedures 
After conducting the first couple of interviews, the researcher started transcribing and 
reviewing the collected data in light of the research questions so as to be able to reflect on the 
work at an early stage and see if methods of data collection were helping address his research 
questions or needed more adaptation. I transcribed the interviews myself as a way of 
familiarising myself with the data and doing initial data analysis concurrently with my field 
work (Silverman, 2005).   
There was an intention of using NVIVO to analyse the interviews but, whatever its 
merits (Richards, 1999), it could not be used as interviews in Egypt were conducted in Arabic 
which NVIVO does not support and it was not practical in time and effort to translate 47 
interviews from Arabic to English. Besides, literal translations may not give the same 
meaning accurately. As a result, I analysed the Arabic interviews manually to overcome these 
difficulties and, as matter of consistency, the UoB data were also analysed manually.  
Framework analysis was used in data analysis. It is a recent approach to qualitative 
analysis which was developed in the context of applied policy research. It shares many 
features with qualitative analysis, especially ‗thematic analysis‘. Its benefit is that it provides 
systematic and visible stages to the analysis process, so that funders, other researchers and 
readers can be clear about the stages by which the results have been obtained (Lacey and Luff, 
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2007; Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). It should be noted that framework analysis is a data-
management tool and not a substitute for interpretation.     
There are several reasons for adopting such approach. Research is often bounded by 
constraints of time and resources and analysis has to be brought to a close when specific 
questions have been answered; framework analysis is suited to asking specific questions with 
limited timescales, especially with a single researcher conducting a PhD research. Another 
reason is that although framework analysis is mainly inductive, it allows for the inclusion of a 
priori as well as emergent concepts in coding (Ibid). As mentioned earlier, the researcher had 
a priori concepts, from existing literature and document analysis (autonomy, accountability, 
efficiency and equity), which he wished to use as codes in addition to codes developed from 
emergent themes.  
Framework Analysis has five key stages which can be undertaken in a linear fashion, 
although it can be used when data collection and analysis occur concurrently.   
1- Familiarization: The tape recorded interviews have been transcribed verbatim. Even, non-
verbal cues, such as silence; pause; words such as ‗well…er‘ and laughter or gestures have 
been transcribed as they might give added meaning to the spoken word. Thus, an interview 
database of full transcribed interviews is available. The transcriptions have been written in a 
word file with two columns: the first includes the whole transcription and the second 
identifies the main points/message from participants‘ answers, initial codes. After transcribing 
the data, I have organized it into retrievable sections. Each interview has a number and a code 
and given interviewees pseudonyms (SM: Senior Managers; SMA: Senior Manager 
Academics and AS: Academic Staff) with a file which helped link pseudonyms to the original 
informants (e.g. SMA1 means Senior Manger Academic number1). This file was kept 
confidential and will be destroyed 10 years after completion of the project in line with the 
 124 
University of Birmingham‘s code of ethics (2007). Names or other identifiable material have 
been removed from the transcripts.  
The data have been organized in a systematic way and any unit of text can be traced back to 
its original context. I have listened to tapes; read and re-read the data, made memos and 
summaries to get familiar with the data before starting formal analysis. 
2- Identification of a thematic framework: This is the initial coding framework which is 
developed both from a priori issues (autonomy, accountability, efficiency and equity) and 
emerging issues from the familiarisation stage. This thematic framework was developed and 
refined during subsequent stages through re-coding to develop better defined categories. 
Some of the themes emerging from the data were also the issues with which I began my 
research, which suggests my data confirmed their importance and enabled me to explore them 
further. For example, during the interviews, academic and administrative staff raised other 
issues/themes, especially in the case of CU (such as lack of job satisfaction; favouritism/lack 
of transparency; etc.). Having reviewed these emergent themes, I found they all fit within the 
four main themes with which I began my research and, as a result, I have included them 
within these themes.  
3- Indexing: Having identified the thematic framework for the study, the process began of 
applying that framework to the data, using codes to identify specific pieces of data 
corresponding to the themes. I searched the data for material that could be coded under this 
framework while concurrently searching for emergent concepts. The preliminary codes, used 
at this stage, were modified later but served to begin the process of categorizing and 
analysing.   
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4- Charting: This process began by using headings from the thematic framework to create 
charts of my data so that I could read across the dataset. These charts could be thematic for 
each theme across all respondents (cases) or by case for each respondent across all themes. 
Both types were utilized as shown in Table  5.1 which shows how data can be compared both 
ways. 
Table  5.1: An example of the process of charting done during data analysis12 
- How do funding mechanisms affect higher education in Egypt? 
    Themes 
Cases 
Autonomy Accountability Efficiency Equity 
SM1 
Funding restricts 
institutional 
autonomy (lack of 
flexibility, 
complexity and 
bureaucracy). 
Strong system of 
financial accountability 
to the representative of 
Ministry of Finance and 
Central Agency for 
Public Mobilization and 
Statistics (CAPMS).  
Insufficient public 
funding & poor 
efficiency. 
Distributing funding 
among universities is 
quite fair.  
SM2 
Funding does not 
affect institutional 
autonomy as it is 
always insufficient. 
Strong financial 
accountability. 
Insufficient & 
inefficient 
Distributing funding is 
quite fair. 
SMA8 
Public funding does 
not affect academic 
freedom at all. It 
does not affect 
institutional 
autonomy as well. 
We have a strong system 
of financial 
accountability. 
Inefficient. 
There would never be 
equity in funding HEIs 
as long as the funding 
does not meet the real 
cost of teaching 
students.   
SMA10 
It does not affect 
academic freedom 
but it really affects 
institutional 
autonomy. 
I think accountability in 
Egypt is only an 
administrative one, not a 
technical one.  
Inefficient at all. 
Have no idea about 
how funding is 
distributed so I cannot 
decide if it is fair or 
not.  
AS30 
It does not affect 
academic freedom 
but affects 
institutional 
autonomy 
negatively. 
There is no proper 
system of accountability 
for academics but I think 
the QAAP is working on 
improving the 
accountability system.  
It is difficult to talk 
about efficiency of 
funding now as we 
are in a transitional 
period with lots of 
projects, lots of 
funding coming and 
lots of changes.  
I do not know how 
universities and 
faculties are funded. 
AS31 
It does not affect 
academic freedom 
but affects 
institutional 
autonomy seriously.  
It does not provide 
accountability for 
academics.  
Inefficient, inflexible 
and insufficient.  
The way funding is 
distributed among 
different universities is 
unfair.   
                                                 
12
 This table represents a much abridged version of the actual transcript just to give the reader a taste of the 
process of charting done during data analysis.    
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5- Mapping and Interpretation: After the charting process, the analysis went further 
searching for patterns, associations, concepts, and explanations in my data, aided by visual 
displays and plots. This stage aimed at identifying points of consensus and contradiction 
between the different types of participants (SM, SMA and AS). In this final stage of analysis, 
the researcher started to identify the main findings, which were then compared with findings 
from document analysis and cross referenced with findings from the literature.    
5.3.5 Other Design Issues 
Other issues crucial to the study are validity, reliability and ethical considerations.   
5.3.5.1 Validity and Reliability 
Although ‗It is impossible for research to be 100 per cent valid; that is the optimism of 
perfection‘ (Cohen et al., 2007, 133), precautions have been taken to secure different aspects 
of validity. 
Content validity is demonstrated through a careful process of piloting and re-piloting. 
This has increased validity by making sure that the instrument measured what it purported to 
measure. Construct validity is demonstrated through triangulation, which involved the use of 
a twofold method for data collection to enhance rigour: document analysis and semi-
structured interviews. Moreover, it combined quantitative and qualitative data, though mainly 
qualitative. The multi-method approach adopted increased the validity or search for truth of 
the research and also helped overcome the problem of method-boundedness. Internal validity 
is demonstrated through ensuring that the findings were drawn from the data and accurately 
described the phenomena under investigation. External validity is demonstrated through the 
choice of CU as ‗a typical case study‘ which has similarities with the other cases that warrant 
generalisations to the other public universities in Egypt (Robson, 2002; Cohen, 2003; Yin, 
2003; Lacey and Luff, 2007; Cohen et al., 2007).     
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Particular precautions were taken to minimize threats to validity and avoid possible 
sources of bias and subjectivity in interviews and data analysis. During the interviews, the 
researcher made sure the interview schedule did not include any leading questions and 
avoided imposing his own definitions of situations on participants. During the data analysis 
stage, the researcher sought to avoid subjective interpretation of the data and made sure that 
the data analysed are lived interpretations and not interpretations of interpretations (Levering, 
2006). Thus, the researcher sought to avoid subjective interpretation by avoiding selective use 
of data and using multiple respondent sources and multiple methods of data collection. 
Careful attention was given to presenting the perceptions of participants accurately and 
honestly without exploitation of the generated data.   
Concerning reliability, careful attention was given to achieving consistency of 
findings generated from the study. The researcher considered the reliability of his research 
methods and research practices by thoroughness, care and honesty in carrying out the work 
(Robson, 2002). Reliability was demonstrated through the piloting and re-piloting of the 
methods and enhanced through methodological triangulation in two ways: the use of multiple 
methods of data collection (document analysis and semi-structured interviews) and multiple 
respondent sources (SM; SMA; and AS). Triangulation was approached by putting more than 
one quotation to support the same argument and to ensure the researcher avoided selective use 
of data. Evidence was also cross-referenced with material in policy documents, reports and 
the literature on funding mechanisms and QAS. Careful attention was given to constructing a 
reliable case study database and demonstrating a clear chain of evidence as recommended by 
Yin (2003).       
Much attention was given to ensuring transparency and rigour through the detailed 
description of every stage of the design including all research decisions, especially the 
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construction of methods of data collection and data analysis. The researcher‘s position as an 
insider has also been identified and is thought to enhance the validity and reliability of the 
findings as it helped build trust between the researcher and interviewees, allowing them to 
give their perceptions frankly. The setting of the case studies and participants have been 
described in detail so that findings can be understood in context and can be applied to similar 
settings where appropriate.  
5.3.5.2 Ethical Considerations 
The application of ethics began at the conception of the research idea and its implications 
remained even after the research was over. High standards of ethical care have been followed, 
following the School of Education Research Ethics Protocol (2007) and the British 
Educational Research Association (BERA) Revised Ethical Guidelines for Educational 
Research (2004).    
- Ethics Approval  
Before conducting the field work, ethics approval has been obtained. A letter was issued from 
the University of Birmingham for participants in the university and another letter from Cairo 
University to its participants. After the protocol had been approved by the ethics committee at 
the School of Education, emails were sent to the selected participants telling them about the 
nature of the study with the interview schedule attached to give them a clear idea about the 
issues under investigation (Crow et al., 2006; Lofman et al., 2004). Those emails also asked 
for their consent to participate in the study while ensuring confidentiality and anonymity. 
They were also asked for their permission to tape record and/or take notes during interviews.  
- Informed Consent   
Interviewing each respondent, I started by thanking him/her for being willing to participate in 
the study. Firstly, I introduced myself to respondents and gave them an oral introduction 
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about the research and the purpose of the interview. This introduction was to give appropriate 
information to respondents so that they were able to give informed consent to participation. 
Although Gary (2004) argues that a written statement is better than verbal agreement, I have 
deliberately taken consent verbally. The reason for this is that the experience of funding 
mechanisms and QAS did not seem to be personal or sensitive issues. Moreover, in the 
context of Egyptian culture, respondents may not feel comfortable when being asked to give 
written informed consent and doing so might have affected their answers.  
- Anonymity and Confidentiality  
The generated data have been treated with utmost confidentiality and honesty. Once the data 
were collected, the names of participants were removed from all data collection forms and 
transcripts and replaced by assigning pseudonyms. Only the researcher has had access to the 
data (Denscombe, 2002; Fraenkel and Wallen, 2006). Interviewees were assured they would 
remain anonymous, no record of the interviews would be kept with their names, and the data 
would not be used for any other purpose. The generated data would be kept in line with 
the University of Birmingham‘s code of ethics on a password secure computer for ten years, 
then destroyed. Interviewees were informed they had the right not to answer any question 
they did not wish to answer and had the right to withdraw at any time and request that data 
collected not be used for other purposes than research (Craig and Charles, 2005). Finally, 
participants were informed that a report of the main findings of the study would be sent to 
those who have provided their email address.    
5.4 Conclusion 
The adopted research design is intended to provide greater depth to the research, more 
attention to the dynamics of the situation and better insights from detailed knowledge and 
understanding. However, implementing this design caused some difficulties for the 
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researcher. First, the research tools and materials had to be prepared in English, translated into 
Arabic, administered in Egypt and then translated back into English to be presented in the 
thesis. While the researcher has the bi-lingual capability for this and has done formal training 
in translation from English to Arabic and vice versa, time is definitely a resource to be 
considered. The second difficulty is about scheduling and rescheduling interviews with 76 
academic and administrative staff in both cases. The process of transcription and data analysis 
was also time-consuming but the rich data generated from this technique is worth the time, 
money and effort. Another difficulty is getting the required policy documents, most of which 
was not easy to get, especially in Egypt case.     
Using case studies has provided detailed knowledge of the selected institutions 
compared with more superficial investigation of several universities. The selected methods of 
data collection fit the research design well. Document analysis helped the researcher examine 
the historical context, policies and strategies, strengths and weaknesses, and reforms taking 
place of both funding mechanisms and QAS in Egypt and the UK. Interviews with academic 
and administrative staff about their experience of these phenomena helped to understand how 
funding mechanisms and QAS might affect universities in terms of autonomy, accountability, 
efficiency and equity. The generated data from both methods have been critically analysed to 
help triangulate the data and address the research questions.     
To sum up, the adopted methodology, strategy and methods of data collection have 
not been chosen because they were preferred by the researcher but for their suitability in 
addressing the research questions. Clearly, no educational research is perfect as each has its 
strengths and limitations but the researcher has done his best to make this research as valid 
and reliable as possible whilst being clear about its limitations.  
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6 CHAPTER SIX 
FUNDING MECHANISMS IN HIGHER EDUCATION IN 
EGYPT AND THE UK 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines how funding mechanisms in Egypt and the UK affect universities and 
the people who work in them in terms of autonomy, accountability, efficiency and equity. The 
data reported have principally been obtained from document analysis and semi-structured 
interviews conducted with 47 staff in CU and 29 in UoB.   
To explore how funding mechanisms affect autonomy, accountability, efficiency and 
equity, direct questions on these issues were included in the interview schedule, with other 
questions about funding mechanisms, their strengths and weaknesses and changes 
interviewees would like to make if they had the opportunity (see Appendices ‗1‘ and ‗2‘: 
Interview Schedules).    
While answering those questions, however, academic and administrative staff raised 
other issues/themes, especially in the case of CU (such as lack of job satisfaction; 
favouritism/lack of transparency; lack of trust… and the urgent need to rationalize the policy 
of providing HE for free). Having reviewed those emergent themes, I found that they all fit 
under the four main themes and, as a result, they have been included within them. That all 
emergent issues/themes can fit within the four main a priori themes emphasizes their 
importance in HE policies and their analyses. The evidence gathered from interviews is 
presented in the text either through direct quotations or by summarising and paraphrasing the 
perceptions of participants.   
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The chapter proceeds as follows. The next two sections address the results and 
discussion of funding mechanisms in Cairo and Birmingham, starting with a brief overview 
about funding mechanisms in each university. Then, the evidence on funding is analysed 
using the four themes of the study, followed by a brief summary. The chapter ends with a 
brief conclusion.  
6.2 Funding Mechanisms in Egypt (Cairo University) 
As an overview of funding mechanisms in Egypt has been provided in Chapter Three, this 
section discusses funding mechanisms in Cairo University. In fact, CU is a little different 
from other public universities in that they all follow the regulations of the Supreme Council 
for Universities and are funded in the same way (line-item funding). Thus, interviewees at CU 
were asked how their national funding mechanisms might affect universities and people who 
work within them. However, they were encouraged to add any specific information about CU 
in relation to self-generated income or other financial aspects relevant only to CU.  
6.2.1 Autonomy 
Interviewees were asked for their perceptions of how the way universities are funded might 
affect institutional autonomy and academic freedom. Their answers/perceptions have been 
grouped into two groups. The majority, 35 out of 4413, falls into a group who sees that the way 
universities are funded affects institutional autonomy seriously but has nothing to do with 
academic freedom in terms of teaching and research activities. The second group is those who 
do not see funding as impacting on institutional autonomy or academic freedom.  
                                                 
13
 As indicated before, the total number of interviewees in CU is 47 but not all of them have answered both 
sections of my interview schedule (the funding section and the quality assurance section). For example, three of 
my interviewees have chosen to answer only the questions in the quality assurance section as they are mainly 
involved in it. Thus, the total number of interviewees in this section is 44.                                                      
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An analysis of the views of those in the first group identify problems of institutional 
autonomy in several ways: inflexibility; bureaucracy and complexity as there is much 
intervention from the government; inadequate funding to meet the developing needs of HEIs; 
HEIs have to spend the money according to budget line item rather than their own priorities; 
academics are neither involved in taking decisions nor have the right to choose their leaders; 
senior managers and academics have no say on the number of students; and, finally, lack of 
transparency. These items support the earlier discussion that budget allocation in Egypt is not 
informed by sector policy or linked to the needs of individual institutions. Budget allocations 
to different institutions are determined unilaterally by the Ministries of Finance (recurrent 
budget) and Planning (investment budget) and are assigned by budget line item where 
universities do not have the latitude to shift resources from one budget line item to another 
because these line items come from diverse resources (e.g. staff costs come from the Ministry 
of Finance and the investment budget comes from the Ministry of Economic Development) 
(SPU, 2008; World Bank, 2002a).    
In this respect, the first issue raised by interviewees is the inflexibility of line-item 
budgets. They argued that public funding affects institutional autonomy seriously as it lacks 
flexibility and has many constraints which impede HEIs from doing their job properly, as 
stated by one senior manager:    
Public funding affects the management of universities as it lacks flexibility 
and is controlled with line-item budget. In certain items of funding, you cannot 
transfer any amount of money to another item even if it is in the same category 
and any unspent amount of money should be returned to the Ministry of 
Finance by the end of the financial year. The university is controlled by the 
budget and has lots of constraints and cannot change anything in that system 
even if it is against its own priorities. There is lots of bureaucracy and 
complexity which leads managers to be coward in taking any decision. (SM, 1)                                     
….                                                                                                                                     
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Purchasing Problems is another issue. Lack of flexibility becomes a big issue when buying 
the required equipments (such as computers, data show projectors … chemicals) for HEIs. 
Both senior managers and academics said that it is a long journey of paper work and the laws 
of auctions are too bureaucratic and delay their work. Sometimes, they are not able to spend 
the entire fund they have as most of the required equipment are imported from outside the 
country and the inflexibility of the laws of auctions delay their work.    
Laws should not delay our work, they should be more flexible because 
sometimes we have funds for buying some equipment but we cannot spend it 
because of the inflexible laws and those funds have to be returned to the 
Ministry of Finance by the end of the financial year. So, I am quite sure the 
inflexibility of funding affects the autonomy of universities and the way they 
manage themselves.                                                                                (AS, 31) 
The second issue is insufficiency of public funding. Interviewees see public funding as 
insufficient to enable HEIs to achieve their developing needs. They commented that they 
cannot produce good bread out of bad flour. Thus, they recommended that both government 
and the society as a whole should help in adequately funding HEIs (providing excellent flour) 
before holding them accountable to giving high quality outcomes (excellent loaves of bread).  
Moreover, funds are not matched to HEIs‟ priorities. Line-item funding lacks 
flexibility as funds must be spent according to predefined budget line item, not according to 
HEIs‘ priorities; which leads HEIs - and CU specifically - to rely heavily on their self-
generated income to attempt to cover the low level of public funding.     
Self-generated income gives universities more flexibility and more autonomy 
than public funding, which has lots of restrictions and lacks flexibility. We 
have more financial autonomy to spend our self-generated funds as we need 
according to the priorities of the university.                                            (SM, 3)  
Most respondents were really troubled with the limited budget which comes in the form of 
line-item funding and some suggested universities should be given their budget in the form of 
a block grant so that they are flexible and autonomous to spend it according to their priorities, 
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instead of having to modify their priorities several times to fit pre-defined line-item 
categories. 
Universities should have more financial autonomy. They should be given the 
funding as a block grant so that they are free to spend that funding according 
to their own priorities not according to the items and categories which the 
Ministry of Finance decides in advance (e.g. certain funding to be spent on 
new buildings, on maintenance … or on research), which is believed to be 
inflexible at all.                                                                                    (SMA, 20) 
Commenting on line-item funding, some interviewees argued that even if universities are 
given their funds in the form of block grants, it would not make a big difference. It would 
provide more flexibility but would still be insufficient as the first category of the budget 
(salaries and compensations for academics and administrative staff) consumes around 70% or 
more of the whole budget because of the huge numbers of administrative staff, which means 
that less than 30% is allocated for operational cost which is nothing.  
Limits on academic affairs is one of the reported impacts of public funding, arising 
from bureaucracy, complexity and much intervention from the government in the academic 
affairs of universities. They see that because government is still the main source of funding 
HE, it intervenes so much in all academic affairs of universities and restricts their autonomy. 
That is why it was suggested that the government should take the role of supervision rather 
than intervention in universities affairs.   
I can remember President Al-Sadat (ex-president of Egypt) when he used to 
say ―Whoever owns his loaf of bread, owns his opinions and his decisions‖. 
That is, if you make your loaf of bread by yourself, not waiting for someone 
else to provide you with it, you own your views as your decisions come from 
your mind, not from the one who provides you with bread. We, as academics 
do not own our bread, we are provided by bread (funding) through the 
government, so we do not own our opinions and our decisions because of the 
intervention and bureaucracy of the system.                                          (AS, 31)              
Control of senior academic appointments is another reported impact of public funding as 
academics are neither involved in taking decisions nor have they the right to choose their 
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leaders, at all levels starting from heads of departments to the vice-chancellors because of the 
overly centralisation of taking decisions and the outdated system of promotion through the 
seniority system.  
We have no voice on the appointment of heads of departments, deans, vice-
deans as there is a great centralization in taking decisions from the faculty to 
the university and from the university to the government.                     (AS, 33) 
Level of student recruitment is one of the main issues which both senior managers and 
academics perceive to greatly restrict institutional autonomy as they have no say on the 
number of students that universities are forced to accept each year. The number of students is 
imposed by the government - through a centralized office, Admission Office of Egyptian 
Universities - and universities have nothing to do with such decisions. They added that 
allowing these students to enter HE is considered to be a must for political, social and security 
reasons. However, there is always a trade-off between the massive numbers of students, poor 
funding and quality which is always compromised. 
Each year we say that our faculty can accommodate 500 new students and we 
are forced to accept 2000 students or more (which is four times the number we 
asked for) as the government wants to provide places for all students who have 
finished their secondary school. When we say we can accommodate 500 
students, we mean we guarantee a space, a computer, a place in labs, suitable 
lecture halls, sufficient academics to provide high quality teaching and 
learning experience for students.                                                         (SMA, 16) 
Thus, neither senior managers nor academics have a say on the number of students 
universities accept each year and recruitment seems to be regardless of capacity and is seen as 
detrimental to the quality of provision.  
The last issue which both senior managers and academics perceive as affecting 
institutional autonomy is lack of transparency. Most commented that there should be more 
transparency in how the budget is decided and how it is distributed between different 
universities so that academics know how it works. They suggested that there should be a 
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funding formula to distribute budgets between universities and that the budget for HEIs 
should be published in newspapers with an explanation of how it works as a means of 
building the eroded trust between HEIs, government and society.    
Public funding really affects institutional autonomy as it lacks transparency. If 
X person of X department holds a high post (a dean of school for example), 
then the department where he/she works would live its golden age and get the 
best fund and facilities in everything. And if X head of school holds a high 
position in the management of the university (such as a vice chancellor), 
his/her faculty would live its golden age and get the best funds and best 
facilities ever. So, I can say that there is no transparency in distributing funds 
among faculties in the same university or even among departments in the same 
faculty as it depends on who rules the game…i.e. from which department or 
school he/she is.                                                                                       (AS, 
37)                                                                                                         
Although most14 interviewees in this group agreed that the way universities are funded affects 
institutional autonomy seriously but has nothing to do with academic freedom, ten 
interviewees did mention that it might affect academic freedom indirectly. While they agreed 
that it does not affect academic freedom in terms of teaching and research, where academics 
are autonomous in choosing the material of teaching and topics of their research, they did 
express the view that inadequate salaries for academics affect them as they have to have 
additional jobs to secure an acceptable livelihood and there are negative consequences of 
having 2
nd
 and sometimes 3
rd
 jobs:  
The way universities are funded does not affect academic freedom but it forces 
academics to look for additional jobs to secure their livelihood. So, it does not 
affect academic freedom directly but it affects it indirectly as lack of proper 
funding might prevent academics from doing certain types of research in 
which they are interested. Inadequate funding also affects the quality of 
academics‘ teaching and research and their scientific/academic productivity as 
it does not enable them to have enough time to enhance their teaching and 
their research.                                                                                          (AS, 24) 
                                                 
14
 When the word ‗most‘ is used, it means ‗an overwhelming majority‘. 
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It is quite clear from the above quotation that insufficient public funding and inadequate 
salaries for academics force them to have additional jobs to secure their livelihood and might 
also prevent them from doing certain types of research in which they are interested. Thus, 
insufficient public funding does not enable academics to enhance their teaching and their 
research practices and affects their academic productivity. 
The second group of interviewees, 9 out of 44, expressed the view that the way 
universities are funded has nothing to do with institutional autonomy or academic freedom. 
They see that public funding is too weak to affect institutional autonomy as it is always 
insufficient so universities spend it quickly while they depend heavily on their self-generated 
income to cover the shortage of public funding. 
Public funding does not affect institutional autonomy as it is too weak to affect 
our activities. For example, the public funding for our research plan in X 
Faculty is 60,000 which is nothing to affect our institutional autonomy. It just 
has some restrictions in allocating funding according to certain items and 
categories and it really needs to be more flexible. When I went to visit some 
universities in USA, I found that their fixed cost was only 30% and their 
operational cot was 70% and they want to increase the percentage of funding 
available for operational cost. If we compare ourselves to them, we will find 
that 70% or more of our budget is for salaries (fixed cost) which means that 
less than 30% is for our operational cost which is nothing.                (SMA, 22) 
They agree with the first group that academic freedom is not affected at all by the way 
universities are funded. 
I do not think funding affects academic freedom at all. I am a member of the 
Scientific Research Academy and I have never seen or heard about a 
researcher who was funded on condition to give certain findings, never 
happens.                                                                                               (SMA, 19) 
6.2.2 Accountability 
Concerning accountability, interviewees were asked for their perceptions of the nature of the 
dialogue of accountability between universities, the government and other funders. Answers 
have been organised into three main groups. The first group, which forms a great majority, 
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sees that the system provides strong financial accountability whereas it provides weak/no 
accountability for academics. The second group, 5 out of 44, sees that the system, in general, 
provides weak accountability mechanisms, whereas the third group, 4 out of 44, has no idea 
about the nature of the dialogue of accountability between universities and funders.  
The first group, 35 out of 44, sees the system as providing strong financial 
accountability whereas it provides weak/no accountability for academics. They see that 
universities are accountable to spend according to the rules of the Ministry of Finance (budget 
line item) and that the government expects universities to diversify sources of funding and use 
their self-generated income to support public funding. Universities are accountable to the 
representatives of the Ministry of Finance and the Central Agency for Public Mobilization 
and Statistics (CAPMAS) for their expenditure. Thus, there are two levels of accountability: 
one before spending the funds, which is done through the representative of Ministry of 
Finance, and the other level is after spending the money, which is done through CAPMAS.   
There is a hard system of accountability from both CAPMAS and the 
representative of Ministry of Finance. There are two ways of censorship on 
funding. One before spending any amount of money which is done by the 
representative of the Ministry of Finance who revises the forms and accepts it 
or not according to the rules. If it contradicts the rules, s/he does not accept it 
even if it is approved by the vice chancellor of the university. The second one 
is after spending money which is done by the CAPMAS. If there are any 
mistakes, we are accountable to the Administrative Prosecution Authority in 
Egypt. Thus, there is lots of bureaucracy and complexity which leads 
managers to be coward in taking any decision.                                        (SM, 1) 
There is a regular check to ensure that universities spend the budget according to the line-item 
funding. If there is any unspent money, it should be returned to the Ministry of Finance by the 
end of the financial year. But normally there is no money left from the budget as public 
funding is very weak and universities depend heavily on their self-generated income; 
however, even their self-generated income is subject for accountability through CAPMAS. 
Although universities have more financial autonomy in spending their self-generated income 
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according to their own priorities, they are also accountable for CAPMAS for how they spend 
those self-generated income.  
Even our self-generated income is accountable and open for check by 
CAPMAS and other censorship agencies at any time. So, actually we have lots 
of financial accountability in the system.                                                 (SM, 3) 
The interviewees added that the accountability system of the Ministry of Finance through 
CAPMAS has many restrictions, especially on buying the required equipments which really 
affects the efficiency of operation in universities. 
Although the majority of interviewees see the system as providing strong financial 
accountability, they see that it is a rigid one as it is just concerned with compliance and 
neither puts outcomes into consideration nor provides any incentives for efficiency gains. In 
addition, they see that the system provides no or weak accountability for academics. Their 
perceptions are built on several rationales: all academics are civil servants and all are on 
tenure track; inadequate salaries for academics which cause lack of job satisfaction so that 
most academics have second and sometimes third jobs to secure their livelihood; the salary is 
fixed for all academics regardless of their work/outputs so there are no incentives for 
enhancing the quality of provision.   
The first issue which weakens the system of accountability for academics is the tenure 
track system as all academics are civil servants. Most interviewees commented that the system 
does not provide accountability for academics as they cannot fire or punish low performers. 
All deans can do is to give extra financial incentives (from the self-generated income of the 
faculty, not from public funding) to high performers, which is not adequate to hold academics 
accountable for their core duties of teaching, research, administration and serving the 
community. Thus, it can be said that, there is only a slight type of accountability which 
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mainly lies in the hands of deans but is not highly activated and does not bring the desired 
results/outcomes. 
As for academics, if I have an academic with high performance, I can give 
him/her some financial incentives. In case of an academic with low 
performance, I can decrease the financial incentives which he/she takes but in 
fact I can‘t fire him/her off as we are all civil servants and all academics have 
tenure, which I think is the worst thing in HE in Egypt.                     (SMA, 11)                                                                                      
One of the surprising findings for the researcher is that it is not only senior managers who are 
not happy with the tenure track system. Academics themselves are unhappy with it as it does 
not provide any incentives or punishments, which de-motivates academics to put more effort 
in their work. The tenure track system also leaves academics with very limited opportunities 
of movement between institutions.   
The second most important issue is lack of job satisfaction for academics which is 
mainly a result of inadequate salaries. Although I have not asked any direct or indirect 
questions about academic pay, all interviewees (including senior managers, senior manager 
academics and academics) raised the issue of inadequate salaries and reported that they are 
not at all satisfied with their salaries. It was reported that academic pay is not adequate to 
secure their livelihood so that most of them have additional jobs15 (mostly in private 
universities and companies). Most academics migrate to Western countries and Gulf countries 
where they can get good salaries that allow them to have enough time to enhance their 
teaching and research practices instead of spending time looking for additional jobs in Egypt.   
The salaries of academics and administrative staff are so weak, even weaker 
than the salaries of our graduates who work in private sector, especially in our 
field (Computer Sciences). The first salary of any of our graduates who works 
                                                 
15
 By law, all faculty members are allowed to hold other jobs. Staff takes advantage of this situation and seeks 
other part-time employment opportunities in order to augment their income. Having two and sometimes three 
jobs contributes to widespread absence, particularly in the professional programs (Said, 2001).  
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in private sector is better than my salary as a professor working in academia 
for around 20 years now.                                                                     (SMA, 15) 
There is no accountability for academics as they take pennies from universities 
so how do you get them accountable for the few pennies they get as a salary.                                                                                                                      
….                                                                                                           (AS, 44)                                                                                      
It is quite obvious from the above quotations that inadequate salaries weakens the system of 
accountability seriously as academics cannot be hold accountable for high quality teaching 
and research when they are not provided with satisfactory salaries. It is even the case that 
some academics prefer resigning from their universities to work full time in private 
universities or big companies where they are given excellent salaries. In this respect, one 
senior manager academic stated: 
Our demonstrators and assistant lecturers used to work part time in big 
companies and private universities to secure their life. Nowadays, they began 
to work full time and do not come to university at all. Some of them prefer 
resigning from the university and working full time in the private sector as it is 
much more rewarding.                                                                         (SMA, 14) 
In addition to the weak salaries, academic pay is fixed for all regardless of their 
performance/outputs so there are no incentives for them to do more work or enhance their 
educational practices. It was reported that all academics take an incentive called overtime 
financial incentive (which should be given only for academics who work overtime hours, 
doing more teaching) although not all of them work overtime hours. Both senior managers 
and academics perceive that all academics should be given such an incentive, and any other 
incentive, regardless of their work because their salaries are not at all satisfactory.  
They also commented that there would never be a good system of accountability for 
academics as long as salaries do not satisfy their minimum needs. Academics teach in 
different places other than their own universities and as consultants in big companies and 
businesses and no one can prevent them for doing so as it is known to all that salaries are not 
sufficient. ―By law, all faculty members are allowed to hold other jobs… in order to augment 
 143 
their income‖ (Said, 2001). As a result, academics do not even have enough time to write 
good research proposals to apply for competitive funding. Most senior managers reported that 
there are lots of excellent and creative academic staff in HEIs in Egypt but they just need 
peace of mind to be really creative and highly competitive. Thus, if the problem of academic 
pay is solved, they would have time to do excellent research and bidding for competitive 
funding would be more rewarding but what is happening now is just a decoration of the status 
quo instead of solving the main problem. They reported that in western countries there is an 
accountability system for academics on the number and the quality of their publications but in 
Egypt, there is no academic refereeing system for research which affects funding or which 
links funding to the quality of the research output of academics.  
Some senior managers see that the system provides accountability for academics but it 
is just on paper, not activated. That is, the laws governing HE provide a system of 
accountability but they are not activated because of poor academic pay. They said that there 
are many committees and many laws and by-laws in place but no sound activated system of 
accountability with all academics given the same salary regardless of performance.  
We have accountability for academics but not activated. I can give some 
incentives for good academics who do their best in teaching and research but I 
can do nothing for bad academics except discounting very small amounts of 
money from their incentives.                                                               (SMA, 12) 
All my relation with the university is about the courses I am teaching but they 
have nothing to do with the way I teach my courses. If students complain that I 
teach good or bad or teach two hours instead of four hours, the university has 
nothing to do with me. If I give the lecture or ask one of my colleagues to give 
it on my behalf, it does not really matter. If students succeed or fail, it does not 
matter. So, academics do not have any sort of accountability to universities at 
all. You cannot ask academics to provide a high quality loaf of bread while 
you provide them with bad flour.                                                            (AS, 46) 
The second group, only five interviewees, sees the system as providing weak accountability. 
They see that the funding system does not provide sufficient accountability as it has lots of 
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gaps and that accountability is only an administrative one, not a technical one. People from 
the Ministry of Finance, CAPMAS and from the university come regularly to check that 
money is spent according to budget line item but have nothing to do with the quality of 
provision or the quality of outcomes. This finding goes in line with the views of the first 
group who agree that the system provides a rigid accountability which is only concerned with 
compliance. That is why they have recommended changing the current system of funding to 
performance-based funding, funding according to the outcomes not according to budget line 
item. One senior manager academic commented that:  
We have lots of defects and gaps in the accountability system which leads to 
one of two things: ―Anyone who wants to manipulate the system can do that if 
s/he knows the rules of the game, s/he can steal an elephant without being 
noticed or being held accountable for anything but if s/he does not know the 
rules of the game, s/he might be held accountable if s/he even stole an ant‖. 
Thus, there should be a good system of accountability without very strong and 
firm bureaucracy and without being very loose as well.                    (SMA, 19) 
This quotation supports the argument that accountability in Egypt is only an administrative 
one, not a technical one which puts outcomes into consideration. If someone said that she has 
spent 100,000 pounds on painting X building and she got a receipt, no one can ask her if it is 
too much money or if it could be done cheaper as financial accountability is mainly based on 
document auditing.  
One of the surprising findings is that the last group, 4 out of 44 interviewees, had no 
idea about the dialogue of accountability between universities and funders. One is a director 
of a quality assurance unit and the other three are academics. The researcher tried to ask some 
follow up questions to elicit more information but they preferred not to answer the questions 
related to accountability.  
Having presented the perceptions of my interviewees on the dialogue of 
accountability, the discussion moves to perceptions on efficiency. 
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6.2.3 Efficiency 
Answers on efficiency fall into two main groups. The first group, which forms the great 
majority of interviewees, sees the system of funding as inefficient and provides several 
rationales: insufficiency of public funding; lack of transparency; lack of flexibility; weak 
salaries for academics and providing HE free for all students. It is clear that some of these 
rationales have already been discussed in the sections of autonomy and accountability but 
they were found to affect efficiency as well. Thus, they are discussed only briefly to avoid 
repetition. On the other hand, the second group, 12 of 44 interviewees, sees that the efficiency 
of the current system can be classified as poor or medium efficiency. What is surprising is 
that no single interviewee mentioned that the current system of funding is efficient.  
The first group, which forms a vast majority, 32 of 44 interviewees, sees the system of 
funding as inefficient for several rationales. Insufficiency of public funding was reported as 
the first factor affecting efficiency. Public funding is getting less every year to the extent that 
it does not satisfy the minimum needs of the different activities of HEIs, especially research. 
Academics reported that they do all their research on their own and do not get funding to 
support these activities16. The insufficiency of public funding goes back to the annual cuts, the 
expansion of student numbers and the need for new buildings and new laboratories to meet 
that expansion. It is also reported that the Ministry of Finance decides the funding of the new 
financial year regardless of what universities have spent the previous year. 
                                                 
16
 Faculty members appear to have very limited access to public funds to support their scholarship. Research 
funding from the Academy of Scientific Research, even on a competitive basis, is reportedly extremely limited 
as is financial assistance that would help staff establish links with international scholarly communities. With the 
exception of one or two-year scientific mission programs, there are no paid sabbatical leaves and a systematic 
incentive process to encourage professional revival is absent. Faculty members, however, are entitled during the 
course of their academic career for a total of up-to ten years of unpaid leave (on-loan) from their 
universities/institutes to other local or foreign universities or even industrial enterprises (Said, 2001).  
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When I prepare the project for the new years‘ budget, I make clear how much I 
have spent the last year and the proposed increase which I need in the budget 
for the New Financial Year with the justifications for that proposed increase. 
The Ministry of Finance should take into account the actual amount of money 
spent the last year and also have to see the average of our spending for the last 
three years before deciding the new budget but they do not do that and usually 
their reply is that we decide the increase in the new budget according to the 
available resources for the HE sector as a whole.                                   (SM, 4) 
Lack of transparency is also reported to affect efficiency. Universities have to overestimate 
their financial needs as they are not allowed to overspend. There should be more trust 
between universities and the government as universities usually ask for much more money 
than their actual needs as they know well if they asked for a budget of 100 million, the 
government will give them just 20 or 30 million. That is why universities ask for 200 million 
or more so that after negotiation they might end up with a reasonable budget somewhat near 
their actual needs. If there is more trust and more transparency between universities and the 
government, this would not happen and there would be more efficiency and rationalization in 
public funding.   
On the other hand, they see that their self-generated income is highly efficient as they 
have started four years ago with three million pounds (EGP) and this year (2009-2010) they 
have raised twenty-five million pounds. It has also been reported that the insufficiency of 
public funding is accompanied by lack of flexibility which really affects efficiency. Public 
funding has to be spent according to budget line item not according to HEIs‘ priorities. Thus, 
any amount of money which comes from the government is spent without thinking about the 
rationale of its spending or whether it is spent efficiently. This goes back to the inflexibility of 
line-item funding because if spending is rationalized in a category and an amount of money is 
saved, it cannot be transferred to another category and should be returned to the Ministry of 
Finance by the end of the financial year. In addition, there is no evaluation of the outcome of 
funding. That is why no one thinks about the rationalization of spending public funding.  
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Public funding lacks internal efficiency. If we are assigned a 100,000 pounds 
under the category of maintenance to redecorate X building, it should be spent 
on that purpose regardless of any other criteria of efficiency such as: Is there 
an urgent need to redecorate that building? Can we redecorate it with 50% of 
that amount of money and spend the other 50% on something else? Actually, 
no one cares about efficiency gains in public funding and that is why there is 
no rationalization in its spending.                                                           (AS, 40) 
There are also complex procedures and bureaucracy in the process of auctions to buy the 
required equipment for universities, which also affects efficiency seriously. Academics have 
reported that sometimes they ask for equipment and it takes too much time for the equipment 
to be bought, to the extent that when it is bought, it is out of date. Thus, the reaction of public 
funding is too slow to satisfy academics‘ needs. 
Poor academic pay has also been reported to affect efficiency as most academics have 
another job and have no time to enhance their educational practices (as discussed in the 
previous section). Thus, inadequate public funding decreases the efficiency of academics. 
Both academics and senior managers are really bothered about their pay and commented that 
‗the HE sector is no less important than State Security and the Armed Forces for their 
country. It should be funded properly as those other sectors are funded, if we are to live in a 
developed country‘. They are quite sure that academics are innovative and creative. They 
have recommended reforming the HE sector by rationalizing the use of human and financial 
resources to decrease waste as, in spite of providing weak salaries for both academic and 
administrative staff, these salaries consume around 70% or more of the whole budget.  
Providing HE free for all students was reported to seriously harm the efficiency of 
funding. Almost all interviewees in CU support the continuation of providing HE free but 
with some rationalization. They see that providing HE free is a point of strength as it allows 
students from all backgrounds to participate in HE but they also believe that the great 
expansion of student numbers and inadequate funding cause serious detriment to the quality 
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of provision. That is why they support the rationalization of the policy/constitution of 
providing HE free and for other several reasons. Quality of provision is always compromised 
as there is always a trade-off against the number of students; with inadequate funding, quality 
is compromised. There is no match between the nominal fees which students pay (around 
120-150 EGP pounds a year) and the real cost of teaching students in HE. Thus, tuition fees 
do not reflect the real cost of teaching students in HE, and not having enough funding is to 
the detriment of the quality of provision.  
The system does not provide any incentives for students to finish their degrees on time 
and be successful graduates who are able to compete in the labour market. Many students do 
not attend lectures regularly and do not give much attention to their studies and thus fail 
several times, so that the percentage of repeating students is high. Students can spend up to 12 
years in university to finish a degree which normally requires only four years. Thus, Egypt 
provides HE free for failing students which adds to inefficiency. It does not make sense to 
provide HE free for failing students. Interviewees added that it is well known that the 
government is committed to provide HE free but universities have increasing needs; so, if the 
government wants to keep HE free, it should pay the full cost of teaching those students. 
However, the current system of allowing all secondary school leavers to enter HE is to the 
detriment of the quality of provision and, by the end of the day, produces graduates who are 
not qualified to compete in the labour market.  
I know that the problem of providing HE for free has political and social 
dimensions but we should not do like ostriches and bury our heads in the sand 
and say this is the constitution and we cannot change it. Of course, we can 
change it as it‘s we who have put that constitution and it should be we who 
change it as it is not a holy religious book.                                         (SMA, 13) 
Almost all senior managers, senior manager academics and academics have mentioned that a 
high percentage of students join pre-HE in private and language schools where they pay very 
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high tuition fees. In addition, parents pay huge amounts of money for their children for 
private tutoring in Primary, Preparatory and Secondary schools to enable them to get good 
scores to be able to join good faculties like Medicine, Pharmacy, Engineering…etc. Thus, it is 
neither efficient nor fair for such students to join HE for free (with nominal fees of around 
EGP 150) or that universities are expected to provide high quality graduates on current levels 
of income. If such students pay higher tuition fees in HE, fees could be spent on enhancing 
the quality of provision and providing grants for students who cannot pay fees, which is fairer 
and more efficient than providing HE free for all.  
One of the senior managers mentioned that ―We pay tuition fees, books fees and living 
expenses fees for around quarter of our students, who are unable to pay, from the social 
solidarity fund in our faculty‖. However, at the same, time there are students who come to the 
faculty by their own luxurious cars, students who change their laptops and mobile phones 
every year or so, why do we have to provide them HE for free? It is unfair as those students 
used to pay thousands of pounds in private schools and for private tutoring but when they 
come to university they pay only 150 pounds a year. Unfortunately when we say HE should 
be provided free only for those who deserve it, the mass media turns the case against us and 
begin spreading it the wrong way, that those who are able to pay tuition fees will have HE but 
those who cannot will not be able to enter HE, which is completely wrong (SMA, 20).   
The vast majority of interviewees recommended that HE should be provided free for 
all students for the first year and then continue free only for successful students. Failing 
students should pay some of the real cost of their teaching. If they fail again, they should pay 
the whole cost of their teaching to encourage them to finish their degrees on time and achieve 
more efficiency. Because of insisting on providing HE free, practical learning becomes like 
theoretical learning because of lack of proper up-to-date equipment where students need to 
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develop practical skills. Thus, to have high quality provision, the full cost for teaching 
students should be paid by government, students, and society or some combination of all and 
there should be more trust between them.  
There is also duality of criteria in HE policies in Egypt. While the government does 
not allow public universities to charge tuition fees and says it is against the constitution, it 
allows private universities to charge fees they choose and also allows pre-HE private and 
language schools to charge fees they decide. It is not reasonable that private universities are 
allowed to charge students fees they choose whereas public universities have to provide HE 
for students for only nominal fees, 150 pounds a year. Thus, there is no fair competition 
between public and private universities. The interviewees in that group perceive that the 
policy of providing HE free for all students, regardless of being successful or failing or being 
able to pay tuition fees or not, is a great failure and should be rationalized. They argued that it 
is not reasonable that a student pays around 150 pounds tuition annually while her pocket 
money is more than 150 a month. On the other hand, only four interviewees are against 
rationalizing free provision, arguing that it is parents who pay and if there are parents who 
could pay thousands of pounds, there are parents who cannot even pay nominal fees.  
A few academics noted a misconception that the more tuition fees HEIs charge, the 
higher the quality of provision. In other words, universities which ask for the highest tuition 
fees should, by default, be the best universities, which is a mistaken view. After teaching for a 
long time in both public and private universities, they discovered that provision is not linked 
to fee levels but equals the easiest provision and that is why students prefer joining private 
universities and alternative academic programmes. It is worth noting that many academics 
who teach in public and private universities agree that universities charging higher fees do not 
equal the highest quality of provision but equals the easiest provision. 
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The second group, 12 out of 44 interviewees, classifies the efficiency of the system as 
poor or medium. One interviewee even argued that if the outcomes of HE (e.g. number of 
graduates) are considered in light of the way it is funded, it can be seen as efficient. They see 
that it is difficult to judge the efficiency of funding at present as it is a transitional period with 
lots of projects, lots of funding coming in and several changes. Thus, they prefer delaying 
judgment on efficiency. One academic described the efficiency of funding as a sick person 
who is taking pain relief which just kills the feeling of pain but does not cure illness. More 
appropriately, the system (patient) needs to be examined well (by a good doctor) to decide the 
main reasons for inefficiency (sickness) and recommend proper changes (treatment). 
6.2.4 Equity  
Having asked interviewees about the equity/fairness of the current system of funding, answers 
are in three main groups. The majority, 24 interviewees, falls into the first group who cannot 
decide whether the funding system is fair or not. While the second group, 12 interviewees, 
sees the system of funding as unfair; the last group, 8 interviewees, sees it as quite fair.   
One of the most surprising findings is that the majority cannot decide whether the 
funding system is fair or not as they do not have enough information about the criteria of 
distributing funding among universities or faculties in the same university so they cannot 
decide whether the system is fair or not. 
I think money is distributed according to the number of students, staff and the 
actual needs of each university. If it is done like this, it is fair. If not, it is not 
fair but actually the criteria of distributing funding are not known.   (SMA, 18) 
If universities take equal shares of funding, it would be unfair as the number of 
students and academic and administrative staff should be taken into 
consideration. I do not know if this happens or not.                               (AS, 38)  
What is more surprising is that almost half of this group are senior manager academics and 
the other half are academics. Thus, it is not only academics who do not have a clear idea 
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about the criteria for distributing funds but senior manager academics as well, which shows 
that the current system of funding really lacks transparency and that the level of disclosure of 
information is weak. One academic in this group commented that they usually hear that 
universities which have political importance, such as CU, get more funding than new regional 
universities and sometimes vice versa but they do not have any documents which prove this, 
which may be why academics prefer not to comment. Additional comments suggested that 
while they do not have enough information about the distribution of funding, they are sure 
that universities depend heavily on their self-generated income to cover poor public funding. 
The second group, 12 interviewees, sees the funding system as unfair for several 
reasons. Firstly, it does not meet the real cost of teaching students which negatively affects the 
quality of provision, which is deteriorating. They perceive the system of funding to work in a 
certain way: if the real cost of teaching a student in X faculty is 1000 pound a year and X 
faculty has 100 students so the funding given to that faculty should be 100,000 pounds (from 
the government, students, parents, society or a combination of all). Only in that way can the 
system be said to be fair as it provides adequate funding for universities. Thus, HEIs in Egypt 
are not properly funded, which is unfair as they cannot, therefore, do their job properly. 
Secondly, there is no fair competition between public and private universities. As long 
as the government permits private HE, it should provide a single framework for competition 
between public and private universities but it does not. While the government allows private 
universities to charge students very high tuition fees, students in public universities pay very 
modest token registration fees and public universities are not allowed to charge higher tuition 
fees. If both public and private universities are required to provide high quality graduates who 
can compete in the labour market, the government should allow fair competition between 
them either by allowing public universities to charge students higher fees or providing them 
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with proper/adequate funding. Participants have also raised the same issue of the need for 
rationalizing the policy of free higher education to make the system more efficient and 
equitable.  
Finally, favouritism/lack of transparency has been reported to affect the fairness of 
funding as there are no objective criteria for distributing funding among different universities 
and different faculties in the same university. They think that distributing funding between 
universities depends to some extent on personal relationships (favouritism) and this happens 
between universities, faculties in the same university and even departments in the same 
faculty: 
I think distributing funding among different universities and among different 
faculties in the same university is not fair as it depends on the contacts you 
have. I just want money to go to those who really deserve it not to those who 
know how to get it through favouritism.                                             (SMA, 15) 
When I joined this faculty, it was very bad and had lots of weaknesses but 
after the dean of this faculty got a high post in the management of the 
university, the faculty started living its golden age, we got lots of funding to 
the extent that all our labs have been refurbished and we are one of the best 
faculties in the university now in terms of funding and the available facilities. 
Thus, distributing public funding lacks objectivity and transparency.   (AS, 47) 
They have added that old universities (in major cities) are given less funding than new 
regional universities because they are perceived to be well established and thus do not need 
more funding, which is unfair as old universities have more burdens, more academic and 
administrative staff and more students. It is noticed that in the last few years the Ministry of 
Finance and Ministry of Planning began to give new universities more funding than old 
universities which is fair to some extent as old universities are well established and have their 
own self-generated income but CU, for example, has around 250.000 student which can be 
divided into five or ten new universities. Thus, there should be more balance in distributing 
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funding among universities and those with huge numbers of students should be given 
reasonable funding. 
For the last group, 8 interviewees most of whom are senior managers and senior 
manager academics, the current system of funding is reasonably fair as distributing funding 
among different universities depends on the actual needs of universities and the available 
financial resources for the HE sector. Universities decide their needs with their justifications 
and the Ministry of Finance gives them budgets according to their needs and in light of the 
funds it has for them. However, this does not mean that it gives equal shares to different 
universities as distributing funding depends on the number of students; the number of 
academic and administrative staff (as indicators, not as main factors) and thus it differs 
between universities. Sometimes new universities are given more funding in certain 
categories like new establishments as they need it more than old universities. Besides, 
academic pay is almost the same in all universities. The Ministry of Planning decides the 
shares of universities in the category of investment according to two things: the actual needs 
of universities and their self-generated income. Sometimes, new universities are given more 
than old well established universities as they have less self-generated income, which is seen to 
be quite fair.  
I know that many people would say it is not fair but I disagree with them as all 
people need more funding to their universities or their faculties and they all 
have justifications for it. For example, people from CU would say ―we are the 
oldest university in Egypt and we have that much staff and that much students 
so we need more funding than any other university‖. People from a new 
university would say ―we are not well established like old universities so that 
we need more funding to have new buildings and new labs… etc.‖ So, each 
university would have its own justifications. But I can see that distributing 
funding amongst different universities is reasonably fair in light of the 
available resources for the HE sector.                                                 (SMA, 20) 
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Although interviewees in this group agree that distributing funding among different 
universities is reasonably fair, in light of the available resources, they agree that it is 
inadequate and that universities depend heavily on their self-generated income.      
6.2.5 Summary 
Having presented the perceptions of interviewees about the current system of funding and 
how they think it might affect universities in terms of autonomy, accountability, efficiency 
and equity, it is clear that there are several issues which have a serious negative impact on 
universities and the people who work within them. Some of these issues (insufficiency of 
public funding; lack of flexibility; lack of trust; lack of job satisfaction and providing HE free 
for all) were found to recur under more than one of the four themes and sometimes under all 
of them. For example, lack of job satisfaction (because of poor academic pay) was reported to 
affect academic freedom indirectly as sometimes academics cannot do certain types of 
research in which they are interested because of lack of adequate funding. Academics cannot 
be hold accountable for the quality of their teaching and research because of poor pay which 
forces them to have additional jobs to secure their livelihood. Having additional jobs was 
reported to affect the efficiency of operation/provision as academics do not have enough time 
to enhance their teaching and their research. However, academic pay, despite being very 
weak, is almost the same in all universities. In that sense it is perceived to be equitable, 
although paying everyone the same regardless of performance may be regarded as 
inequitable.  
It is notable that there are no significant differences in the perceptions of the different 
groups of senior managers, senior manager academics and academics on these issues. It can 
be argued that there is considerable agreement about the current system of funding and the 
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problems which seriously affect it as they all suffer from inadequate funding, lack of 
flexibility, lack of trust and unsatisfactory salaries.  
Having discussed funding mechanisms in HE in Egypt, the discussion moves to funding 
in the UK and the UoB specifically. 
6.3 Funding Mechanisms in the UK (University of Birmingham) 
In UoB‘s case, participants were asked how they think funding mechanisms might affect 
universities and the people who work within them on two levels: nationally (the UK) as most 
of them have worked in more than one university in the UK because of academics‘ transfer 
phenomenon (ease of movements between institutions); and internally (UoB). This is because 
the system is more devolved in the UK as the government gives universities funds for 
teaching and for research as a block grant and universities are autonomous to spend that grant 
according to their own priorities. Thus, each university in the UK has its own financial 
mechanisms. As a result, this section will go through the participants‘ perceptions on funding 
mechanisms on the national level firstly and then internally in UoB. Before discussing the 
results, I provide a brief overview of the financial model of UoB.  
Despite meeting many senior managers and senior manager academics in UoB, the 
researcher was not able to get any documents about the old or the new financial models in the 
university. He was told that there are no written documents about those models and that they 
have just been presented and explained to senior managers, heads of colleges and heads of 
schools when they were first introduced. Thus, all information about those financial models 
has been obtained from the interviews.  
The old model was reported to be an income and expenditure model based on how 
much money the University gets from the funding council for teaching and for which 
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subjects. Students‘ tuition fees are added to that block grant and then are distributed to 
different schools, depending on the number of students and the type of subjects taught. 
Similarly for research, the funding council grant is distributed according to the quality and the 
volume of research schools undertook. So, the university used to give schools the income it 
received and schools would meet their costs, including estates and libraries and so on, and 
what they have left over, they could keep as a surplus. Thus, the old model was highly 
devolved.  
The new financial model, introduced from 1
st
 of August, 2008, has devised a new 
college layer between the university and schools where schools have been grouped under five 
colleges; heads of those colleges act as Pro-Vice Chancellors and sit on the University 
Executive Board (College Structure, 2011). The university gives colleges a budget for staff 
costs and non staff costs and also expects them to generate earnings from research and from 
trading activities and, delivering to agreed targets in terms of student recruitment and research 
performance. If one of the schools achieves a surplus, 50% of it goes to the central pot of the 
university to be reinvested across the whole university. The other 50% is retained in the 
college, and it is up to the college to decide how they want to invest that money. A college 
can decide to reinvest that money for the benefit of the wider college, reinvest in the school 
which generates it as a reward, in another school which is not able to generate sufficient funds 
or divide it among other schools. Heads of colleges can really do whatever they wish; clearly, 
the new model is not as devolved as the old one and there is much control.  
Thus, the old model used to distribute income and give budgets to schools and it used 
also to charge them for corporate services. So, typically, if a school had two hundred students, 
they would be given funds that would pay for their staff costs and their non-staff costs, their 
student costs. On top of that, they would generate money from research, consultancy and 
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some market price courses. And then, against all of that income, the university charges 
schools an amount of money for finance, HR, estates and all infrastructure costs. And then 
they would be left with a surplus or deficit annually. The new model takes away the income 
that comes from HEFCE, the income to do with research and the income to do with overseas 
students but it also takes away the charges to do with corporate areas. So what schools or 
colleges are now left with is a real budget that they can actually manage. ―So it is not just 
about a deficit or a surplus a school has made; it is about, here is your budget and for that 
budget we would like you to deliver this many students, this much research at this quality and 
so we try and manage as a whole, really‖ (SM, 4). The things that have been taken off are the 
income parts and the corporate services parts. One of the weaknesses of the new model is that 
definitely not distributing direct income is an issue for academics. Another weakness is that 
there is a danger that not distributing the corporate charges, the direct costs, could mean 
people take their eyes off those costs (SM1; SM4; SMA16; AS29).  
Additional comments by senior managers and senior manager academics included: ―I 
do not think the model says ―all right you can keep X if you do Y‖ necessarily incentivizes. It 
might do. And I think the new model is trying to move away and what we‘re saying is, look, 
what do you need to deliver your targets, not what can you keep by delivering them?‖ The old 
model was too devolved but it was also very difficult for the university to find people to run 
19 schools, which become 28 schools under the new college structure (College Structure, 
2011). Although the old financial model was not that difficult to a quantitative person but 
many heads of schools were not very interested in the details and they did not become 
academics to run businesses and understand budgets (SM1; SM4; SMA16; AS29). The 
differences between the old and the new financial models in UoB are summarised in Table 
 6.1.   
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Table  6.1: A comparison of the old and the new financial models in UoB   
The Old Financial Model The New Financial Model 
- Income and Expenditure Model - Expenditure-based Model 
- has a formula - does not have a formula 
- a very devolved model   - a much more controlled model  
- does not allow much strategic planning - allows more strategic planning 
- heads of schools are more autonomous - heads of colleges are more autonomous 
- schools are budget holders - Colleges are budget holders 
- schools could keep any surpluses 
- surpluses are divided between the college 
and the university‘s central pot 
- provides incentives for high performers 
- does not provide incentives for high 
performers  
- student-driven - not student-driven 
- quite clear as it has a formula  - less clear as it lacks a formula 
- more transparent - less transparent 
6.3.1 Autonomy 
When interviewees were asked for their perceptions of how the way universities are funded 
might affect institutional autonomy and academic freedom, their perceptions fall into three 
groups. The majority, 18 out of 2817, sees that funding has no impact on institutional 
autonomy or academic freedom. The second group, only 4 interviewees, sees that funding has 
no impact on academic freedom but restricts institutional autonomy to some extent. The last 
group, 6 out of 28, sees that funding restricts academic freedom in some respects but has no 
impact on institutional autonomy.  
The majority who sees that funding has no impact on institutional autonomy or 
academic freedom provide several rationales. Receiving funding in the form of a block grant 
gives universities a considerable amount of autonomy. The block grant system is very good in 
                                                 
17
 As indicated before, the total number of interviewees in UoB is 29 but not all of them have answered both 
sections of my interview schedule (the funding section and the quality assurance section). For example, one of 
my interviewees chose to answer only the questions in the quality assurance section as he is mainly involved in 
it. Thus, the total number of interviewees in this section is 28.   
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maintaining institutional autonomy and academic freedom and is considered to be one of the 
main strengths of the current system of funding as it allows universities to set their own 
priorities and make their own decisions on how to spend to meet their needs. In light of the 
financial constraints within which government allocates funds, they can see that HEIs are well 
equipped financially compared to the past and this allows universities to invest in facilities, 
not just in people, which is quite important for the long term health of the sector. 
I would always say that, it‘s better to have more than less. But as an 
economist, I can see that in light of the financial constraints and the several 
sectors that the government has to fund, I can see that HEIs are adequately 
funded.                                                                                                 (SMA, 14) 
The block grant provides universities with a fair amount of flexibility. The strength of this 
funding model is that it gives universities a degree of independence from the government. 
When allocations to individual institutions are announced by HEFCE, the breakdown between 
teaching and research is shown but the total allocation is provided as a block grant for 
institutions to allocate according to their own priorities. They added that although HEFCE 
gives teaching funding according to a formula which defines four broad groups of subjects 
(price groups) for funding, and have set relative cost weights for each based on expenditure 
and student FTE (Full-time Equivalence) data by cost centre, it does not ask universities to 
spend according to those groups.   
HEFCE has formulae that say it costs whatever twice as much to teach 
engineering than it does for teaching English and so it gives funding to 
universities based on theses formulae but it does not tell universities "you must 
actually spend twice as much on teaching engineering than on teaching 
English. So, there is quite lot of autonomy that sets around that funding of 
institutions and that's fairly strong. Universities can develop new areas which 
may not be covered exactly by existing funding and that's good.          (AS, 29) 
In addition to the block grant, universities are free to raise money from other sources. For 
example, universities can have more autonomy by recruiting overseas students as it enables 
them to be more autonomous and more innovative with that extra income. On research, 
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universities can get more funds from industry, business… and donations. Thus, universities 
enjoy a fair amount of autonomy and flexibility as there are diversified sources of funding. As 
universities are not reliant on one source of funding, they have more flexibility, providing 
some protection to changes in the environment and government policies; diversity also 
reduces the influence of any one source of funding. 
Universities have ultimate autonomy to appoint their own governing bodies and staff 
(including chief executives and Vice-Chancellors). Despite funding much of university 
activity, governments have no control on governing bodies and staff appointments, unlike 
many countries where universities depend heavily on public funding (e.g. Egypt). This 
independence is reflected in their charter status which makes them independent and self-
governing. Interviewees in this group agree that funding has no impact on academic freedom 
as there is no control on what academics teach or what they research. Rather, control is on 
the quality of teaching and research not on its focus, so they do not think it has an effect on 
academic freedom: 
I personally don‘t feel under pressure to report in any way because I am being 
funded by an external agency. The way that universities work is to give the 
academic freedom within the overall constraints of quality assurance and so 
on, to teach whatever is relevant for their students.                            (SMA, 14) 
One academic reported that he sometimes feels under pressure to report in a certain way to 
satisfy sponsors of research but he has never experienced that with public funding. 
I do have fall outs occasionally with funders who says well I don‘t like that 
interpretation of it or more likely they say I want you now to say that the 
implications are these but I‘m not willing to say that because I‘m just 
protecting the data as it is. So yeah I get that. In terms of the governmental 
funding, I don‘t really feel that, up to the way universities are funded I don‘t 
feel particularly that my freedom is compromised.                                (AS, 18) 
It has been reported that academics need to have adequate resources to enable them to conduct 
research consistently and coherently over a period of time and publish its outputs and 
 162 
outcomes without concern that any particular interest group has any impact on their future 
resources for research. In that sense, the current system works relatively well because it is 
diversified with several sources of funding that academics can access to underwrite their 
work. As long as academics have the resources, time, and the facilities to undertake the 
research they think is important and publish its outcomes without fear or favour, their 
academic freedom is not compromised.  
The second group, of 4 interviewees, agrees that public funding does not affect 
academic freedom but believes it restricts institutional autonomy to some extent. They agree 
with the first group that the block grant provides universities with a good degree of autonomy 
but perceive constraints in funding. They see that they would have more autonomy if they 
have no government funding at all but recognize the risk of losing the stability which public 
funding provides, so it is a trade-off between the two options. They add that it would be better 
if their sources of funding are directly from students and people who want research done, such 
as private companies, as this would give them more autonomy as they currently perceive too 
much government control: 
Well for example, if we decided to stop teaching Science and just teach Arts 
subjects, then apart from the problem of what we would do with our staff, 
we‘d immediately fall outside what called our contract bound. So we‘d lose 
massive funding. We could do that, but probably there‘d be intervention from 
the government before we got to that point. You may know the reaction when 
Exeter University closed their chemistry department a few years ago and 
Sussex was going to close their chemistry department. So you know, the 
government does intervene when you do things that they don‘t like.      (SM, 2)   
Thus, they agree that public funding affects institutional autonomy to some extent but 
recognize it as less centralized as France, Spain and other countries, where there is much 
control. Public funding does restrict institutional autonomy in terms of teaching because of 
the caps on student numbers and tuition fees. They argued there should be no caps on student 
numbers to have a real market in HE. They also note the absence of quality measures for 
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teaching funds, unlike research. It is also difficult to change the number of home/EU full-time 
students they teach because they have to bid for them. It is argued that this funding system 
allows the government to support many universities and avoid the risk of some universities 
failing if universities were free to recruit as many students as they wish. Capacity is also an 
issue because if 10,000 students wanted to join UoB, the university could not take them. It is, 
therefore, a model that provides stability but also preserves the status quo. They also 
recommended taking off the cap on tuition fees to allow a ‗real‘ market in HE and more 
competition across the sector.  
Public funding, in their view, does not restrict institutional autonomy in terms of research.  
But in terms of research, it gives a lot of freedom because once we‘re given 
the funding, it‘s pretty much up to us to use it as we wish. Although they do 
allocate the funding based on performances of different subject areas, we get it 
as a block grant so we can then distribute it as we want to, so we can actually 
support the weaker areas and that‘s quite positive really.                        (SM, 3)    
Thus, the block grant allows universities to have enough space for successful strategic 
planning in terms of cross subsidizing weaker areas for the benefit of the whole institution.  
The third group, of six interviewees, sees funding as not affecting institutional autonomy but 
restricting academic freedom in some respects. They see that it impacts on academic freedom 
in terms of research as academics are being told all the time that research has to have an 
economic impact:  
Well, it certainly impacts your academic freedom in terms of research because 
now we are being told that for example, research has to have an economic 
impact. So you have to think about areas of research that can produce impact, 
preferably economic impact. And certainly in terms of achieving this, you will 
be successful in getting external grants. You have to think about your research 
agenda – not in terms of the questions you want to ask, but the answers you 
provide will fit the constituents‘ needs, like an economic need or having to 
prove an economic impact. I think that‘s certainly a restriction.          (SMA, 9) 
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Other academics confirmed that all research funding has to have an impact statement that 
describes its broader implications, and those cases are hard to make if they are just doing 
some ‗blue skies‘, innovative research. If they have to justify everything in terms of benefit, it 
curtails opportunities to get funding for new and interesting scientific ideas. They think they 
are being forced to become an applied research organization, a development organization, 
rather than doing fundamental science and are being forced to do more short-term research to 
satisfy sponsors. It has been reported that research councils are inclined to fund certain types 
of research and, if academics are told that they have to do research in a certain area as it is 
more likely to be funded, that is a restriction on their academic freedom. What is important to 
note is that academics have to get research grants to be promoted, which makes them more 
likely to do certain types of research.  
Funding might distort teaching and research through the accountability mechanisms. 
Accountability in teaching exists through certain mechanisms such as student feedback and 
assessment of student assignments and there may be a tendency for these procedures to make 
teaching less flexible, more regimented and less responsive. In respect of research, there may 
be a tendency for the research to become more short-term as academics look for four suitable 
outputs at the end of an RAE period. If academics look at their outputs in terms of how they 
are going to be valued by the RAE panel, they may produce work which is more conservative 
and less risky. One of the academics raised a particular concern for research in schools of 
education most of which may be more professional or scholarly research rather than the 
empirical work that is more likely to be respected by peer reviewed journals and, therefore, 
the RAE. So, there is a tension about how fair it is as the RAE seems to prioritize certain 
types of research.  
 165 
Having presented the perceptions on how funding mechanisms affect institutional 
autonomy and academic freedom in HE nationally, the discussion moves to their perceptions 
on how it works under internal funding mechanisms in UoB. All interviewees agreed that the 
internal funding model in UoB does not affect academic freedom but they see that the new 
financial model affects the autonomy of schools, as there is a new college level of 
administration. There is a drift of money upwards from schools to colleges. They see more 
power devolved to colleges and more autonomy at the college level but less autonomy at the 
school level. Only one of the senior manager academics argued that schools have reasonable 
autonomy under the new financial model: 
The values of institutional autonomy and academic freedom are respected and 
we just need to make balance between them and have a fair accountability in 
the system. I think the new financial model gives schools more autonomy but 
within a clearer defined set of parameters of what that autonomy is meant to 
achieve.                                                                                                  (SMA, 7) 
However, all interviewees agree that a reasonable amount of autonomy rests within colleges 
as they are budget holders. Each college has a strategy and resources which enable it to 
deliver this within available resources, as long as they meet their institutional targets. 
Colleges have more flexibility and autonomy to move funding between different schools and 
different subjects areas. Most of the senior managers see this as a strength as heads of 
colleges can deploy resources more effectively than under the old financial model. On the 
other hand, schools are less autonomous as they are no longer budget holders: 
Schools have much less autonomy as we don‘t have budgets and thus we don‘t 
have the freedom to use the money in the way we think is best. Colleges are 
more autonomous than schools as all aspects of the budgets seem to be 
controlled by them now.                                                                     (AS, 27)  
Schools cannot keep their surpluses anymore. If a school achieves a surplus, 50% of it goes to 
the central pot of the university to be reinvested across the whole university. The other 50% is 
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retained in the college to which the school belongs, and it is up to the college to decide how to 
invest that money (as explained in section 6.3).   
Heads of schools have reported that the power of decision-making has been removed 
from schools to colleges with colleges looking at decision-making from their perspective and 
their ‗agenda‘ which is not necessarily the schools‘ ‗agenda‘. Senior manager academics who 
have been heads of schools under both of the old financial model and the new one see the 
structure as reducing the autonomy of heads of schools in favour of heads of colleges. For 
example, under the old model, staff payment was met from schools‘ budgets and, if a member 
of staff left a job, a school would make salary savings that can be used in the same year for 
other purposes. Now, salary costs are actually met at the highest level in the university and, if 
some savings happen, it is the university that benefits. Even if a head of school wants to 
appoint replacement staff, s/he cannot automatically do so but has to apply to the college and 
make the case, and it is up to the college to decide.  
6.3.2 Accountability 
When interviewees were asked for their perceptions of the dialogue of accountability, all 
agreed that there is a fair amount of accountability in the system in terms of financial 
accountability and in relation to the quality of teaching and research in HE in the UK. The 
dialogue is clear for both teaching and research and universities know what is expected of 
them. They also agreed that accountability should be reasonable without too much regulation 
to allow universities to do their job properly.  
There is always a conversation between the government and universities to 
hold them accountable for taxpayers‘ money. But, if the government strait-
jackets universities with much regulation, universities won‘t be able to do their 
job properly and won‘t be able to compete internationally.                     (SM, 5)  
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As for financial accountability, it was agreed that there is considerable accountability as 
universities are accountable for the funds they get from HEFCE for both teaching and 
research, for the grants and contracts they get from research councils, other governmental 
bodies and other funders like industrial partners and European funding agencies. Universities 
also have financial accounts which are open for audit. They are also accountable through 
performance indicators/targets and statistics about rates of graduation, drop-out rates and 
employability of students (HESA, 2011).   
There is accountability in terms of quality and financial audits in everything 
universities do. So, I think accountability does work, but again, there‘s a lot of 
red tape in the public sector and I think that‘s something that a lot of other 
organizations have to deal with, not only universities. We‘re no different, 
really.                                                                                                        (SM, 4) 
In some ways, it is right to have that accountability as it is public money which 
we should be accountable for but one of the major problems that I see now is 
that there‘s a requirement to have very detailed statistical reports on students. I 
think HESA used to be used primarily for just informing the sector about the 
student body but increasingly now it‘s being used as a control mechanism.    
……..                                                                                                        (SM, 2) 
While it is agreed that universities should be accountable for public money, interviewees 
believe accountability should be a lighter touch.   
For research accountability, universities are accountable for the funds they get from 
HEFCE for research, their grants from research councils, other governmental bodies and other 
funders. This accountability includes the need to publish high quality papers in top journals as 
well as accountability to agencies which fund research projects. This accountability is 
reinforced through the RAE which has a strong impact on distributing money among 
universities based on the quality of their research outputs. The RAE is considered to be a 
reasonable way of making universities accountable.  
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The RAE is a pretty reasonable way of making universities accountable for 
research income and I think that the institutional audit of teaching inevitably 
gives us some degree of accountability.                                             (SMA, 7) 
As for teaching accountability, universities are accountable for HEFCE to recruit an agreed 
number of students. They are accountable for the quality of teaching through QAA, National 
Student Survey (NSS)18 and other performance indicators. QAA checks the quality of teaching 
through institutional audits and make these public for all stakeholders, including prospective 
students. NSS is also helpful to prospective students and performance indicators reported by 
HESA on rates of graduation, drop-out rates and employability of students, can also be 
considered as a form of accountability for the quality of teaching. League tables19, from these 
data, inform the newspaper reading public. 
I assume that universities are accountable in the sense that there are 
institutional audits, performance targets and the National Student Survey. 
They literally produce statistics on everything, statistics on completion rates, 
drop-out rates, and graduation and employment rates. It‘s all performance 
management, really, and how we perform, that we‘re accountable to. (SMA, 9) 
It has been added that universities are held accountable for the quality of teaching in three 
ways: constraints, incentives and disincentives and directives. As for constraints, universities 
are constrained to a certain number of students which they cannot exceed. However, through 
incentives, universities can take an extra number of students if they take part in widening 
participation. Universities can also be given a financial incentive if they develop their 
                                                 
18 
The NSS is an opportunity for final year students to give feedback on all aspects of university life including: 
teaching; assessment and feedback; academic support; organization and management; learning resources and 
personal development (NSS, 2011). 
                                                                                      
19 League tables of British universities have been published annually, by The Times, The Independent and other 
organizations, since October 1992. They have become increasingly popular over the last few years regarding the 
ranking of universities and have an impact on the public's perception of the best universities. The main aim of 
these rankings is to inform newspaper reading public, especially prospective students, and their parents. 
Therefore, the ranking is not purely research-oriented. The factors used to assess universities include not only the 
quality of research but other factors which are relevant to undergraduate students such as teaching quality, entry 
standards, drop-out rates, student satisfaction and graduate job prospect. 
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teaching in a certain way, which can be seen as an incentive or a disincentive. Universities are 
also accountable through directives they get from the government such as those about 
employability as the government might want universities to develop programmes that will 
create far greater opportunities for graduate employment.      
However, four interviewees see weak accountability for teaching as there is no quality 
measure in teaching linked to funding. They see funds for teaching distributed according to 
the number of students taught by each institution and the rate of funding depends on the 
discipline not the quality of teaching. Quality of teaching does not impact on funding as 
research quality does through the RAE:  
While research money is mainly quality-driven, teaching money is not driven 
by the quality of teaching or the quality of outcomes. So, there is no real 
market in education as funding for teaching flows to institutions irrespective of 
their academic strength and the quality of provision. I think the government 
wants to support many universities because I suspect if there was a market that 
says you are free to recruit students and you are free to go wherever you like, a 
number of institutions would probably fail because they would not be quite so 
popular. So, in a way, this kind of a model at the moment preserves the status 
quo.                                                                                                           (SM, 1) 
Interviewees also noted that although the QAA is supposed to check the quality of teaching, it 
checks a paper trail rather than the actual quality of teaching: 
Accountability is really a tricky thing. In theory, there are official agencies to 
guarantee accountability. For example, the QAA is supposed to check the 
quality of teaching, for accountability purposes, but that in reality is 
completely nonsense as they do not actually check the quality of the teaching 
itself, they check paper trail instead.                                                       (AS, 29) 
Turning to accountability internally in UoB, almost all interviewees agreed that there is much 
more accountability/control and much less autonomy under the new financial model 
especially with colleges as a new level of administration. They agree that departments and 
schools are now accountable to colleges and colleges to the university. However, one senior 
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manager added that it is not quite as straightforward, as schools are independent units and 
also have accountabilities directly to the university, depending on the type of activity.  
Colleges are responsible for financial and academic management of the 
schools and they are accountable to the vice chancellor who is in turn 
accountable to the funding councils.                                                        (SM, 1)  
One of the interviewees argued that because, technically, accountability lies in the colleges as 
the budget holders, schools are less accountable than colleges. It can be argued that this is 
technically correct as all interviewees agree that under the new financial model, there is much 
more autonomy at the college level and much less in schools. 
Under the current financial model, technically, accountability should stop at 
the budget holder (colleges) as schools have no control over the budget. 
Previously we‘ve been the budget holder so the accountability starts with us; 
it‘s our fault if we have not delivered what we said we were going to do. 
However, now if the college decides to pump 40% of the budget into one 
subject area, that‘s their decision and they should be held responsible for their 
decisions.                                                                                                 (AS, 28) 
I think that it is an attempt to manage the academic affairs of the university 
much more centrally but I don‘t think it will actually work.              (SMA, 16) 
In theory schools are now accountable to colleges but I do not understand yet 
how they could be hold accountable to the university and that‘s another 
question.                                                                                                  (AS, 29) 
One of the senior manager academics sees the new financial model as a reflection of the way 
in which the managerial system is starting to have more impact upon universities. The 
university is really trying to balance the sort of autonomy and individualism of academics 
with the hierarchical and more market-based approaches of the new public management. 
Thus, the values of institutional autonomy and academic freedom are respected but the 
university aims to make a balance between them with necessary accountability. It means 
schools are given more autonomy but within a clearer set of parameters of what they are 
meant to achieve.  
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6.3.3 Efficiency 
The majority of interviewees, 22 out of 28, sees the system of funding as reasonably efficient 
while a minority, of 6, finds it difficult to decide whether the system is efficient or not.  
As for the first group, they provide several rationales as to why the system is 
perceived to be reasonably efficient. The first rationale is transparency as universities know 
the rules, how funding is allocated and how to secure sources of funding. The principles on 
which funding are based are seen as sensible ones in the sense that teaching money is linked 
to the number of students and research money is linked to judgments on the quality of 
research. Thus, transparency is mainly achieved through clarity of accountability.   
The block grant provides universities with a good degree of stability, autonomy and 
flexibility to spend money according to their own priorities. That flexibility allows universities 
to manage policy objectives properly. While recurrent funding is not viewed as enough to 
cover the full cost of teaching and research activities, there are other streams of funding. 
Efficiency is also aided by diversified sources of funding and competition between 
universities which drive up the quality of provision.  
It is quite efficient. I can‘t think of many better ways of doing it in terms of 
teaching apart from I would want to put more freedom into the fee regime. In 
terms of research, I think probably the QR element of research is pretty 
efficient.                                                                                                 (SMA, 7) 
Thus, they see that funding is efficient for both teaching and research but they would like to 
see more competition in the teaching element. The funding system is a fairly diversified one 
which recognizes that there is a cost for providing high quality teaching and research. Having 
that diversified system of funding in place shows the government and society‘s commitment, 
valuing HE because of its real benefits to individual graduates and to the well-being of the 
society as a whole. However, they see there is a more complex range of funding for research 
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than for teaching and that research funding is quality-based whereas teaching funding is 
student-based. Thus, in this respect, it does not really matter whether the teaching is good or 
bad as it is a contract between the funding council and universities based on the number of 
students and not the quality of teaching - unlike research. Interviewees suggested that having 
a competitive element for both research income and postgraduate student fees would probably 
drive up quality and, if they have more competition in undergraduate student fees between 
universities in the same way, it would lead to higher quality teaching.  
It has also been reported that the customer culture made universities more responsive 
to students‟ concerns for the quality of provision. Since 2006, the government has allowed 
universities to charge students tuition fees up to £3,000 per year and it is claimed that this has 
made universities more concerned about the quality of provision in response to students‘ 
concerns about the quality of their teaching and learning because students have to re-pay these 
fees. Thus, universities become more responsive to students because of the customer culture 
and their concerns for quality make the system more efficient.     
Although interviewees in this group agreed that the system of funding HE, overall, is 
reasonably efficient, they also agreed that there are downsides/inefficiencies in the system 
which should be addressed. Firstly, they see that universities are underfunded because of the 
annual financial cuts and that more money is needed to avoid cutting academic jobs. 
Secondly, most interviewees see that the different bands for funding different subjects are 
questionable, whether they are accurate and actually reflect the cost of teaching the different 
subjects. They also recognize that the formula will never please everybody.  
Thirdly, they see that there is more bureaucracy in the system especially when you 
want to introduce something new such as a new programme or a module. The systems for 
assuring quality require staff to go through a checklist of procedures and activities before 
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having a new proposal accepted. It can sometimes take up to two or three years to fully 
develop an initiative, which can be too late and thus universities are not particularly 
responsive in that sense. The second aspect of bureaucracy is that universities are required to 
collect quite a good deal of information about what they do and return this to HEFCE to 
demonstrate that they did what they said they will do; this is particularly true of the RAE 
which is criticized for being very bureaucratic and an expensive way to assess the quality of 
research. Finally, interviewees have reservations for research funding through RAE and other 
research councils. They see that the way research is funded pushes universities to give more 
attention for research than for teaching. Research-led universities normally give more 
attention to research than teaching which leads to treating teaching activity as secondary, 
which might be to the detriment of the quality of teaching:  
One of the main weaknesses of the system is that the system does drive 
academics‘ efforts to research rather than teaching. You may prepare rather 
casually for your lecture ― it does not really matter, I am depressed by it‖ but 
you won‘t prepare rather casually for research bid because you know that other 
people compete for the large amount of money that comes from research. So, 
there is a rather more captured audience on the research side rather than on the 
teaching side. So, there is an imbalance in the roles funding teaching and 
funding research do especially in research-led universities which drive efforts 
to research and minimize efforts for teaching.                                    (SMA, 11) 
The effect of the RAE has been to draw money away from teaching towards 
research so in the research-led universities; there may be a tendency to get 
teaching done by people who are less qualified, to bring in visiting lecturers 
and not to give the people who are doing the major part of the research much 
teaching to do, which may handicap or disable, in some sense, the ability of 
students to gain from the teaching they are getting because it‘s not research-led 
teaching.                                                                                              (SMA, 13)  
Academics spend much time on preparing research proposals to get grants and sometimes 
they end up with nothing as the chances of being successful in getting research grants is 
becoming very low to a stage where it does not worth academics‟ time and effort in preparing 
research proposals. However, this is not the case for all universities as they still find that 
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most of the research money goes to Oxford and Cambridge which confirms that the funding 
bodies need to build research excellence centres rather than spreading research money widely. 
Oxford, Cambridge and Imperial College attract the best researchers and tend 
to do the best research and so it's fair that they get more money. On the other 
hand if you want more universities to do more research then spreading out 
research money is good. If you want top research that can compete with the 
rest of the world, then you do have to give more money to Oxford and 
Cambridge where there is a higher quality research; you can't have all our 
universities being the top in the world. Thus, there is always a compromise 
between having a few top universities or several average universities. (AS, 27)    
It has been reported as well that a lot of energy, time and money are spent on administrative 
exercises which are designed to maximize performance on either a teaching quality 
assessment or RAE and the assessment criteria are often opaque. When research funding was 
made more selective through the RAE, its advantage is that resources are given to the best 
researchers but it also has disadvantages. One of these is that the RAE, overall, weakened 
Britain‘s university sector because it suddenly created teaching universities and research 
universities.  
The RAE churns out mediocre publications because of the great competition to 
get research funding. Academics‘ transfer from a university to another for the 
sake of securing RAE money or to get promotion is also questionable. (AS, 
18) 
All interviewees are aware about the high cost of the current system especially in terms of 
RAE but they do not know a better way of assessing research quality. They are all concerned 
about the huge amount of money and effort that are put into the RAE. One of the academics 
raised another concern about its inefficiency: 
Will those 20 or 30 people you pick for the RAE panel review team cover the 
whole areas of one field like Education from critical psychology to web-based 
learning, motivation studies and whatever other subjects to be? Of course, not 
and this is only one field in one discipline so what about the other disciplines? 
Thus, it is totally deficient.                                                                     (AS, 17)    
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As for the second group of 6 interviewees, it is difficult to decide whether the system of 
funding is efficient or not as the term efficiency is so broad and difficult to define and thus 
difficult to judge: 
Well, efficiency is a relative term. I find that it‘s an enormously difficult 
question to answer just because efficiency itself is so hard to define. It‘s more 
if you talk about producing baked beans, yes, you can talk about efficiency. 
But producing research, answering questions, and developing new areas of 
knowledge, it is very difficult to say what efficient would be.               (AS, 21)  
Turning to efficiency internally in UoB, perceptions fall into three main groups. The majority, 
13 interviewees, sees that it is too difficult to decide whether the system is efficient or not, 
while a second group of 9 sees the financial model in UoB as reasonably efficient. A last 
group of 6 interviewees sees that it is inefficient.   
The majority group sees that it is quite difficult to decide if the financial model in UoB 
is efficient or not as the model is still new, not settled. Thus, the system needs time to settle 
down before being judged. They add that the new model is still vague for most of them.  
We are in a transitional period and it is too early and too hard to decide if the 
current model of funding is efficient or not.                                       (SMA, 12) 
The weakness is that really nobody understands it well enough at the moment, 
it is too vague.                                                                                     (SMA, 16)  
As for the second group, the financial model in UoB seems to be reasonably efficient. Firstly, 
it allows for much better strategic planning for the whole institution, allowing more strategic 
investment because, if UoB gets 10 million GBP in one place, it can invest more strategically 
than if one million each goes to ten places.  
For instance, If you have a medical school, you have to have a chemistry 
department, medics need chemistry, so having a medical school without a 
chemistry school is not going to work. But school of Chemistry may not be 
able to generate enough income to keep itself going so we have to find a way 
of resourcing. We are like a corporation in that prospect in that we know what 
each unit can earn and if one can earn much more money, that‘s fine because it 
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can support one that can‘t earn enough money which is equally crucial to an 
organization like this. And that‘s what allows us to offer the best programmes 
we have. Actually it is a weakness if academics do not believe in cooperative 
behaviour. Academics should think about the university collectively.    (SM, 1) 
Another strength of having the college layer under the new financial model is the connection 
between the strategic decisions of the university‟s executive board and the operationalization 
of those decisions. The connection between decisions and their implementation is more 
dynamic as heads of colleges, members of the executive board of the university, are decision 
makers. Previously, there was a gap between what senior managers decided to do strategically 
and what was done operationally, which the college system clearly addresses. Thus, having a 
small number of colleges allows for better management than having so many schools:  
When you have 19 different schools under the old model, for all those schools 
to be managed effectively, you need a lot of managerial and financial expertise 
in each school and the university did not really provide that which means that 
some schools would be very badly managed and it was not necessarily the 
fault of the head of school. So, again if you have a smaller number of colleges, 
hopefully you can have much more quality in running and managing schools 
within each college, which means that the quality and financial management of 
these schools would be better. In that sense, it should be more efficient but you 
have to balance that again through a model of incentives. If the new system 
removes incentives for schools to behave in efficient and economical ways, it 
would be worse.                                                                                      (AS, 29) 
I think that being able to sit with other heads of schools and the head of the 
college on a regular basis is very helpful because you realize the commonality 
across different schools in terms of the challenges faced.                  (SMA, 14) 
As for the last group of 6 interviewees, the new financial model is completely inefficient. 
They see that the college layer just adds an extra tier of bureaucracy as there are too many 
middle managers and committees and much time is wasted in justifying what they want to do 
rather than actually doing it. They also see that there is not enough money to enable them to 
do their job properly.   
There probably is enough money coming in at the top, but it does not actually 
filter down to the teaching and research activities which we are delivering. It 
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gets stuck somewhere in the Aston Web building.                                  (AS, 
25) 
The new financial model, compared to the old one, is not efficient as there is a 
lot more bureaucracy in e-mails, meetings to go to, lots of committees and 
papers coming and stuff like that in the new system.                              (AS, 
20) 
The new financial model lacks transparency as it has no formula. No one actually knows how 
money is distributed, which means that the university has more control and it is less clear on 
how they direct that control. Some senior people do not even know the funding streams as it is 
an expenditure-based model. In their view, the inability to know streams of income cripples 
the ability to plan in advance. It is quite hard for heads of schools and even heads of colleges 
to understand which parts of the activity are actually producing surpluses or deficits as they 
do not tend to see the income in the way they used to under the old model. It has been 
reported that heads of schools have to overestimate their financial needs as they are not 
allowed to overspend. Thus, while the current model has the benefit of simplicity, it is less 
clear and less transparent and that is why they really need to move back to a system where the 
income streams were transparent. 
The new model is a complete mystery to me. I would have hoped that the 
money followed the number of students, quality of research and the amount of 
research grant that we win. However, when I speak to the head of school or the 
head of college, there is no model to explain the way money is split up and 
delivered to different schools.                                                                 (AS, 25) 
The new financial model is a disincentive. It is viewed as not providing incentives for 
academics or departments who generate money to do that anymore as schools cannot keep 
their surpluses. Heads of schools mentioned that, as long as they generate money and make 
surpluses, they should have a share of those surpluses to invest in their schools and be able to 
generate higher surpluses in the future but actually what they get back from creating new 
activities is just a sum of money which covers the cost of those activities. 
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6.3.4 Equity 
Views on the equity/fairness of the current system of funding fall into two main groups: 17 
interviewees see the funding system as reasonably fair whereas 11 interviewees find it too 
difficult to decide whether the funding system is fair or not.  
The view of the first group is that the system seems to be reasonably fair. The system 
is transparent and HEIs are properly funded as the way universities are funded for teaching 
and for research is quite clear; universities know the rules of the game and know how to 
secure teaching and research money. In terms of teaching money, they see that the system is 
fair for students, as students in comparable subjects are treated in the same way whatever 
university they join. They like the fact that universities receive income that represents the 
number of students multiplied by a known amount of money. However, they have some 
reservations on the distribution of teaching money according to the four subject 
bands/categories, which they believe is not really based on objective analysis but has grown 
out of history and that the real cost of delivering subjects is not recognized by the funding 
councils.   
In terms of research money, funding is not distributed equally among universities and 
neither should it be as research money should go where the quality is judged to be located. 
Thus, research money is distributed according to the quality of research outputs, which is 
considered to be reasonably fair. Research is mainly funded through competition and this is a 
good mechanism as resources are given to the best universities, researchers and proposals. 
Funding for teaching is quite fair as it depends on the number of students. For 
research, it is different as obviously we get a lot more money than say 
Birmingham City University because of the quality of our research but we 
probably won‘t get as much money as say Oxford or Cambridge or London 
School of Economics. In that sense, it is fair as it depends on the quality of 
research outputs.                                                                                      (AS, 
20) 
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Although these interviewees agree that it is fair for research money to be distributed 
according to the quality of research outputs, they have reservations, as the system in place 
favours institutions that have done well in the past. Funding tends to be correlated over time 
so institutions that managed to secure good funding in the past continue to do so, in that sense 
it is difficult for institutions to move easily up or down the league tables:  
Sitting in a Russell Group University like Birmingham, it is probably not a 
problem because we have a good reputation but for other institutions which are 
less favoured, it is much more difficult to break into the funding rounds 
because of the fact that there is a natural tendency for institutions that have 
done well in the past to continue to receive research funding for its reputation 
so there is that sort of natural reinforcing which makes it hard for other 
institutions to break in.                                                                        (SMA, 14)                                                                                   
The system seems to favour institutions just because of them having a 
particular name like Oxbridge universities which always get the lion share of 
research money. So, we do not know what the rules of the game are.   (AS, 21)                                                                                                                                                 
Interviewees added that the system might be unfair for new, post 1992, universities because 
the kind of research they do may not be highly valued by the RAE. Although the system 
seems to be unfair for new universities, interviewees mentioned that it also depends on how 
much money the government is prepared to devote to fund HE and, if the government simply 
funds all institutions equally, no British university will have enough money to compete 
internationally. Thus, they argued that the funding system is reasonably fair but probably 
could be fairer. However, there is always a compromise between having a few top universities 
or several that are no more than average. 
The UK has a system where there is a hierarchy of universities with different 
funding and of course the American system does the same with more private 
money. So, I mean no government is ever likely to give the HE sector so much 
money that everybody says "Wow, there is no shortage in our system of 
funding". The British system seems as fair to me as most systems but probably 
could be fairer.                                                                                        (AS, 29) 
For the second group, of 11 interviewees, they find it difficult to decide whether the funding 
system is fair or not. Firstly, they comment that there is a lack of enough information on 
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funding HE nationally. They suggest that they do not have enough information to judge the 
system and decide whether or not it is fair. Secondly, equity is a broad concept which is too 
difficult to define and thus difficult to be judged. They suggest that equity is a complex word 
which might include several aspects, such as: equal opportunity; equal quality of opportunity; 
and whether it is fair to institutions, to students and to staff. They see that funding might be 
fair in some senses and unfair in others and what is fair for some might not be fair for others. 
Thus, equity in terms of funding HE is controversial and difficult to define. 
I am not quite sure about the fairness of the system of funding. There is a big 
debate on whether it is fair to institutions, to staff and to students; whether the 
RAE allocation process is fair or not? You cannot have a fixed answer for that. 
Do the students necessarily get the education they might expect to get in 
RUSSEL group universities? I‘m not sure that‘s the case. Do they get it in the 
new universities? Probably. So, maybe it‘s the most able students, who have 
the highest A level grades, who are going to the best universities, are not 
necessarily getting the sort of academic teaching support that they might have 
expected.                                                                                                (SMA, 7)    
Everything is equitable in one sense for all academic staff. For example, everyone is entitled 
to have a study leave or have payments to go to conferences. In that sense, all the money is 
distributed equally between academics. However, one academic argued that ―If you take a 
different version of equity from John Rawl‘s ideas of equity ‗appropriate reward for talent‘, 
the system may be unfair for some academics. Thus, there are situations where equality of 
treatment is the key issue; other where equality in opportunity is the key issue and yet others 
where appropriate reward for talent is right. So, the system is fair in some senses but unfair in 
others.  
They also have similar reservations as the first group raised about the level of equity 
in funding between pre and post-1992 universities in terms of QR money. They agree that the 
system favours institutions that have done well in the past and does not create a fair space for 
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competition between universities. They see an intention to put universities in categories, 
research universities that are research excellence centres and teaching universities:  
Some of the post-1992 were saying they increased their research output, 
increased quality of their research across the board as they have gone through 
each of the RAE rounds but their income through the RAE is actually going 
down and down. So, they are trying to improve themselves and positioning 
themselves amongst institutions like Oxbridge Universities and Redbrick 
Universities but they are actually finding their efforts not being rewarded 
maybe because other institutions are already ahead of them, ahead of the game 
and they will hate to change, cannot change to make themselves stronger in 
research terms.                                                                                        (AS, 19)   
Perceptions on equity internally in the UoB fall into three groups. The majority, 18 
interviewees, sees that it is too difficult to decide whether or not the system is fair. The 
second group of five interviewees sees the financial model in UoB as unfair and the last group 
of five sees that it is reasonably fair.   
As for the majority group, they find it quite difficult to decide whether or not the 
financial model in UoB is fair, as the model is still new and not settled. Thus, the system 
needs time to settle down before being judged. They add that the new model is extremely 
opaque, less transparent and has many disincentives. They also have reservations about the 
way teaching money is distributed according to the different subject bands: 
A Medicine programme actually costs more than an English programme as it 
requires labs whereas an English programme is classroom-based. But actually 
there are several undergraduate programs in school of Education that do have a 
lot of practical work that should be funded on the one and half times band but 
they aren‘t because traditionally in the old system, all our programs were 
funded on the same banding. So even if Medicine had a programme that was 
purely classroom-based, it would be funded on the same banding as if it is a 
lab-based one. The money you attract for a course should be dependent upon 
what‘s in that course, and what it really costs to deliver it, rather than if it costs 
less in a classroom or in a lab.                                                                (AS, 20) 
As for the second group of 5 interviewees, they view the financial model in UoB as unfair 
because it is not transparent and disincentive. The system does not provide incentives for 
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schools to generate money as they cannot keep their surpluses. The following quotes show 
their views on the disincentivising features:   
I wasn‘t happy at all when we lost our reserves. I wasn‘t happy about that 
because you plan strategically for the future before the system came, and I had 
an idea of using our reserves for postgraduate bursaries to bring students from 
outside the UK to come and make us more international. So we worked hard to 
get the money as a reserve and we have plans on how to use it, and then all the 
money is gone. On the other hand, schools that are running a deficit would be 
very happy with that system.                                                               (SMA, 12) 
The system does not provide any incentives at all. I know no incentives 
whatsoever, other than you losing your job or the closure of a department 
which are very negative incentives as they keep academics under threat all the 
time. So why should I worry myself about generating more money. The only 
incentive I have is to publish papers and improve my CV so that I can get a 
better job somewhere else.                                                                   (AS, 25)                                                                                                             
They also have concerns on the unequal patterns of historical resource distribution in terms of 
teaching and research money.  
As for the last group of 5 interviewees, including three senior managers and two 
senior manager academics, the financial model in UoB is reasonably fair as it can keep the 
whole institution alive. They see the benefits of cross-subsidies within the university, rather 
than pockets of excellence and areas that are allowed to decline. The money that is returned to 
the university, from schools‘ surpluses, is reinvested for the benefit of the whole institution 
which they think is reasonably fair. They agree that it is difficult to have a 100% fair system 
but at least the current financial model in UoB treats all colleges and schools as equitably as it 
can. 
Well in the sense that no funding is given to any particular academic activity at 
the expense of another activity across the college, yes it‘s fair. But, is it fair 
because we‘ve managed to equalize what may have been unequal patterns of 
historical resource distribution so far, no it‘s not yet fair as we have not 
managed to do that yet.                                                                         (SMA, 7)   
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6.3.5 Summary 
Having presented the perceptions of interviewees about the current system of funding, in the 
UK and UoB specifically, it is clear that most have clear-cut answers about how funding 
mechanisms affect the dialogue of accountability and autonomy but they had more limited 
answers to questions on the issues of efficiency and equity of the funding mechanisms. They 
see efficiency and equity as relative terms which have several meanings. Thus, funding 
mechanisms might be efficient in one sense and inefficient in another; similarly, they may be 
fair in one sense and not in another.  
There are also no significant differences in the perceptions of the different groups of 
senior managers, senior manager academics and academics on the issues of autonomy, 
accountability, efficiency and equity. Unequal patterns of historical resource distribution are 
viewed as a serious issue in distributing teaching and research funds, nationally and internally 
in UoB. All interviewees agreed that research money is quality-driven whereas teaching 
money is student-based. They also agreed that research funding is based on competition 
which is supposed to drive up quality and recommended having more competition in funding 
teaching through removing caps on student numbers and tuition fees in order to have a real 
market in HE. 
6.4 Conclusion  
To conclude, this chapter has presented the results and discussion related to the second 
research question ―How do funding mechanisms affect higher education in Egypt and the 
UK?‖ The analysis and discussion were structured around the four themes, which form the 
theoretical framework of the study, and themes that emerged from the data were discussed as 
sub-themes under the four main ones. The most significant data in this chapter were those 
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gathered through interviews with academics, senior manager academics and senior managers 
in both cases.   
The main findings showed that line-item funding in Egypt HE has a negative impact 
on institutional autonomy and might have an indirect negative impact on academic freedom. It 
has weakened the dialogue of accountability as it provides an administrative accountability, 
not a technical one. It also has negative impact on the efficiency of operation as it lacks 
flexibility and does not provide incentives for efficiency gains and improvement. Finally, lack 
of transparency and favouritism have been reported to affect the fairness of distributing 
funding among different universities and among different faculties in the same university, as 
the system lacks a funding formulae.  
On the other hand, the block grant system in the UK HE has been found to enhance 
institutional autonomy as it provides universities with a reasonable degree of autonomy and 
flexibility. It has improved the dialogue of accountability as the system provides sound 
financial, research and teaching accountability. It has also improved the efficiency of the 
system as it brought more competition between universities which has driven up the quality of 
provision. It also provides incentives for efficiency gains and makes universities more 
responsive to the needs of students and society. Although interviewees did not give clear-cut 
answers on the fairness of the system, it was found that the majority agreed that the funding 
system is reasonably fair as it is transparent and HEIs are adequately funded.    
The interpretation of results in this chapter has pointed to valuable implications for 
policy and practice that will be presented in the concluding chapter. The next chapter 
addresses the third research question ―How do quality assurance systems affect higher 
education in Egypt and the UK?‖     
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7 CHAPTER SEVEN 
QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEMS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
IN EGYPT AND THE UK 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines how Quality Assurance Systems (QAS) in Egypt and the UK affect 
universities and the people who work in them in terms of autonomy, accountability, efficiency 
and equity. The data in this chapter have principally been obtained from document analysis 
and semi-structured interviews conducted with 47 staff in CU and 29 in UoB.  
To explore how QAS affect autonomy, accountability, efficiency and equity, direct 
questions on these issues were included in the interview schedule, together with other 
questions about QAS, their strengths and weaknesses and changes interviewees would like to 
make if they had the opportunity (see Appendices ‗1‘ and ‗2‘: Interview Schedules).    
The next two sections report the results of the QAS analysis in Cairo and Birmingham, 
starting with a brief overview about quality assurance mechanisms in each university. Then, 
the evidence on quality assurance is analysed using the four themes of the study, followed by 
a brief summary. The chapter ends with a brief conclusion.  
7.2 Quality Assurance Systems in Egypt (Cairo University) 
As an overview of QAS in Egypt has been provided in Chapter Four, this section discusses 
QAS in Cairo University. In fact, Internal Quality Assurance Systems (IQAS) in Cairo 
University are little different from other public universities in that they are all required to 
follow the guidelines provided by NQAAC and NAQAAE. However, Cairo University differs 
in that it has been giving attention to issues of quality and evaluation even before the QAAP. 
In 1999, it established one of the first centres in Egypt concerned with institutional 
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performance appraisal and quality assurance. Under QAAP, the title of this centre changed to 
Quality Assurance and Accreditation Center (QAAC) in 2006.  
Since 2006, the centre started to implement quality systems through institutional and 
programmatic self studies, helping colleges and institutions within the University identify 
their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. Plans for improvement emerged and 
many colleges are now working to align their systems and activities with the quality system. 
To assure the sustainability of such activities, quality assurance units have been established in 
colleges and institutions and 22 out of 25 have funds to support the implementation and 
sustainability of these QA activities from both national (Quality assurance and Accreditation 
Project, QAAP, Continuous Improvement and Qualifying for Accreditation Project, CIQAP, 
and University Development Project, UDP) and international (USAID, United Nations 
Development Project, UNDP, and Ford Foundation) bodies (QAAC, 2007; QAAC, 2008a; 
QAAC, 2008b). 
7.2.1 Autonomy 
Interviewees were asked for their perceptions of how QAS might affect institutional 
autonomy and academic freedom. Their perceptions have been grouped into two groups: 31 
out of 40,20 see QAS having no effect on institutional autonomy or academic freedom while 
the second group sees QAS affecting institutional autonomy and academic freedom in some 
respects.  
                                                 
20 As indicated before, the total number of interviewees in CU is 47 but not all of them have answered both 
sections of my interview schedule (the funding section and the quality assurance section). For example, seven of 
my interviewees have chosen to answer only the questions in the funding section as they are mainly involved in 
it. Thus, the total number of interviewees in this section is 40.    
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The first group, which forms a great majority, provides several explanations why QAS have 
no effect on institutional autonomy or academic freedom. They see that QAS guarantee that 
universities are autonomous and responsible at the same time. QAS help improve the 
governance of universities, guarantee academic freedom and the right of students to be 
provided with the skills required for their qualifications: 
QAS do not affect academic freedom at all as academic freedom is one of the 
major components in quality assurance, but it should be understood in its right 
meaning. QAS ask academics to prepare a course specs and a programme 
specs but it has nothing to do with the way academics teach their courses or do 
their research. Thus, QAS do not affect academic freedom but actually help 
academics organize their work. It guarantees that the course would provide 
certain skills for students which are really important in terms of their 
qualifications. QAS do not affect institutional autonomy as they guarantee that 
universities are autonomous and responsible at the same time.            (SMA, 7) 
They add that even if QAS put some restrictions, they are usually crucial to improving the 
quality of provision. Despite agreeing that QAS have no effects on institutional autonomy or 
academic freedom, most agreed that QAS add extra burdens such as documentation and 
paper work which take too much of academics‟ time and effort and these sometimes have a 
negative effect on the performance of academics. QAS ask academics for things which are 
really difficult to achieve, especially in light of the massive number of students, inadequate 
funding, poor infrastructure and poor academic pay in public universities. They argued that 
such problems should be solved first if QAS are to be implemented and activated properly: 
QAS do not affect academic freedom or institutional autonomy. It just adds 
some extra burdens like documentation and paper work but actually it has 
nothing to do with academic freedom as academics used to do all the QA 
activities but without documentation. Now, they are asked to document these 
activities so that whoever comes after them can benefit from such database 
instead of starting from scratch.                                                      (SMA, 22) 
…                                                                                                               
However, one of the senior manager academics (SMA, 23) argued that paper work and 
documentation cannot be regarded as extra burdens devised by QAS as they are part of 
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academics‘ work. A director of one quality assurance unit (AS, 25) added that the paper work 
help academics have good time-management skills and be well organised.   
An analysis of the views of the 9 interviewees in the second group identifies 
restrictions on institutional autonomy, such as lack of flexibility, especially in approving new 
modules or programmes which can take up to 5 years. However, this inflexibility was 
reported to go back to the laws and regulations governing higher education in Egypt and not 
to QAS.  
Changing the laws is very difficult, so approving new courses takes much time 
and this is really a big problem as we cannot provide up-to-date courses to 
enable our students to compete in the labour market.                         (SMA, 14) 
Universities do not have the autonomy to appoint their own governing bodies and staff. It has 
been reported that as long as vice-chancellors of universities are appointed by the 
president/governor of the country, universities cannot be autonomous, as autonomy should 
mean appointment of governing bodies and staff is done according to the qualifications of the 
applicants for the required posts. However, because Vice-chancellors are appointed by the 
President, it is assumed they are chosen to satisfy the needs of the government and achieve 
their policy/agenda. Thus, to guarantee the autonomy of universities in Egypt, there is a need 
for the governing bodies and staff to be chosen according to their qualifications, as done in 
other countries.  
Restrictions on academic freedom have also been identified in terms of the volume of 
paper work which academics are asked to prepare. This includes putting items that must be 
covered in the course specifications and which, therefore, might restrict academics‘ creativity 
and the dynamics of teaching students; asking academics to set the exams in certain ways and 
provide model answers for the final exams may not be reasonable, especially in studies like 
Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences where there is usually no single right answer. 
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I think QAS restrict academic freedom to some extent because of putting fixed 
things in the course specs which restricts academics‘ creativity and dynamics. 
I know that QAS aim at guaranteeing that the course covers at least the 
minimum requirements of educating students and providing them with certain 
skills. However, I think there should be an item in the course specs which can 
be called ‗Open Topics‘ where academics can handle the new stuff that 
appears in the field without having to wait for ages for approving a new 
course. We have already applied that idea in our faculty but it is not 
generalized in the university as a whole. We have done this as we have new 
stuff every day in our field in computer sciences and if we have to wait for 
approving new courses, we would be backward and would be teaching out-
dated stuff to our students.                                                                  (SMA, 15) 
Just two interviewees, in this group, believe it is too early to decide whether or not QAS 
affect academic freedom and institutional autonomy. In their view, the systems need more 
time to settle down before being judged, as QAS in Egypt are still in a transitional phase.       
7.2.2 Accountability 
When asked for their perceptions on the dialogue of accountability, all agreed that while QAS 
include rules which appear to guarantee a strong dialogue, these are not activated for several 
reasons. They see that good QAS provide two things: autonomy for HEIs to decide their own 
policies, mission, vision and objectives and, through that autonomy, hold HEIs accountable to 
all stakeholders. QAS in Egypt HE include rules which should provide autonomy, 
accountability and transparency but unfortunately those cannot easily be activated as lots of 
the laws and regulations governing HE in Egypt contradict with and impede the proper 
implementation of QAS. 
As long as the laws which govern higher education have not been changed or 
adapted to fit the new reforms, the accountability system - which QAS should 
provide- will continue to be weak and not highly activated. It is as if QAS with 
its rules go on one direction whereas the laws and regulations that govern 
higher education go on a different direction. There should be harmony 
between them to guarantee proper implementation of QAS and a strong 
dialogue of accountability.            .                                                  (SMA, 22)  
In addition, HEIs have no say on the massive number of students they are forced to accept 
every year which affects the quality of provision, especially in light of inadequate funding, 
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lack of proper infrastructure and fees which do not reflect the real cost of students‘ education. 
All agreed that QAS can be implemented properly with reasonable numbers of students, 
whereas it is quite difficult to guarantee high quality provision with massive numbers of 
students in faculties such as Arts, Law and Business.  
Could you imagine a lecturer giving a lecture to around 1,000 students in a big 
lecture hall, what quality are you talking about? He cannot raise discussion, he 
cannot divide them in small groups, and they cannot evaluate the course or the 
lecturer as most of them do not attend lectures and most of them cannot even 
find a place to sit. QAS require teaching in small groups and we cannot do 
that. If we think about doing it, it means that instead of having an academic 
teaching 4 hours a week to a group of 1,000 students, s/he has to teach more 
than 40 hours a week only to one group (if that number is divided into small 
groups) which is not reasonable at all because of poor academic pay and the 
fact that most of them have additional jobs to secure their livelihood. So, 
academics cannot spend extra time at their own institutions as they lack job 
satisfaction.                                                                                          (SMA, 12)        
They also agreed that there is no activated accountability for academics because poor pay 
forces them to have additional jobs to secure their livelihood. As a result, they have no time 
to enhance their teaching and research practices as they spend most of their time outside their 
own universities. In addition to poor pay, other issues which weaken accountability include 
the tenure track system and that academic pay is fixed for all regardless of their performance.  
In a trial to solve the problem of poor academic pay, the Ministry of Higher Education 
(MoHE) has devised a scheme which links an increase in academic pay to the quality of 
academics‘ performance and their participation in the implementation of QAS. The scheme, 
starting from July 1, 2008 aims at providing a financial incentive to academics to enable them 
to spend more time in their universities rather than in additional jobs and is supposed to be the 
first stage of correcting salaries to be followed by developing a new scale of salaries. A 
second aim of the scheme is to have in place an activated accountability system for academics 
(SCU, 2008). 
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However, the scheme of linking an increase in academic pay (a financial incentive) to 
the quality of performance is controversial. Almost all interviewees see it as a failure in that it 
has linked the financial incentive to academics‘ physical attendance rather than performance, 
participation in that scheme requires academics to attend four days a week on a regular basis 
for a minimum of 28 hours weekly21. Moreover, it fails to recognize that academics work most 
of the time even when they are at home spending much time preparing lectures, marking exam 
sheets and doing research and that these home-working hours are not counted. Second, there 
is a lack of proper offices for academics. Where some faculties/departments provide an office 
for each academic, others provide an office for each four or five academics and sometimes for 
a whole department. Third, the difficulty of monitoring academics‟ attendance as they may be 
working in their offices, the library, lecture rooms or labs and, thus, no one can closely 
monitor their work. They even argue it is against the ethos of academia to monitor attendance 
as they are not employees who have to sign before leaving their work every day. Finally, the 
financial incentive is not rewarding enough to secure an acceptable livelihood for academics. 
While linking a financial incentive to performance was recognized as a trial and a 
means of increasing academic pay, it is regarded as insufficient and just a decoration on the 
status quo and not a solution to pay or accountability. This opinion is supported by arguments 
that the financial incentive is not enough to make academics satisfied with their salaries and 
enable them to spend more time in their own universities and enhance their teaching and 
research activities. 
Linking a financial incentive to academics‘ performance has nothing to do 
with quality assurance and provides no accountability for academics as it is 
just a failing trial to increase academics‘ salaries.                              (SMA, 15)    
                                                 
21
 For more information, see the scheme of linking increase in academic pay to the quality of performance (SCU, 
2008). 
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Theoretically, QAS include good forms of accountability for academics but 
practically they are not activated. Linking a financial incentive to academics‘ 
performance is just a paper work and is actually nothing as academics work 
most of their time even when they are at home. In fact, it is an issue of trusting 
professionals to do their work properly. Actually good academics will do well 
with or without QAS while bad academics will not change their practices with 
or without QAS as well.                                                                          (AS, 31) 
Interviewees have added that there should be more trust in academics with neither 
documenting attendance nor financial incentives seen as good forms of accountability. There 
should be other forms of accountability which enhance rather than diminish professional 
accountability.    
Only six interviewees (four of whom are senior manager academics and two 
academics) see benefit in the use of financial incentives to influence academics‘ performance 
but believe it needs more time to settle. They see it as a step towards a good accountability 
system but they also believe it should be linked to performance rather than physical 
attendance. 
To sum up, almost all interviewees agreed that linking a financial incentive to 
academics‘ performance is a good idea in principle but has been implemented wrongly. It 
may be that it was a mistake to increase poor pay by linking it to participation in 
implementing QAS, as it needs to become part of a culture of quality rather than being linked 
to financial incentives. Solving the problem of pay should be dealt with separately, as linking 
it to participation in QAS is not seen as rewarding. Instead, almost all senior managers, senior 
manager academics and academics recommend that academics should be given appropriate 
salaries in the first instance with quality part of the system and then extra financial incentives 
given to high performers to raise competition between academics to enhance the quality of 
provision.      
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Another reported crucial problem is that the performance-related financial incentive was not 
paid on a regular basis, as had initially been promised/planned. Providing the financial 
incentive once or twice and then stopping it because of lack of finance destroyed trust 
between universities and the government and led academics to lose trust and credibility in 
QAS as a whole (Khalid, 2009; 2010a).  
The main problem is that the financial incentive did not continue because of 
insufficient financial resources, which in turn destroyed trust between 
universities and the government. Now, we are still implementing QAS in our 
faculty, not for the financial incentive which already stopped, but because we 
really aim to get accreditation but I am not quite sure if it is the case in all 
universities (or even in all faculties in Cairo University) or not.       (SMA, 20) 
The laws of governing higher education have been providing a good 
accountability system for academics even before QAS but those laws are not 
activated and cannot be activated as long as academics‘ salaries are too weak 
to satisfy their needs. You cannot hold academics accountable for the quality 
of provision while you do not give them their rights.                             (AS, 43) 
This last quotation shows that poor pay is one of the most significant factors which weakens 
the dialogue of accountability between academics, universities and government.   
7.2.3 Efficiency 
The majority of interviewees, 22, finds it difficult to decide whether or not QAS are efficient. 
A group of 11 sees QAS as reasonably efficient but needs more time to be highly activated, 
whereas 7 interviewees see QAS as wholly inefficient.     
The majority of interviewees took the view that it is too early to decide and difficult to 
assess whether or not QAS are  efficient as the project is incomplete and the culture of quality 
assurance is new to HEIs in Egypt and needs more time to settle down before being judged. In 
their view, the QAAP is really making a change but, while they cannot say it has improved 
the quality of provision, it has stirred the still water and that is very important. It has raised 
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awareness of the culture of quality, documentation, evaluation, self-study, peer review…etc., 
but needs time to become more highly activated and give its fruits.   
I cannot decide if it is efficient or not as we are in a transitional phase and 
QAS really need more time before being judged. However, I can see that what 
is happening is really good and really helpful. Through the self-study, we have 
discovered lots of duplications in the provision of certain courses. For 
example, we discovered that some academics teach two subjects in the same 
department with almost the same contents but with different titles. We came to 
know this through the course specs prepared by academics and that‘s why I 
can see QAS as very beneficial to HEIs.                                             (SMA, 13)                                                                
Thus, QAS in higher education are in their transitional phase with many projects, available 
funding and changes occurring, so the project needs more time before being judged. 
Interviewees added that, although the project has recently started, QAS are being taken 
seriously and this might make the system more efficient but, nonetheless, they are worried 
about the sustainability of financial resources to guarantee its proper implementation. A 
second important issue is the need to reform laws and regulations governing HE which 
impede proper implementation of QAS.  
Eleven interviewees see QAS as reasonably efficient. They see the efficiency of the 
system improving but it needs more time to be highly activated and become well embedded. 
They agree that documentation and paper work are quite crucial in a system which did not 
have any sort of documentation before and that this paper work is a progress and a base for 
improvement. The culture of documentation and institutional audit has made academics think 
more seriously about their work which, in turn, may help achieve a minimum acceptable 
quality of provision.  
QAS have not been well adapted to the Egyptian HE context but I can still see 
that they form a good way to guarantee at least that careless academics begin 
to think seriously about their work and guarantee the minimum acceptable 
quality of provision.                                                                            (SMA, 15)                                                                                                  
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QAAP has been reported to be successful in raising awareness of the culture of quality 
assurance in Egypt HE and the QA initiative is going in the right direction but needs suitable 
funding to be sustainable. They agreed that the idea of QA is quite efficient but lacks funding 
and this impedes implementation and threatens its sustainability.  
It is quite efficient at least in our faculty as our graduates can compete locally 
and internationally and a big number of them could get grants to pursue their 
postgraduate studies outside Egypt.                                                        (AS, 28) 
The efficiency of QAS is improving even if it is still paper work which is not 
totally activated as it would be a base for improvement.                        (AS, 33)    
They also agreed that QA should cover both accountability and enhancement but currently it 
is focused on the paper work. This may be considered as a weakness but actually paper work 
is essential and can be an entry to development and improvement although not an end by 
itself. Interviewees added that for faculties starting to implement QAS, the focus in the first 
stage is on paper work and documentation to make strengths and weaknesses clear and enable 
them to do better strategic planning to improve the quality of provision, whereas in faculties 
where QAS are well established, the focus shifts to improvement. Thus, paper work is crucial 
for audit purposes and can be a base for improvement but more time is needed as the culture 
is new and changing and embedding a new culture takes time. Unfortunately, some think that 
QA is only paper work rather than paper work as a base for audit and improving the quality of 
provision and accountability.  
It focuses on paper work in the first instance as a base for improvement. Our 
faculty has already passed the stage of focusing on paper work and now we are 
trying to activate that paper work through internal audits, external examiners, 
meeting students, parents, employers and other stakeholders to ask them about 
their opinions of our graduates and what they are missing so that we can 
improve things. So, paper work is actually a base for improvement.         
…………….                                                                                           (AS, 26)                 
Some interviewees commented that at the outset of the project there was much resistance to 
QAS from academics as it was seen as putting extra burdens on them and requiring much of 
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their time while they are not well-paid and have additional jobs to secure their livelihood. 
However, this resistance is declining as many are becoming more persuaded of the benefits of 
QAS, although it will not end as long as academics are not satisfied with their pay.      
Using SWOT Analysis in the self study evaluation has been reported to be very 
beneficial in terms of revealing the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to the 
management of the institution at all levels (department, faculty and university). It also helped 
in identifying the status quo and working on its improvement.   
The system of student feedback, although still not highly activated, has also been 
reported to improve the efficiency and quality of provision as academics have started to 
diversify their ways of teaching to meet the different learning styles of students.  
The last issue expected to improve the efficiency of the system is establishing a link 
between evaluation and funding under CIQAP. This is important for accountability and as an 
incentive to improvement. As discussed in Chapter Four, if the peer review process reports 
that a university is not ready to receive an accreditation visit, it is responsible for preparing its 
action plan for further development, informed by its mission, self-evaluation report(s), peer 
review report and the National Committee‘s published criteria for accreditation. This action 
plan may include application for funding from CIQAP to assist secure a successful outcome.   
The last group, of seven interviewees, sees QAS as inefficient. They suggest that there 
are several unresolved problems which make the system inefficient, such as: inadequate 
funding; lack of proper infrastructure; massive numbers of students; poor pay for academics 
and poor accountability for academics. They argued there would never be an efficient system 
of quality assurance as long as those problems are unresolved. They also argued that QAS are 
just about playing the game. They are about completing paper work and ticking boxes, about 
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compliance rather than improvement, adding that paper work is seen as an end in itself rather 
than a means for improvement.     
It focuses only on paper work as improving the quality of provision needs 
proper funding which we really lack. Academics should be given satisfying 
salaries if we are to have a high quality provision.                                (AS, 36)                                                             
It is inefficient as long as academics‘ salaries are too low to enable them to be 
free to their own institutions and to enhance their teaching and research instead 
of spending much of their time in additional jobs                                   (AS, 
39) 
This group also sees that QAS are inefficient as all academics have tenure track so they do 
not care about it, with only those involved in the QA units and activities interested. 
Interestingly, they reported that in private universities all academics take QA more seriously 
as they are afraid of losing their jobs or not being eligible to renew their contract. They added 
that this is the same for Egyptian academics working in universities in Gulf countries. Thus, it 
can be concluded that academics working in private universities and in Gulf countries take 
QA more seriously as they are well-paid and do not want to lose their contracts, whereas the 
same academics do not give the same attention to QA in public universities as they are not 
well-paid and have tenure track as no one can fire them.   
Finally, they argued that QA criteria are not adapted to different contexts, adding that 
QA criteria are the same for public and private universities, which is inefficient and unfair as 
there are many differences between them in terms of funding, infrastructure, the number of 
students and academic pay. They recommended that QA criteria should be adapted to 
different contexts and systems.   
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7.2.4 Equity 
Views on the equity/fairness of QAS fall into three main groups: the largest group of 
interviewees (19) sees QAS as reasonably fair; 13 see QAS as unfair and 8 suggest it is too 
difficult to decide whether or not QAS are fair.   
The largest group sees that QAS are reasonably fair for HEIs, academics and students 
as the audit team writes a report about the HEI and the HEI itself writes a report about the 
audit team to tell if they were neutral or subjective and to identify concerns they might have 
about the team. An HEI can appeal against the review report and can assess it according to the 
published criteria from NAQAAE. Interviewees in this group added that, although paper work 
is still not highly activated, they think QAS are fair as they provide transparent criteria for 
evaluation and provide indicators for measuring performance. 
However, they also see that the system needs improvement and have some 
reservations, the first of which is about audit panels. They see that some are junior academics 
who have never had high administrative posts and lack managerial/administrative experience. 
They recognize that this occurs because of lack of qualified and trained auditors and is 
acceptable only in the short term as NAQAAE should build capacity through training more 
qualified people with managerial/administrative experience as well as good experience of 
teaching and research. 
The second reservation is that student feedback is not taken seriously by all students. 
Some students do not believe their feedback would make a difference in terms of the provided 
programmes, courses or certain subjects or even the tutors themselves. In addition, the 
feedback system is not well activated as a large number of students, especially in theoretical 
studies, do not attend regularly to be able to give feedback. Moreover, students are still not 
accustomed to a culture of feedback in earlier stages of their education.  
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Students still are not used to giving feedback as this is a culture which they 
have not been brought up on. Students should be trained on giving feedback 
from earlier stages of their education if we really need to activate that system 
of feedback and benefit from it. …………………………………… (SMA, 23)                                                                                        
…                                                                                                               
The third reservation is that participation in QAS is optional for academics and 
administrative staff and students are not well involved. These interviewees argue the 
importance of involving all academics, administrative staff and students in the 
implementation of QAS so that there is a feeling of ownership of managing quality, thereby 
helping embed the culture of quality assurance in the system.  
I can see that QAS are quite fair. I might say this as I am involved in a quality 
assurance unit whereas others who are not involved might say it is not fair 
because they are not aware of what‘s going on and that‘s why I can see the 
great importance of getting everyone involved.                                      (AS, 
30)                                                      
This group agreed that QAS are reasonably fair but need proper funding to be sustainable and 
maximize their benefits. There is also an urgent need for the QA criteria to be adapted to the 
features of each university/faculty to guarantee fairness in the evaluations. This confirms that 
a ‗one-size fits all‘ policy does not work in the higher education context and needs to be taken 
into account. 
The second group, of 13 interviewees, sees QAS as unfair for three reasons.  First, the 
audit panels may not be fair in their reports and concentrated on the bad stuff during their 
visits. They see the audit panels as not objective in their evaluation with possibilities of 
mistakes because the project is still new as is the culture of QA, resulting in everyone still 
learning and time needed for the process to be well established.  
QAS are not quite fair as the auditors focus on the bad stuff only. For example, 
If I am excellent in 4 items out of five where I am 50% good in the fifth item, I 
would be given a low grade in the whole category (like 30%). Instead of 
giving me 80% as I am excellent in four items out of five and giving me 
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advice on how to enhance the fifth item, I would be given a low grade on the 
category as a whole which is unfair at all.                                              (AS, 31)                                                                                      
Another reservation which comes from Faculty X is that most external auditors (the audit 
team) were from small regional universities which have around 2,000 to 3,000 students in 
their faculties coming to audit X faculty in Cairo University which have 16,000 students so 
they do not have the same problems of big numbers and that is why they cannot write a fair 
report or give a reasonable judgment. It has also been reported that the criteria for choosing 
reviewers are not known or clear. Academics in X added that external audits are not fair as the 
process includes high subjectivity and the peer reviewers are sometimes very strict in auditing 
certain universities/faculties and lenient in others. That is why they suggest having a fixed 
committee of peer reviewers for each discipline to review all faculties under the same 
discipline as a means of guaranteeing fairness.              
It is theoretically fair according to the criteria on paper but practically it is 
unfair as it is to some extent subjective. Even the criteria for choosing 
reviewers are not known for us and we think it is not transparent.                                     
.                                                                                                               (AS, 25) 
Secondly, QA criteria are not well adapted to the Egyptian HE context. They see some QA 
criteria as adapted to the Egyptian context while others are not. According to the set criteria, 
QAS are quite fair but the question is: ―Are the criteria for evaluating HEIs fair?‖ Of course 
not, as they can see that those criteria ask for higher standards/requirements than the capacity 
and available resources and facilities of Egyptian public universities. Thus, those criteria 
really need some adaptation to suit the nature of different faculties and universities, as 
government-run universities do not have the funding and infrastructure which could enable 
them to achieve the required standards by QAS. They added that QA criteria might be 
appropriate for private universities as most of them have strong funding - mainly from high 
tuition fees - , proper infrastructure and fewer students.       
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Thirdly, the system of student feedback is unfair as it is sometimes very subjective. Students 
are not familiar with the culture of giving feedback and sometimes are very subjective in their 
feedback if they are not happy with the tutor or with anything in the module. Interviewees 
commented that most students do not attend regularly so their feedback cannot be guaranteed 
to be objective and it is why they consider the system of student feedback a waste of time.     
The last group, of 8 interviewees, finds it too difficult to decide whether QAS are fair 
or not as the project is incomplete and that more time is needed before being judged. 
Moreover, not all universities/faculties are at the same stage of implementing QAS. Some 
faculties started implementing QAS in the first cycle of QAAP (QAAP I: 2002-2007) whereas 
others started in the second cycle (QAAP II: 2007-2012). Even those faculties which first 
started implementing QAS are  not at the same stage as some of them have finished their self-
study, received an external audit visit, applied for CIQAP, implemented their action plan and 
are ready to receive a visit from NAQAAE, whereas others are at different stages of that 
cycle. These interviewees added that the culture of QA is new to HEIs in Egypt and that the 
project is in its transitional phase where everyone is still learning how to implement it 
properly to help improve the quality of provision.  
I cannot decide if QAS are fair or not as they are incomplete. QAS are still 
new and the most qualified reviewer/auditor would have two to four years 
experience which is not fair enough to be a reviewer but we have no other 
options as we are still working on building capacity and training more people. 
Till now we are doing internal and external evaluation within the MoHE as 
QAAP belongs to the MoHE to qualify its universities to apply for 
accreditation. So, we cannot say if the system is fair or not unless we receive a 
visit from an independent agency like NAQAAE but we have not been to that 
stage yet.                                                                                                 (AS, 27)  
Running the QAAP, the main aim for MoHE is to qualify its universities to apply for 
accreditation and, as all the internal and external audits that have been conducted in Egyptian 
universities were done by MoHE, academics cannot decide if QAS are fair or not unless they 
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receive an external visit from an independent agency like NAQAAE, which has not been done 
yet. This confirms that the project is still in a transitional phase with lots of changes taking 
place so it needs more time to be established before being judged.         
7.2.5 Summary 
There is a general agreement that implementing QAS in Egypt HE is a step on the right road 
for enhancing the quality of provision but one that faces problems which impede 
implementation, such as inadequate funding, poor academic pay, lack of proper accountability 
for academics, massive numbers of students, poor infrastructure and nominal fees. It has been 
argued that these problems should be solved first if QAS are to be implemented and activated 
properly. QAS are an excellent initiative but need to be taken more seriously and there should 
be more support from government and society to guarantee the sustainability of the project.  
The majority of interviewees agreed that QAS have no effect on institutional 
autonomy or academic freedom. However, they agreed that QAS add extra burdens, 
particularly of documentation and paper work, which take too much of academics‘ time and 
effort and which, in turn, might affect their performance negatively. As for accountability, all 
agreed that QAS include rules which should guarantee a strong dialogue of accountability but 
those rules are not activated because many laws and regulations governing higher education 
contradict with and impede the proper implementation of QAS. For example, HEIs have no 
say on the number of students they must accept every year, which inevitably affects the 
quality of provision or the lack of activated accountability for academics because of poor pay 
forcing them to have additional jobs to secure their livelihood. There is a general agreement 
that poor academic pay is one of the most significant factors which weakens the dialogue of 
accountability between academics, universities and government.    
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The majority of interviewees believe it is too early and difficult to decide whether or not QAS 
are efficient because the project is incomplete and the culture of quality assurance is new. 
They see that QAAP is really making a change and, while they cannot say it  has improved 
the quality of provision, they recognize ‗it has stirred the still water‘ which is important in 
raising the awareness of the culture of quality but still needs time to give its real fruits. As for 
equity, the majority of interviewees see QAS as reasonably fair for HEIs, academics and 
students. They accept that external audits are fair because they are done according to 
published criteria from NAQAAE and that audit panels were, to a great extent, objective and 
transparent. They add that, although paper work is still not highly activated, they think QAS 
are fair as they provide transparent criteria for evaluation and indicators for measuring 
performance. However, they see that the system is in need of much improvement and have 
some concerns about the audit panels and the student feedback system. 
Having examined QAS in HE in Egypt, the analysis moves to QAS in the UK and the 
UoB specifically.    
7.3 Quality Assurance Systems in the UK (University of Birmingham) 
Although the QAA provides guidelines for QAS, each university in the UK has its own IQAS 
which will, therefore, differ in some respects from others. The University of Birmingham‘s 
IQAS are known as ―Birmingham Integrated Quality Assurance and Enhancement System‖ 
(BIQAES) which encompasses the key processes the University has put in place to monitor, 
review and enhance academic standards, the quality of its learning, teaching and assessment 
and the academic support given to students. It is informed by the QAA‘s Academic 
Infrastructure, which comprises the Code of Practice for the Assurance of Academic Quality 
and Standards in Higher Education, Framework for Higher Education qualifications, Subject 
Benchmark Statements and Programme Specifications. BIQAES is one element of the 
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University‘s academic policy and quality framework within which Schools and Colleges are 
required to work, the broader academic policy and quality framework also including the 
External Examiner system, student representation system, programme approval processes, 
University legislation and Codes of Practice (BIQAES, 2008). 
BIQAES consists of the following main components: Programme Review; School 
Quality Review; Review of Collaborative Arrangements; Specific Checks; Thematic Review; 
Key Processes and Documentation. Its main purposes are:  
• to monitor the quality of the student learning experience and of learning and teaching 
opportunities; 
• to identify, encourage and disseminate good practice and to identify and eliminate 
weaknesses; 
• to provide an opportunity for Schools, Colleges and the University to test the 
effectiveness of systems and procedures for monitoring and enhancing academic 
quality and standards; 
• to encourage the development and enhancement of these systems, in the context of 
current and emerging provision; 
• to provide public information on the University‘s capacity to assure the quality and 
standards of its awards; 
• and to provide a framework for the consideration of feedback from students and 
External Examiners about academic quality and standards (Ibid)22. 
                                                 
22 For more information about BIQAES, see:
 
http://www.as.bham.ac.uk/aqu/biqaes/index.shtml                
 
 215 
There is a Quality Assurance and Enhancement Committee (QAEC) in the university which is 
supported by QAECs in the five Colleges and which, in turn, work closely with QAECs in the 
University‘s Schools. Students are represented on all these committees.  
7.3.1 Autonomy 
Perceptions of how QAS might affect institutional autonomy and academic freedom fall into 
two groups: the majority, 19 out of 2823, sees QAS having no effect while a group of 9 sees 
QAS affecting institutional autonomy and academic freedom in some respects.       
The majority sees that universities have a good degree of autonomy and QAA 
institutional audits respect these freedoms. They agree that universities are responsible for 
assuring the quality of their provision and the QAA‘s main job is to check that universities 
have sound IQAS in place. Whereas RAE looks directly at the quality of research, QAA looks 
at the processes rather than the quality of the teaching activity itself, leaving institutions to 
ensure that learning opportunities and academic standards are appropriate and staff are 
properly trained.  
Quality of teaching is assured through QAA. It is more about providing 
guidelines for universities to create self-evaluation systems. It is moving more 
towards self-evaluation and away from the old model of heavy-handed visits.               
.                                                                                                              (SMA, 9)    
Nonetheless, most interviewees have some reservations about both QAA and RAE. They 
think the QAA procedures try to bring a level of uniformity to the system which may encroach 
on autonomy. They think the QAA should encourage more diversity rather than greater 
uniformity. In addition, they agree that QA mechanisms cover both accountability and 
                                                 
23 As indicated before, the total number of interviewees in UoB is 29 but not all of them have answered both 
sections of my interview schedule (the funding section and the quality assurance section). For example, one of 
my interviewees has chosen to answer only the questions in the funding section as s/he is mainly involved in it. 
Thus, the total number of interviewees in the QA section is 28.   
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enhancement in terms of checking the quality of research whereas it covers only 
accountability when auditing teaching as the QAA is very process-driven, not outcome-driven, 
and does not affect funding for teaching. They add that QAA is a paper work exercise which 
is almost entirely pointless and a game, and that universities are good at playing games by 
hiding stuff which is not to their credit. Paper work and an enormous amount of 
administration only put more pressure and workload on academics and do not motivate them 
to improve the quality of teaching itself. One senior manager academic argued that there is no 
need for the QAA as the marketplace can decide whether or not HEIs are strong in 
maintaining academic standards.   
Well we don‘t need the QAA at all. The marketplace is sufficient to decide 
whether we are strong in maintaining our academic standards or not. If we‘re 
poor with that, students won‘t come to our institution. So, we have an 
interesting maintenance system that doesn‘t need to be policed by another 
body ―a watchdog‖ that is too expensive. In fact, a week-long visitation can‘t 
get under the skin of an HEI which will very readily be able to cast a cloak 
over those practices which are not to its credit and will obviously be setting 
out to vigorously promote those practices which are to its credit.                                                                  
.                                                                                                                (SM, 5) 
Members of this group argue that the RAE encourages short-term goals. There may be a 
tendency for research to become more short-term as academics look for four suitable outputs 
at the end of an RAE period or may encourage academics to focus only on the four outputs 
which they think will be ranked highly on RAE. It has also been reported that academics may 
be forced to do certain types of research and publish in certain types of journals to secure QR 
money. 
To be able to secure QR money, universities encourage academics to do 
certain types of research and publish in certain journals so actually academics 
are satisfying their universities and RAE  but they are not doing the things they 
enjoy doing. In addition, the quality of your paper does not really depend on 
the ranking of the journal where it is published. You can have a very good 
paper published in a lower quality journal whereas you can have a rubbish 
paper published in a top journal.                                                             (AS, 23)                                                                                                           
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The second group, of 9 interviewees, sees QAS affecting institutional autonomy and academic 
freedom in some respects. Firstly, they argued that because of financial pressures, universities 
are now run like businesses which is not necessarily compatible with their main objectives. 
So now the business model is taking over from the collegial model that used to exist and this 
places some restrictions on institutional autonomy and academic freedom. For example, 
universities now close programmes with low recruitment whereas this was not always the 
case. Universities are also more inclined to invest more money in areas/programmes which 
are expected to generate greater income. They are also very good at playing games to secure 
more funding through spending huge amounts of money to hire academics who can score well 
in the RAE and, thereby, secure research money.  
Secondly, they see that the government wants to have more control on what 
universities do. As the source of funds, government is now more likely to insist on the skills 
students should develop, so institutional autonomy becomes eroded, leading to a considerable 
tension in the system.  
The British tend to do it in a rather discrete way than other parts in the world. 
It is said that universities have complete autonomy but the reality is that we do 
not have complete autonomy and when the minister says this is an issue ought 
to be done, then vice chancellors think and say OK. And tell pro-vice 
chancellors that this ought to be done and this is bad influence rather than if 
you like ‗instrumental power‘ but nonetheless the instrumental power is there 
in the funding regime. And you see the logic of it ―He who pays the piper calls 
the tune‖.                                                                                              (SM, 6)    
They see that QA procedures aim to make everything standardised, which is not beneficial in 
terms of the teaching and learning experiences of students. They see universities having 
limited autonomy as they must follow the QA guidelines and codes of practice. The danger is 
that the educative process can be standardized/systemized to the extent that spontaneity 
disappears, the capacity to pick things up and do different things is lessened and made more 
difficult. The QAA contributes to a huge bureaucratic system where quality is just measured 
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by ―Have you ticked all the boxes?‖ which does not have anything to do with quality but 
whether or not ―[Are] universities complying with the guidelines and codes of practice, which 
is just about checking paper trail‖ (SMA, 9).  
This group see government as wanting to control professionals, a trend of not trusting 
professional judgments which is seen in other countries, as governments do not trust 
professionals to regulate themselves. Thus, QAA audits are perceived as based on lack of trust 
as their role is to provide universities with codes of practice that tell universities what they 
should do and then institutional audits come to check whether universities have followed 
those rules and codes of practice, a condition of very limited autonomy. 
QA mechanisms tend to introduce a degree of regimentation or conformity in 
teaching which I‘m not sure is entirely beneficial for education. You know, we 
want an education system which inspires, challenges, encourages people to 
think. If assessment procedures become standardized, then teaching tends to 
become standardized and there would be no innovation in universities. I think 
that is the main problem really.                                                           (SMA, 13)                                                                                                                                    
Another restriction identified by this group is that the process sends very strong signals about 
the kind of teaching academics have to do, thereby limiting academic freedom. The use of 
Web CT was cited as an example, influencing the use of enquiry-based learning and student-
led learning. Those signals may be forcing academics to develop their teaching in a certain 
way to satisfy QAA guidelines, which can be seen as a reduction of academic freedom. There 
is also more paperwork required, also impacting on academic freedom. At Birmingham, for 
example, the foundation of the quality assurance for academics is their module box and in that 
module box, academics have to have certain documents including, for example, student 
evaluations of the module. It can be said that the QAA procedures force academics to think 
inside the box and does not allow for much innovation in the teaching and learning 
experiences of students. 
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Academics have also reported that RAE and the funding regime push them towards doing 
research that has a direct industrial and economic value and, while that does not impact on 
some academics whose work generally leads to tangible products, it is an issue for others who 
work on theoretical issues that might have potential long term impact. This is a further 
example of how these QA processes can affect academic freedom, pushing them towards 
certain areas that would be categorized positively by the RAE. Academics, members of this 
group argue, may be more inclined to think how to satisfy the RAE rather than necessarily 
doing more interesting or innovative work. Thus, while the RAE does measure the quality of 
research, it can limit the sort of research done by academics. 
Having presented the perceptions on how QAS affect institutional autonomy and 
academic freedom in terms of the national framework, perceptions were also reported on how 
they are influenced by the IQAS in UoB. Almost all interviewees agreed that IQAS in UoB 
have no effect on either institutional autonomy or academic freedom. Senior managers agreed 
that IQAS in UoB are fairly robust and transparent as both academics and students know how 
the system works. They also agreed that there is an issue of autonomy being more managed 
but argued that managing academics is best done by engaging them in the process of quality 
assurance and identifying solutions to problems. In addition, however, while the university 
does give schools and academics a reasonable degree of autonomy, it does not allow deficient 
delivery in the name of autonomy.    
Nobody has the autonomy to do things that result in the poor quality of 
delivery. There is only one university, and that university is responsible for its 
quality assurance processes and its reputation; and its reputation hinges on 
robust quality assurance. So, if there is a conflict between autonomy and 
quality, then quality has to win. This university cannot allow for deficient 
delivery in the name of autonomy. It would be foolish, wouldn‘t it?                                               
.                                                                                                                 (SM, 5) 
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Academics indicated that IQAS affect workload more than anything and slows down the 
implementation of new ideas, such as introducing new programmes, because of the paper 
work and committee process. They added that one of the key problems of quality assurance is 
that it is supposed to cover quality assurance and enhancement but the latter is frequently lost. 
The quality assurance system is just a matter of saying, ‗yes we are doing this, yes we‘re 
doing that by ticking the box‘, not ‗This is what we do well, this is what we can improve, let‘s 
improve it, here‘s the action plan‘ (SMA, 9). Thus, there are huge gaps in enhancement that 
are not picked up because the paperwork takes over.   
Although the majority of interviewees agreed that IQAS in UoB do not affect 
institutional autonomy or academic freedom, they are concerned about the centralization of 
the system and the level of uniformity which the university wants to implement in all of its 
schools. They agreed that a ‗one-size fits all‘ policy does not work. Thus, what works in one 
school might not work in another and best practice in one school might not be appropriate 
elsewhere. Thus, trying to apply the same regulations of QA in all schools might have an 
adverse effect overall. Those regulations, for example, restrict academics to a certain way of 
assessing students whereas they should be more flexible so that academics can try more 
innovative ways of assessment. They are also concerned about the endless codes of practice 
which schools have to follow but which change frequently.  
Now the College of Engineering has a quality process across the whole college 
whereas there are nine schools in the college and each of them used to have 
their own quality procedures. Now there's only one quality procedure for the 
whole college which means each school has to change what they do. It's going 
to be a problem in that it's going to be a "one size fits all" regulation where 
regulations appropriate for one school might not be appropriate for another 
school, so that's not really gonna to work and it will waste a ridiculous amount 
of time.                                                                                                     (AS, 
27)                                                                                                                                               
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Another example of the centralization and uniformity which IQAS in UoB try to impose is the 
necessity of providing handouts to students before lectures by putting them on the Web CT, 
although some academics see this as detrimental to teaching and learning.   
Life is not like that bureaucratic trail which changes the way we do things. We 
are always under pressure to give handouts to students before lectures by 
putting them on the Web CT beforehand which means that there is no 
pedagogical surprise in our lectures. I might want to ask students some 
questions or get them to discuss something before the lecture and I do not want 
to provide them with the handouts before hand. So, the whole system destroys 
innovation and makes teaching really really dull dull dull in terms of having 
orders: you must do this, you must do that. No, we mustn‘t as teaching is about 
how to get students excited, not to get them spoon-fed. I think this is based on 
a mechanism for teaching which sees ideal teaching as a way of information 
transformation ―you are there to inform people‖ which is clearly a 
misconception of teaching.                                                                     (AS, 17) 
Thus, the main purpose for an academic to attend a lecture for an hour or more is to try to 
encourage students to go and find out information, think differently, try to change or open 
people‘s minds to new ideas instead of providing students with handouts beforehand. Thus, 
IQAS should encourage more diversity rather than a uniformity and regimentation, which 
they see harmful to the whole system. 
7.3.2 Accountability 
Asked for their perceptions of the dialogue of accountability, almost all interviewees agreed 
that there is a fair amount of accountability in the system in terms of quality of teaching and 
research in HE. Universities are accountable for the quality of teaching and research through 
different mechanisms including QAA, and NSS. Other performance indicators reported by 
HESA on rates of graduation, drop-out rates and employability of students can also be 
considered as a form of accountability for the quality of teaching, as well as the RAE. Thus, 
there are several layers of accountability in UK HE. In addition, universities are accountable 
to students for the quality of provision; to employers for the appropriate qualifications of their 
graduates and to other stakeholders and society as a whole. There are also professional bodies 
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which do similar audits to QAA and, therefore, work as accountability mechanisms. Those 
bodies audit and accredit certain programmes such as the TDA, which accredits teacher 
training programmes, and the British Computer Society, which accredits computer sciences 
programmes. Interviewees argued that those professional bodies do a more rigorous review 
than the QAA.  
The way government assures the quality of research is through the RAE whose 
assessment of research quality has a strong impact on the distribution of research money. 
Interviewees agreed that RAE is considered to be a reasonable way of making universities 
accountable for QR money. However, they think it is not really a quality assurance 
mechanism as much as an income distribution mechanism. In terms of teaching, they see weak 
accountability as there is no quality measure linked to funding, as there is in research. 
Although the QAA is supposed to check the quality of teaching, they added that it checks a 
paper trail rather than the actual quality of teaching.  
Well it seems to me that the quality assurance of teaching all seems to be 
paper-based rather than actually the quality of the teaching itself. Providing 
universities‘ve got a quality assurance system in place, you can get a good 
mark but that doesn‘t necessarily mean that the teaching is any good. What 
really matters is the quality of the process but not so the quality of the 
teaching. So, it is taken for granted that as long as there is a robust internal 
quality assurance system in place, the quality of provision will be there as a 
side effect of the existence of IQAS.                                                      (AS, 26)                                                                                                             
Some interviewees mentioned that accountability for teaching is there but probably becoming 
relatively less because of the fact that all universities have gone through the subject review 
process and scored well. So, basically, the sector is pretty secure and universities have been 
given the responsibility to assure quality themselves without detailed audits. Thus, QAA‘s 
accountability is slightly more distant than subject reviews, because it is just not needed. That 
is why they think the accountability is university-based in the first instance and then the 
university is accountable to the QAA.    
 213 
Whether QAA is really effective in assuring quality of teaching, I don‘t think 
it gets down into that level of detail - it‘s looking at systems and processes. 
Whereas subject review did actually look at individual staff carrying out 
teaching but in a way that was far too intrusive. So, I think it‘s better that QAA 
is not going into that level of detail. But, I think it‘s like all these things - it‘s a 
game, and as with subject reviews, universities learn how to present things and 
obviously you try to cover up the bits that aren‘t perfect.                       (SM, 3)                                                               
Interviewees agree that the government, as the main funder of higher education, has the right 
to use some kind of check to ensure taxpayers‘ money is not wasted and is well invested. 
However, the QAA, as a means of assuring the quality of teaching, is just becoming a huge 
bureaucratic system where quality is just measured by ―Have you ticked all the boxes?‖ and 
does not have anything to do with quality. QAA imposes huge bureaucracy and then becomes 
a game but one with consequences that have nothing to do with improving the quality of the 
teaching and learning experiences of students. Whereas almost all interviewees agreed that 
QAA is a paper trail and ticking boxes, covering accountability and compliance more than 
enhancement, they see IQAS covering both accountability and enhancement. To the extent 
that they agree QAA may cover accountability and enhancement, it does not encourage 
people to think ―outside the box‖. They see it as limiting innovation because of the level of 
uniformity it imposes. 
Although interviewees agreed that QAA is more concerned with accountability 
(processes and paper trail) than enhancement, they agreed that the culture within universities 
is that it is more than a paper work exercise, partly because the environment has become very 
market-driven environment. That is, it is not simply being able to tick boxes and having well-
prepared paperwork because what universities deliver affects their position in league tables 
and universities do not want to damage their reputation. Thus, there is another layer of 
accountability which is market accountability, which matters more for universities. 
Interviewees argued that even without having those external agencies as a ‗watchdog‘, 
universities would still do a good job as they want to attract more students, the best academic 
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staff and secure research income. That is why NSS and league tables are considered very 
strong accountability drivers as they affect the reputation of universities and, in turn, affect 
student intake and the quality of that intake, as well as the number of overseas students. That 
is why they recommended making quality assurance mechanisms lighter touch and putting 
more trust in professionals, as it is academics who do the teaching, evaluation and research as 
well as generating research income. 
We want to be recruiting effectively in the marketplace, to be a world leader in 
higher education, and we need to ensure that we continue to be a world leader 
in higher education in an increasingly competitive marketplace.            (SM, 5)   
Turning to accountability at UoB, almost all interviewees agreed there is a reasonable amount 
of accountability in the system but see that IQAS covers accountability more than 
enhancement.   
They agreed that schools are accountable to the college and colleges to the university 
and that there is a good dialogue between quality assurance committees in the university, 
college and schools. Thus, the university‘s Quality Assurance and Enhancement Committee 
(QAEC) is supported by the five colleges‘ QAECs which work closely with schools‘ QAECs. 
Academics said that they are accountable, in the first instance, to the director of QAEC (called 
Quality Assurance Champion in some schools) of their departments who is then accountable 
to the director of QAEC on the school level who is in turn accountable to director of QAEC 
on the college level who is finally accountable to the university‘s QAEC. Thus, the line 
management and direct management responsibility of the schools sits first with heads of 
schools, then heads of colleges who have responsibility to ensure the quality of provision in 
schools is satisfactory. Thus, schools are accountable to the college and then the university 
committee oversees the college committees. 
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Interviewees recognized that there are different layers of accountability for assuring the 
quality of provision ranging from external audits by QAA, internal audits by the university, 
Programme Reviews, School Quality Reviews, Thematic Reviews, Key Processes, external 
examiners‘ reports to students‘ feedback. Although they agree that BIQAES is a robust 
system, they see it covering accountability more than enhancement. However, some 
mentioned that the different types of audits and checks used by BIQAES lead to 
enhancement. 
The process of assuring quality does not ask people ‗how do you do this‘. It 
rather asks them ‗do you do this‘ and requires an answer with yes or no with 
an evidence. It doesn‘t ask you ‗could you do this better? How do you think 
you can do better?‘ It basically asks you ‗what are you doing, are you doing 
this, are you complying?‘ ‗Yes we are.‘ That‘s it. So the enhancement just 
loses out almost completely as QA process is more about compliance than 
enhancement.                                                                                         (SMA, 9) 
Nonetheless, they see schools becoming more accountable and less autonomous as a result of 
colleges as a new level of administration. All schools in the same college have to follow 
university regulations in terms of quality assurance and codes of practice but see ‗One size fits 
all‟ policy as not seeming to work efficiently. They argued that because schools differ, instead 
of imposing uniformity, diversity should be encouraged as long as things are done well. It is 
enhancement of quality that really matters.  
I mean it‘s much easier if we‘re making baked beans tins, we can have certain 
quality procedures which everyone‘s gonna to follow and then we‘re gonna to 
do exactly the same as our products are always a baked beans tin at the end of 
the day. Whereas actually in universities, we‘re teaching around 200 different 
subjects at different levels and we‘re doing research in different disciplines so 
it‘s very difficult to have a set of procedures to cover everything we do and it‘s 
more difficult to impose one set of rules or procedures on different schools of 
different nature even under the same college.                                        (AS, 28)                                                                                                
Most interviewees see BIQAES as quite bureaucratic, very time-consuming and not 
particularly effective. For example, there are many tick-box checklists which are not seen as 
effective in assessing what is actually going on. One senior manager mentioned that the key 
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processes checklist is not effective at all as schools sometimes tick ‗yes‘ in a certain box but, 
when are asked for more information, they do not know anything about the issue and have 
probably not done what they have said they were doing (by ticking the box). That is why they 
see it as a pointless process. However, they see that the School Quality Review (SQR), which 
is fairly common across most universities, works pretty well. They also added that the layers 
of accountability (different methods of audits) cannot get under the skin of an institution and 
that schools can hide the things that go wrong in their departments, which is why they 
recommend having more trust in professionals and making quality assurance processes lighter 
touch.   
The reality is that I can easily hide which goes wrong in my department from 
inspectors and I am not ashamed because there is very little that goes wrong 
and it goes wrong because I have people who are distracted by other things but 
things can be better. So, there should be more trust in professionals as trust 
breeds trust and saves much of the huge amount of time, money and effort that 
are spent on quality assurance processes.                                            (SMA, 15)                                                                      
Most interviewees mentioned that on top of these layers of accountability, they have market 
accountability, which actually matters. They are accountable to their students and have to 
make sure their programmes meet their expectations. For example, for every module taught, 
students are asked to give feedback and both academics and senior manager academics react 
to this and alter things if appropriate. The university and its schools also make sure they are 
responsive to the needs of employers. Thus, the culture within university generally is that 
quality assurance procedures are not just a paper work exercise because they work in a 
market-driven environment (which is not about ticking boxes) because it is what they are 
delivering that affects their position in league tables and the market. This argument confirms 
what has been mentioned earlier, that universities are now run more like businesses and why 
market accountability matters more than anything else.  
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7.3.3 Efficiency 
Views on the efficiency of QAS fall into two main groups. The majority of interviewees sees 
that QAS are reasonably efficient in terms of research but inefficient in terms of teaching. 
Only seven interviewees see that it is too difficult to decide whether or not QAS are efficient.       
The majority of interviewees, 21, sees QAS as reasonably efficient in terms of 
research but inefficient in terms of teaching. Although huge amounts of effort, money and 
time are spent on the RAE, it is viewed as fairly efficient because the money distributed 
makes the effort worthwhile. They add that while not perfectly efficient, it is difficult to 
identify a more efficient way of assessing research. They believe that the RAE may cut 
corners by only looking at four papers rather than reading all outputs of academics but this is 
an acceptable trade-off between doing the job perfectly and doing it in a reasonably efficient 
way. That is why they see the RAE is doing a reasonable job and cannot think of better ways 
of assessing the quality of research other than peer review.   
For research, I think the RAE is relatively efficient because at the moment it‘s 
only done once every five years and that is not too bad and people are not 
expecting lots of things to happen in between.                                      (AS, 29)   
As for assuring the quality of teaching, they see that the NSS is quite efficient as it is an 
important indicator of the quality of provision based upon students‘ feedback. However, there 
might be some game playing as some universities may pressurize students to answer in a 
certain way. As for the QAA, they see that it may be efficient as institutional audits now take 
place only once every six years but they do, nonetheless, have reservations about the process, 
including inefficiencies that need to be addressed. They see that it is just about paper trails 
and ticking boxes. Academics spend time ensuring there is a good paper trail rather than using 
time and quality systems to improve their teaching. Time is spent retrospectively ticking 
boxes rather than actually improving the quality of things.  
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If we‘re doing the quality properly and the paperwork is reflecting what we‘re 
doing, then that could be beneficial. I think what actually happens is we end up 
saying, ―Oh my god we‘ve got to do some paperwork, let‘s do the paperwork 
instead of let‘s improve the quality of our teaching‖.                             (AS, 25) 
Thus, they see QAA as a total waste of academics‟ time and taxpayers‟ money. It is becoming 
inefficient because every year they go through lots of procedures which do not actually 
improve the quality of what they are doing. They added that QAA is a bureaucracy and an 
unnecessary interference as it is heavily paper-based and does not really assess the quality of 
teaching. They do argue, however, that the NSS helps in improving the quality of provision as 
it is what their potential customers think of them that really matters.  
It is not efficient as it is heavily paper-based and paperwork seems to increase 
exponentially and I don‘t think that‘s efficient. The huge amount of paperwork 
seems to create inefficiencies.                                                               (SMA, 9)  
Any system that is taking that amount of time and money to produce its 
evaluations of quality I don‘t think are that efficient. You know there must be 
other ways of doing it which would require less input of time, effort and 
money.                                                                                                     (AS, 19)                                                                                                              
While QAA is supposed to be lighter touch than Subject Reviews, which were highly 
interventionist, QAA is still very labour and resource intensive. Subject Reviews were not 
efficient in terms of the time, money and effort spent on them and, in a sense, they collapsed 
under their own weight, moving to the supposed lighter touch of institutional audit. But these 
are also labour and resource intensive diverting academics from the core missions of teaching 
and research. In the view of these interviewees, while institutional audits may have some 
positive effects in their recommendations it is universities that improve quality through their 
internal systems and not the institutional audits.  
Thus, the question raised by most senior managers and senior manager academics is: if 
there are a handful of institutions in the country about which QAA has worries, why do they 
need to evaluate all universities to the same level? They suggest it might make more sense if 
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the QAA had mechanisms which concentrate its energies on improving or closing institutions 
that fail to achieve a basic level of quality rather than providing the same instruments in all 
institutions. It is an issue of „Where do you put your energies?‟  
The second group of 7 interviewees cannot decide whether or not QAS are efficient 
and see efficiency as a relative term with several meanings. Thus, QA mechanisms for both 
teaching and research in HE might be efficient in one sense and inefficient in another. 
Difficult to decide as efficiency is a relative term. I‘m not sure if it‘s as black 
and white as that. I‘m not sure that you can answer that question with a yes or 
no as QA mechanisms might be efficient in one sense and inefficient in 
another sense. But do I think there are things that could be done to improve the 
system, of course yes. Do I think the government should give up trying to 
develop mechanisms for allocating its money to universities and to develop 
mechanisms for assuring the quality of provision? No.                           (SM, 5)                                                                             
Summing up the above account, it is clear that most interviewees are more or less happy with 
RAE in terms of assuring the quality of research whereas they have many reservations about 
the QAA in terms of assuring quality of teaching. While they have reservations on the 
efficiency of RAE, these are much less than those on the QAA, concluding that both need 
improvements to do their job more efficiently.   
Turning to efficiency internally in UoB, perceptions fall into three main groups: while 
a group of 12 sees that IQAS in UoB are reasonably efficient, ten see them as inefficient and 
six cannot decide.  
The first group, of 12, sees IQAS in UoB as reasonably efficient because moving to 
larger academic units, colleges, allows for more strategic planning through BIQAES. Before 
the college structure, the university used to have a quality assurance and enhancement 
committee which looked after quality across all its 19 schools. Now, colleges have their own 
quality assurance and enhancement committees which work closely with the same committees 
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in schools. BIQAES is embedded in this network of committees and its information flow 
enables senior managers to deal more with strategic issues rather than simply the quality 
process. The process is also more effective because colleges can sustain a better dialogue with 
its smaller number of schools, making BIQAES more effective as people understand better 
what they have to do, why and how they can do it. They add that what they have now is more 
robust and effective.  
The college structure also helps in terms of quality enhancement as colleges allow 
much greater opportunity to spread best practice than the previous system of 19 schools. The 
dissemination of information is in terms of communication between directors of quality 
assurance and enhancement of schools, colleges and the university. One academic mentioned 
that having directors of quality assurance and enhancement in schools is beneficial as they 
attract academics‘ attention to areas where there might be problems and support them. He sees 
‗the beneficial effect is felt more from the people who are on the spot. The higher up people 
are, the less they tend to understand the implications of what they‘re saying‘ (AS, 21).    
Moving to larger academic units under the new college structure would be 
more efficient as it will avoid lots of inefficient data collection in smaller units 
and allows for more strategic planning.                                              (SMA, 10)                                                            
One of the reported strengths of BIQAES is that it is an integrated system with annual reviews 
of modules and regular reviews of programmes involving external assessment. In addition, the 
university has specific checks which they use to follow up issues that have been identified. 
The system is also pretty efficient given that most of the work is done by academics and it is a 
characteristic of BIQAES that the best way of managing quality is by giving academics 
ownership of the process. BIQAES is also a transparent system as students have the handbook 
which tells them how the system works.  
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Interviewees added, however, that although BIQAES is efficient in the sense that it does the 
job it is set up to do, they are not happy with the bureaucracy of the system and the paper 
work generated. However, they think that these are driven more by the national QAA and 
recognize that Birmingham‟s IQAS, as with any other university, is influenced by the national 
QAA‟s agenda.   
The second group, of 10 interviewees, sees IQAS in UoB as inefficient for several 
reasons. Firstly, reforms in the university are becoming more centrally-driven rather than 
considering the different nature and needs of colleges, schools and departments. They think 
there has been a structural change at college level but not sufficient change at school and 
department level. They see that a ‗one-size fits all‟ policy does not work as the different 
structures and variations in schools and departments are healthy and the university should 
encourage this diversity more than uniformity. However, they agree that these diverse 
structures are sometimes confusing and make things difficult and perhaps inefficient.  
Secondly, BIQAES is viewed as labour-intensive generating a lot of paperwork which 
is essentially about game playing and having a well-prepared paper work but does not 
improve the quality of teaching. Its concern is too much about process, reflecting the QAA 
and not teaching itself. One senior manager mentioned that there are many key processes 
checklists, requiring schools to tick boxes to no great effect. The information collected from 
such checklists is not really helpful and does not actually change things very much, which is 
why there are plans to get rid of them.  
It is not particularly efficient as it is very labour-intensive but I can‘t think of 
many better ways of doing it. I wouldn‘t say that our system is any less 
efficient than any other university. I think it‘s a feature of QA mechanisms in 
universities which is clearly affected by the QAA.                                 (SM, 2)                                                            
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Thirdly, they see that there is more bureaucracy and complexity in approving new 
programmes/modules. The system for assuring quality requires staff to go through a checklist 
of procedures and activities before having a new proposal accepted. It can sometimes take up 
to two or three years to fully develop an initiative, which can be too late, making the 
university less responsive.  
Approving new modules takes a very long time. Things are getting really 
worse and you are being confronted with problems that have nothing to do 
with wanting to teach the most up-to-date science to some very curious 
students who come from all over the world to spend just one year in this 
university. But that‘s our life and we have been told that a certain module 
cannot be taught because we missed the deadline which was in February, 
which seems ridiculous and crazy.                                                      (SMA, 15) 
Interviewees are also concerned about the codes of practice which also keep being altered. 
Too often there is no consistent mechanism for telling academics that procedures have 
changed and schools and academics have to spend time keeping up-to-date with these codes 
of practice. 
Finally, they see that the whole college structure between schools and the university is 
creating an awful amount of extra work. One director of quality assurance and enhancement 
mentioned that ‗It is just a waste of time in my opinion, just repeating what we already do in 
the school, they are checking what we are checking. We can check ourselves and we do not 
need all the extra work at the college level and do the paper work after making checklists and 
such for the university level‘ (AS, 27). If the university have some worries about certain 
schools or departments, they should audit them instead of applying the same instrument to all 
schools. Thus, again, comes the efficiency question of „Where do you put your energies?‘   
The last group of six interviewees cannot decide whether IQAS in UoB are efficient or 
not as they might be efficient in one sense and inefficient in another.  
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7.3.4 Equity 
Views on the equity/fairness of QAS fall into two main groups: the majority of interviewees 
see QAS as reasonably fair but a few find it difficult to decide whether or not QAS are fair.  
Eighteen interviewees identify a number of reasons why they assess QAS as fair. First, 
they see the system is transparent as all universities know the rules of the game and know 
what is expected. In addition, everybody (universities, academics and students) is treated the 
same way and no one is discriminated against because of QA processes. They also recognize 
that there should be accountability by universities for the quality of their provision and think 
this is fair but believe there should be other ways of holding universities accountable without 
taking the volume of time, money and effort that QAS require. Thus, although they agree that 
QAS are reasonably fair, they recommend it should be lighter touch and show more trust in 
professionals.   
It is transparent as people know how the system operates and therefore, they 
have the opportunity to change and make sure that their procedures of assuring 
quality of teaching go in line with the procedures of the external agencies.        
.                                                                                                            (SMA, 10)  
I don‘t think I‘m being discriminated against because of the name on my door. 
……                                                                                                        (AS, 21) 
Second, members of this group recognized that QAS are fair for students as they are well 
represented and their voice is heard through the feedback system and the NSS. They added 
that the system of quality assurance is there to approve the quality of provision, ensure 
universities meet accepted standards and, through whole series of processes and regulations, 
ensure that students get consistent treatment. However, the role of the QAA in doing this is 
indirect as it is universities and their regulations which ensure the quality of provision with 
the QAA checking whether those regulations are implemented. Thus, it is universities that 
make sure students are well represented on quality assurance committees and that their voice 
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is heard. Also, academics do their best to ensure fairness in examining students, marking 
exam sheets and double checking and moderating marks.  
Third, in terms of assuring the quality of research, RAE is perceived to be reasonably 
fair, whereas most interviewees have some concerns about the QAA in terms of assuring the 
quality of teaching. Distributing QR money according to the quality of research outputs is 
accepted and they cannot find a better way of doing this. Indeed, the RAE is viewed as 
making a good balance between being effective and giving incentives for cutting-edge 
research. It is accepted that fairness in terms of RAE does not mean giving equal shares to 
universities.    
As far as the RAE is concerned, fairness may not be the right word because it 
is all based on academic judgment and academic judgment and fairness are 
different in my opinion. Academic judgment is the best you can possibly have 
and it is perfectly appropriate but fair would be the wrong adjective. For 
example, a 4 star university gets seven times the amount of money that a two 
star research university would get and 3 star research would get three times the 
amount of money that a 2 star research gets and 1 star research would get 
nothing, is that fair? Yes, may be. It is a good balance between being effective 
and giving incentives to do really cutting-edge research. So, in that sense, it 
would be fair.                                                                                (SMA, 15) 
…….                                                                                                          
Nonetheless, some have concerns about the panel of peers who do the assessment, 
questioning the fairness of their judgment, particularly in terms of whether peers have enough 
time to think about their judgment and discuss it with other panel members and whether there 
are enough peers to cover the range of expertise within discipline areas. 
A fourth reason for judging QAS as fair, in terms of assuring the quality of teaching, is 
that members of this group think it is fair as all universities are treated the same way. Despite 
this, they have some concerns about the process. QAA institutional audits are viewed as 
heavily weighted in terms of paper work. They suggest it leads to game playing by ticking 
boxes and having well prepared paper-work in place which consumes huge amounts of time 
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but ultimately does not assess the quality of teaching itself, but the process. Another concern 
is that membership of the audit panels are reported to be mainly from new universities and 
this is seen as unfair in auditing big research-led universities as they may fail to recognize that 
pre-1992 have different approaches to teaching and research and give different weight to these 
activities. The danger with checking systems if the auditors are from new universities auditing 
old universities, they may think things are not done the right way and vice versa because they 
will be looking for the uniformity which is imposed by the process of auditing. Thus, they 
recommend there should be a balance in the external audit panels to guarantee fairness.  
I think you need to make sure that people who are making the assessment are 
able to make judgments about a particular type of institution that they are 
visiting because the assessors are drawn from a wide range of higher education 
institutions and if you have a bias of individuals coming from different types 
of institutions from the one they are assessing, the results would not be fair at 
all.                                                                                                            (SM, 1) 
Another concern is game playing with universities learning to play the game and hiding 
material which would not be to their credit.  
The university will acknowledge where it feels that it does have problems but 
yeah we‘re not asked when somebody assesses us to show such problems. 
You‘re not going to hang the dirty washing out to dry, are you? You‘re going 
to put that in the cupboard.                                                                    (AS, 20)                                                                                                   
The second group of 10 interviewees find it too difficult to decide whether or not QAS are 
fair because equity is a broad term which includes several dimensions. They see that QAS 
might be fair in one sense and unfair in another sense and moreover, what some people might 
consider as fair, others might criticise as being unfair. For example, it can be fair in terms of 
standardised treatment to universities and people but uniformity can be stifling and, therefore, 
unfair from the point of view of innovation. Institutional audits, as well, might be fair or not 
as it depends mainly on the nature of the audit panel. Although all auditors get the same 
training, people bring their own institutional experience which can affect the dynamics of 
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institutional audits. ‗It can really affect how much auditors drill down into certain areas and, 
therefore, there is an element of luck which can affect the final outcome report‘ (SM, 3). 
Quality assurance mechanisms are too complex to start to brand in terms of 
whether the whole structure is fair or unfair. There are features of them that 
some people might regard as fair and some people would criticize them as 
being unfair, but whether that is sufficient to obtain the whole structure, I 
myself doubt. You are always going to have to come to some conclusions 
about how you devise the structure and you are going to have some rules, and 
those rules will always be contested whatever fair they are.                (SMA, 5) 
Perceptions on equity internally in the UoB fall into two groups: whereas half of the 
interviewees see IQAS in UoB as reasonably fair, the other half finds it too difficult to decide 
whether or not IQAS are fair. In terms of assuring the quality of research, they see that little is 
done internally in UoB (such as strategic research reviews and research report reviews), as the 
main mechanism for assuring the quality of research is done through RAE. However, the 
university encourages academics to do high quality research and publish in top journals.  
The first half of respondents sees IQAS as reasonably fair for a number of reasons. 
First, BIQAES is transparent as all schools know how the system operates and know what is 
expected and everybody (schools, academics and students) is treated the same way. Senior 
managers and senior manager academics in this group see the university has been careful and 
even-handed in the way they have developed their system to ensure BIQAES is fair for 
academics and students. 
I think it‘s fair yeah. At least people understand what they have to do, it‘s 
clearly led, and nothing is a surprise, so we are all aware of what is required.                                                             
.                                                                                                               (AS, 23)   
Members of this group added that BIQAES is a combination of heavy and light touch with the 
benefit that a lot of responsibility is placed in the hands of those who deliver. The university‘s 
visiting team go into schools to do a quality review once every six years, which is relatively 
light touch whereas schools report back annually through the checklists and their programme 
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reviews. So, quite a lot of responsibility for quality assurance sits low down in the system. 
Although members of this group agreed that IQAS in UoB are reasonably fair, there are some 
concerns/worries about the sort of central uniformities which is viewed as pretty unhelpful 
because colleges and schools have different ways of doing things. Their view is that if 
something can be done more locally, then that is better as requirements can be adapted to 
local circumstances. Some academics added that colleges do not necessarily understand the 
nature of their individual sub-units (schools) terribly well.   
The other half of respondents sees IQAS might be fair in some senses and unfair in 
others. One example mentioned is that the system can be fair for students but unfair in terms 
of the workload of academics.  
This group view BIQAES as fair for students as they are well represented and their 
voice is heard through the feedback system. Students are represented in QAECs at all levels 
across the university, from the highest level (the university QAEC) where the Guild of 
Students Vice President (Education and Access) is a committee member to representation on 
college and school QAECs. There is also a student representative on the learning and teaching 
committee and the university have a student representation system co-ordinating committee 
with the vice president of the guild of students its chair. Their voice is also heard through the 
NSS. The director of quality assurance in X school said ―I think we‘re very rigorous in the 
university in ensuring fairness across the board, especially when it comes to students‖ (AS, 
28).      
Can‘t decide but I think it is fair for students. Students have a form where they 
fill in their feedback, then obviously those are presented to the students on the 
student notice-boards, as is partly with the external examiners‘ report as well. 
So, students know what is going on. Also, there are these student-
representation systems so if there‘re any quality issues, or any issues about any 
programme or module, then the student reps can raise them within program 
committees or boards of study.                                                               (AS, 20)  
 228 
On the other hand, there are concerns about fairness in terms of workload and promotion of 
academics. Members of this group mentioned that although promotions are a fairly good 
system on paper for balancing teaching, research and administration with promotions, they 
think there is still quite a strong feeling that research is really what matters and this 
undermines the whole system. One director of quality assurance and enhancement said ―I see 
people who are excellent at doing research and generating research money getting promoted 
because if you are excellent at research, you can pack your bags and go anywhere whereas if 
you are excellent at teaching you probably can‘t‖ (SMA, 8). Thus, it is research which really 
matters in terms of promotion and it is why academics see teaching as inferior to research.    
The view was also expressed that the ways of calculating workload are not fair to all 
academic staff. Members of this group think there are some staff who work extremely hard, 
attract a lot of research money and do a lot of teaching but their efforts are not acknowledged 
by the university as it should be, whereas they think more work should be expected of other 
people. They add that the incentive for high performance has always been promotion but the 
system of promotions is less transparent for academics. One academic said ―although the 
criteria for promotion are readily available and you can look at them and see what you have 
got to do but in some cases some criteria seem to hold less weight than others which seems to 
be less transparent and unfair‖ (AS, 19). It has been reported that there are good examples 
within certain schools of academics who have tried to meet all the criteria for teaching, 
research management and administration but still do not get promoted and subsequently have 
left the university to go elsewhere for promotion. Indeed, a number have gone to leadership 
positions in other institutions because UoB has not recognized their efforts and think that the 
university should have done so.  
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7.3.5 Summary 
Having presented the perceptions of interviewees about QAS in the UK and specifically in the 
UoB, it is clear there are no significant differences in the perceptions of the different groups 
of senior managers, senior manager academics and academics on the issues of autonomy, 
accountability, efficiency and equity, nationally and internally.  
On autonomy, the majority of interviewees agreed that QAS have no effect on 
institutional autonomy or academic freedom. However, they agreed that paper work and 
administration put more pressure on academics and do not motivate them to improve the 
quality of teaching itself. They also have concerns about the level of uniformity QA 
procedures bring to the system nationally and internally. As for accountability, almost all 
interviewees agreed that there is a fair amount of accountability in the system in terms of the 
quality of teaching and research. They agreed there are several layers of accountability in the 
system but regard accountability for teaching as weak compared to that for research. Market 
accountability has been reported as another layer of accountability, which matters more for 
universities than other mechanisms. 
On efficiency, the majority of interviewees agreed that QAS are reasonably efficient in 
terms of assuring the quality of research but inefficient in terms of teaching. They see the 
RAE as doing a reasonable job whereas they have several concerns about the QAA. 
Concerning equity, the majority of interviewees see that QAS are reasonably fair as they are 
transparent and all universities know the rules of the game and are treated the same way. The 
system is fair for students as they are well represented and their voice is heard. RAE is also 
perceived to be reasonably fair.    
IQAS in UoB are seen as having no effect on institutional autonomy or academic 
freedom. It provides a reasonable amount of accountability but is seen by some as covering 
 231 
accountability more than enhancement. Interviewees did not give clear-cut answers about the 
efficiency and equity of IQAS in UoB as the system might be efficient in one sense and 
inefficient in another; similarly, they may be fair in one sense and not in another. Finally, 
Birmingham‘s internal quality assurance system, like any other university, has been reported 
to be influenced by the national QAA‘s agenda. 
7.4 Conclusion  
To conclude, this chapter has presented the results and discussion related to the third research 
question ―How do quality assurance systems affect higher education in Egypt and the UK?‖ 
The analysis and discussion of results were structured around the four themes, which form the 
theoretical framework of the study, and themes that emerged from the data were discussed as 
sub-themes under the main four. The most significant data in this chapter were that gathered 
through interviews with academics, senior manager academics and senior managers in both 
cases, and their interpretation point to valuable implications for policy and practice presented 
in the concluding chapter.   
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8 CHAPTER EIGHT 
KEY FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
8.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses the main findings in relation to the second and third research questions 
of the study, which investigate how funding and QAS affect higher education in Egypt and 
the UK in terms of autonomy, accountability, efficiency and equity. The most significant data 
are from the interviews, with evidence cross-referenced with data from relevant policy 
documents, reports and literature.          
8.2 Autonomy 
Table  8.1 summarises the perceptions of participants on autonomy in relation to funding and 
QAS and shows that the great majority in both universities take the view that academic 
freedom is not affected either by funding or the way quality is assured. However, a few 
interviewees at CU comment that academic freedom might be affected indirectly, as 
inadequate funding and poor pay prevent academics from doing certain types of research in 
which they are interested or force them to have additional jobs to secure an acceptable 
livelihood, leaving no space to enhance teaching and research. A few interviewees in UoB 
also see academic freedom as restricted to some extent due to increasing concern for research 
which has a clear impact, and that the RAE seems to prioritize certain types of research to the 
detriment of others.       
Perceptions on institutional autonomy are quite different. In Egypt, institutional 
autonomy is viewed as seriously affected due to the inflexibility of line-item funding; 
inadequacy of public funding; limits on academic affairs; control of senior academic 
appointments; having no say on students‘ intake quotas and lack of transparency. In the UK, 
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universities are seen as enjoying a reasonable amount of autonomy as the block grant and 
diversified sources of funding allow them a fair amount of autonomy and flexibility. They 
also have autonomy to appoint their own governing bodies and staff. Areas of restriction are 
caps on student numbers and tuition fees. It is also believed that colleges in UoB have more 
autonomy than schools, as they are budget holders and, thus, have more power in decision-
making.  
The majority of interviewees in CU and UoB see QAS having no effect on 
institutional autonomy or academic freedom. An interesting aspect of this finding is that 
respondents in both cases have the same perceptions although the system is well-established 
in the UK but quite new in Egypt. Moreover, in both cases, the majority agree that QAS add 
extra burdens such as documentation and paper work which take too much time and might, as 
a result, restrict academic creativity in research and teaching. They also believe paper work 
and administration put pressure and extra workload on academics but do not motivate them to 
improve the quality of teaching itself. Participants in UoB also have concerns that the QAA is 
too process-driven and risks imposing a uniformity that may encroach on autonomy. They 
also have concerns that the RAE encourages short-term goals and pushes academics to do 
research that has direct industrial and economic value. A few interviewees in UoB see that 
institutional autonomy might be restricted due to the trend of universities increasingly being 
run like businesses; government also wants to have more control on what universities do 
through greater standardisation. A few interviewees in CU also believe that institutional 
autonomy might be restricted in some respects, such as lack of flexibility in approving new 
modules/programmes and control of governing bodies and staff appointments.                                   
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Table  8.1: Autonomy in Higher Education in Egypt and the UK 
Funding Mechanisms Quality Assurance Systems 
Egypt The UK Egypt The UK 
*The majority, 35 out of 44, falls into a group 
who see that the way universities are funded 
affects institutional autonomy seriously but 
has no impact on academic freedom in terms 
of teaching and research activities 
-An analysis of the views of those in the first 
group identify problems of institutional 
autonomy in several ways:  
-inflexibility of line-item budgets;  
- insufficiency of public funding; 
-funds are not matched to HEIs’ priorities; 
-limits on academic affairs; 
-control of senior academic appointments; 
-no say on  level of student recruitment; 
-lack of transparency. 
*Although most interviewees in this group 
agreed that the way universities are funded 
affects institutional autonomy seriously but 
has nothing to do with academic freedom, ten 
interviewees did mention that it might affect 
academic freedom indirectly. 
-negative consequences of having 2nd and 
sometimes 3rd jobs to secure an acceptable 
livelihood; 
-inadequate funding and poor academic pay 
might prevent academics from doing certain 
types of research in which they are interested. 
*The second group, 9 interviewees, is those 
who do not see funding as impacting on 
institutional autonomy or academic freedom  
-public funding is too weak to affect 
institutional autonomy; 
-academic freedom is not affected at all by the 
way universities are funded.  
*Nationally  
*18/28 see funding having no impact on institutional autonomy 
or academic freedom  
-receiving funding in the form of a block grant gives universities a 
considerable amount of autonomy; 
-the block grant provides a fair amount of flexibility; 
-diversified sources of funding allow universities a fair amount of 
autonomy and flexibility;  
-universities have ultimate autonomy to appoint their own 
governing bodies and staff; 
-funding has no impact on academic freedom as there is no 
control on what academics teach or what they research. 
*4/28 interviewees see funding having no impact on academic 
freedom but restricts institutional autonomy to some extent 
-public funding restricts autonomy in teaching because of the caps 
on student numbers and fees. 
*6/28, see funding as not affecting institutional autonomy but 
restricting academic freedom in some respects 
-academics are told their research must have an economic impact; 
-all research funding has to have an impact statement that 
describes its broader implications; 
-funding might distort teaching and research through the 
accountability mechanisms; 
-RAE seems to prioritize certain types of research.  
*Internally in UoB 
*All agreed that the funding model in UoB does not affect 
academic freedom but the new model affects the autonomy of 
schools as there is the new college level of administration  
-there is a drift of money upwards from schools to colleges; 
-a reasonable amount of autonomy rests within colleges as they 
are budget holders; 
-schools cannot keep their surpluses anymore; 
- Decision-making has been removed to colleges. 
*The majority, 31 out of 40, sees QAS having no 
effect on institutional autonomy or academic 
freedom 
-QAS guarantee that universities are 
autonomous and responsible at the same time. 
-However, they agreed that QAS add extra 
burdens such as documentation and paper work 
which take too much of academic’s time and 
effort. 
*The second group, 9 interviewees, sees that 
QAS might affect institutional autonomy and 
academic freedom in some respects  
-lack of flexibility, especially in approving new 
modules or programmes which take too much 
time (up to 5 years); 
-universities do not have the autonomy to 
appoint their own governing bodies and staff; 
-the volume of paper work which academics are 
asked to prepare might restrict academics’ 
creativity and the dynamics of teaching students. 
  
*Nationally 
*The majority, 19 out of 28, sees QAS having no effect on 
institutional autonomy or academic freedom  
-Universities have a good degree of autonomy and QAA 
institutional audits respect that autonomy.  
*Despite agreeing QAS have no effect on institutional autonomy 
or academic freedom, most have some reservations about QAA 
and RAE:   
-QAA procedures try to bring a level of uniformity which may 
encroach on autonomy;   
-QAA is very process-driven; 
-Paper work and an enormous amount of administration only put 
more pressure and workload on academics and do not motivate 
them to improve the quality of teaching itself; 
-RAE encourages short-term goals. 
*The second group, 9 interviewees, sees that QAS might affect 
institutional autonomy and academic freedom in some respects  
-universities are now run like businesses;   
-government wants to have more control on what universities do; 
-QA procedures aim to make everything standardised; 
-the process sends very strong signals about the kind of teaching 
academics have to do; 
-RAE and the funding regime push academics towards doing 
research with a direct industrial and economic value.  
*Internally in UoB 
*Almost all interviewees agreed that IQAS in UoB have no effect 
on either institutional autonomy or academic freedom. 
-IQAS affect workload more than anything.  
*Although the majority of interviewees agreed that IQAS in UoB 
does not affect institutional autonomy or academic freedom, they 
have some reservations about the system: 
-centralization and uniformity which the university wants to 
implement in all of its schools.  
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The analysis identifies similarities and differences between the two cases, some of which are 
directly related to funding and QAS but others with broader governance and cultural issues. 
In Egypt, concerns about institutional autonomy may arise from the negative 
influences of line-item funding as represented in policy documents and literature (Said, 2001; 
World Bank, 2002a; Cheung, 2003; Johnstone et al., 1998; Jongbloed, 2004), these indicating 
that its funding mechanism is not successful because it is not sensitive to institutional 
autonomy (OECD, 2008). Some of the concerns about autonomy might arise from QAS in 
terms of the extra workload on academics, which divert them from teaching, research and 
serving the community. However, some may arise from the regulatory system governing 
higher education in Egypt. For example, issues of bureaucracy, government intervention, 
limits on academic affairs, control of senior academic appointments, lack of flexibility in 
approving new modules/programmes… and having no say on student intake/quotas have 
nothing to do with either funding or QAS. Thus, centralisation and the fact that universities 
are managed in the same regulatory environment as other parts of the public sector may 
inhibit autonomy more than funding and QAS. 
  This finding is consistent with the Strategic Planning Unit‘s report on ―Higher 
Education in Egypt - Country Background Report‖ stating that although public universities in 
Egypt are referred to as autonomous bodies, some legislations regulating leadership and 
financial factors limit and control the level of autonomy in these institutions (SPU, 2008). In 
that regard, it is worth noting that the proposal for granting Egyptian universities more 
administrative and financial autonomy, under HEEP, was rejected by the Parliament as it is a 
politically sensitive issue and that is why such proposals are still facing some resistance 
(World Bank, 2009) which may go back to the difficulties of the governance and political 
environment of Egypt.    
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In the UK, the autonomy that is described might arise, in part, from the block grant 
(Cheung, 2003; Bullock and Thomas, 1997; Johnstone et al., 1998; Jongbloed, 2004) which 
allows universities a reasonable degree of autonomy, while the autonomy described in 
relation to QAS may reflect that these systems respect the autonomy of universities with 
controls on the quality of teaching and research, not their content. However, some issues that 
restrict autonomy arise from the regulatory system governing higher education in the UK, 
such as caps on student numbers and fees, universities being run like businesses, and the 
desire of government to have more control on what universities do through greater 
standardisation and use of guidelines and codes of practice. Such factors may reflect a lack of 
trust in professionals to be self-regulating, a trend highlighted in the literature from the 1980s 
(Le Grand, 2003; Roberts, 2004; Thomas, 2006).  
It may be, therefore, that it is the decentralisation of the system and the fact that 
universities are private institutions/corporations established as charities serving public benefit 
(Floud, 2005; Harris, 2011) that contribute to autonomy more than funding and QAS with 
some governance issues restricting autonomy.          
Supporting this argument is the proposition that line-item funding can co-exist with 
rules allowing universities to decide their own direction, including choice of governing bodies 
and staff and deciding levels of student recruitment. In contrast, a block grant system can be 
in place alongside a regulatory system that does not allow universities to control the 
appointment of their governing bodies or staff or even to have a say on the level of student 
recruitment. Thus, the regulatory system - the laws and regulations governing higher 
education- are also influential on autonomy, along with funding and QAS. 
It is also clear that, despite expectations from the literature of quasi-markets and new 
managerialism, that they will alter the relationship between funders and providers (Deem, 
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1998; Davies, 2003; Le Grand, 2003; Roberts, 2004; Deem and Brehony, 2005), the reported 
perceptions in UoB offer some challenges to this. The majority see institutional autonomy and 
academic freedom as not affected, their perception being that it has not altered the relationship 
between the funder and the provider, as universities still enjoy a reasonable degree of 
autonomy with controls on the quality of teaching and research, not their content. However, 
quasi-markets and new managerialism do have some effect on institutional autonomy and 
academic freedom through caps on student numbers and fees, the need for universities to 
operate like businesses (as also reported in Lynch, 2006 and Kok et al., 2010), more control 
through greater standardisation and use of guidelines and codes of practice, increasing 
concern for research which has a clear impact, and that the RAE seems to prioritize certain 
types of research to the detriment of others.     
8.3 Accountability 
On accountability, and as shown in Table  8.2, there are considerable differences in the 
perceptions of interviewees in Egypt and the UK. 
In Egypt, although the great majority believe the system provides strong financial 
accountability, it is seen as rigid and concerned with compliance with established laws and 
regulations for budgets and neither considers outcomes nor has incentives in place for 
securing efficiency gains. It is believed that the system provides administrative accountability 
not a technical one and is based on document auditing. There is also general agreement that 
the system provides weak/no accountability for academics. On QAS, it is believed they 
include rules which guarantee a strong dialogue of accountability between academics, 
universities, students, the government and other stakeholders but the rules are not activated. 
Reasons for this are related to academics being treated as civil servants, all on tenure track but 
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lacking job satisfaction due to poor pay24; other reasons are regulations governing higher 
education which contradict with and impede the proper implementation of QAS. Almost all 
interviewees agreed that the scheme of linking increase in academic pay to the quality of 
performance, under QAAP, is not a solution to either pay or accountability.   
In the UK, it is believed there is a fair amount of accountability in the system in terms 
of finance and the quality of teaching and research. Perceptions on accountability show that, 
whereas the RAE is seen as a reasonable way of holding universities accountable for QR 
money, almost all interviewees see the system providing weak accountability for teaching as, 
unlike research, there is no quality measure linked to funding. There are several concerns 
about the QAA becoming a huge bureaucratic system, which checks the quality of the process 
and the paper trails rather than the quality of teaching. There is a general agreement that there 
are several layers of accountability in the system with much more control and much less 
autonomy nationally and internally in UoB, as both QAA and BIQAES are seen as too 
bureaucratic and resource intensive, securing accountability more than quality enhancement. 
However, although QAA and BIQAES are seen as more concerned with accountability than 
enhancement, there was agreement that the culture within universities means it is not only a 
paper exercise, partly because the higher education environment has become an increasingly 
competitive marketplace. Thus, on top of layers of administrative accountability, there is 
market accountability which is seen as mattering more. 
                                                 
24
 Although around 78% of public current expenditure in higher education go to wages, the ratio of academic to 
non-academic staff is still relatively high which leads to diverting a big share of current expenditures away from 
academic staff leading to an under motivated teaching staff, which leads to low quality higher education in the 
end (Fahim and Sami, 2009). Academics have staged several public protests over poor pay (Khalid, 2008; 2009; 
2010a).  
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The analysis of accountability has identified several issues, some directly related to funding 
and QAS but, as with autonomy, others concerned with broader governance issues and 
cultural factors.  
What emerges is that issues identified in Egypt concerning rigid administrative 
accountability and lack of accountability for the work of academics may have less to do with 
funding or QAS but are influenced by the regulatory system governing higher education, 
which inhibits a proper dialogue of accountability. Indeed, the overly centralised regulatory 
environment with its employees treated as civil servants on tenure track with salaries based on 
seniority regardless of performance/outcomes has worsened that dialogue. This finding is 
consistent with policy documents and the literature (Said, 2001; QAAP, 2008b; OECD and 
World Bank, 2010) which confirm that the legislative framework for governing higher 
education in Egypt is obsolete and not up to contemporary challenges with academic staff 
adversely affected by selection, recruitment practices, and poor remuneration. It can be argued 
that the limited autonomy of universities also weakens the dialogue of accountability as some 
of the main characteristics of a strong dialogue of accountability - trust and discretionary 
authority - are absent (Fenstermacher, 1979; Dunn, 2003; Heim, 1995 cited in Heim, no date; 
Heim, no date).      
In the UK, some of the identified issues relate to funding and QAS but others might 
also be associated with the regulatory system. For example, fair financial accountability might 
go back to the clarity of the dialogue of accountability with universities‘ awareness of what is 
expected in terms of securing money for teaching and research. Weak accountability for 
teaching might be explained in terms of the absence of quality measures linked to funding 
teaching, unlike research funding and the RAE, as reflected in the literature (Bush, 2007; 
Neyland, 2007).  
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Issues related to QAS are concerns about the QAA and BIQAES as being bureaucratic and 
resource intensive, covering accountability more than enhancement. These concerns reflect 
the wider literature (Harvey and Knight, 1996; Lee and Knight, 1996; Deem, 1998; Davies 
and Thomas, 2002; Robert, 2004; Stohl, 2007; Biggs and Tang, 2007; OECD, 2007) which 
see QAS as mainly concerned with accountability, value for money and fitness for purpose, 
rather than enhancement, so that the university sector has become more directly managed for 
reasons of greater accountability.  
The fact that market accountability matters more for universities indicates that the 
regulatory system/environment, particularly in a quasi-market form, may have more impact 
on the dialogue of accountability than funding and QAS. Thus, decentralisation, allowing 
universities a degree of autonomy to decide their direction within a quasi-market environment 
might be judged as a successful means of enhancing the dialogue of accountability as it 
increases competition between universities and makes them more responsive to students, 
employers and the wider community. However, despite this, it is necessary to be alert to the 
fact that universities are good at game-playing, making it possible for them to hide things 
during institutional audit that would not be to their credit. 
Thus, there would always be a need for audit systems to generate market information 
for quasi-markets. However, the main question is: can those audit systems be run in a better 
way than currently, bearing in mind that whatever system is put in place, there would be an 
element of game-playing as academics and senior managers would need to present a good 
image of their institutions? The answer to this question may include two options for policy 
makers: (a) either having a very intrusive system which tries to control this but probably at a 
cost that would be high and, moreover,  might still not work or (b) having lighter touch audit 
systems to inform the market accompanied by more ‗investment‘ in trust in professionals. It 
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can be argued that there would be more gains in terms of information flow by having a lighter 
touch audit system accompanied by more trust in professionals rather than having a very 
intrusive system, which might not work anyway.    
This finding is consistent with the literature (Harvey and Green, 1993; Le Grand, 
2003; Harvey and Newton, 2004; Floud, 2005; Le Grand, 2007) which called for the 
importance of professional accountability through having more trust in professionals and 
making QAS lighter touch, with Codd (2005) arguing that the restoration of an eroded culture 
of trust in the education sector requires a form of accountability which enhances rather than 
diminishes professional accountability, bearing in mind that markets only prosper in societies 
that have elements of trust and reciprocity (Codd, 2005; Thomas, 2005).  
It can be argued that professional accountability can be enhanced through having more 
trust in professionals by giving them ownership of managing the quality of provision; making 
QAS lighter touch by reducing workload, paper work and administration for academics; 
encouraging more diversity rather than uniformity; ensuring that QAS serve both 
enhancement and accountability purposes and finding a good balance between them.    
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Table  8.2: Accountability in Higher Education in Egypt and the UK  
Funding Mechanisms Quality Assurance Systems 
Egypt                             The UK Egypt The UK 
*The first group, which forms a great majority, 35 out of 
44, sees the system as providing strong financial 
accountability whereas it provides weak/no accountability 
for academics.  
-strong financial accountability; 
-even universities’ self-generated income is subject for 
accountability through CAPMAS; 
-weak/no accountability for academics. 
*Although the majority of interviewees see the system as 
providing strong financial accountability, they see that it is 
a rigid one as it is just concerned with compliance and 
neither puts outcomes into consideration nor provides any 
incentives for efficiency gains. In addition, they see that the 
system provides no or weak accountability for academics. 
-The first issue which weakens the system of accountability 
for academics is the tenure track system; 
-lack of job satisfaction for academics; 
-academic pay is fixed for all regardless of their 
performance/outputs;  
*Some senior managers see that the system provides 
accountability for academics but it is just on paper, not 
activated. 
*The second group, 5 out of 44, sees the system as 
providing weak accountability mechanisms.  
-the funding system does not provide sufficient 
accountability as it has lots of gaps and that accountability 
is only an administrative one, not a technical one. 
*The third group, 4 out of 44, has no idea about the 
nature of the dialogue of accountability between 
universities and funders. 
*Nationally 
*All interviewees agreed that there is a fair 
amount of accountability in the system in terms 
of financial accountability and in relation to the 
quality of teaching and research in HE in the 
UK.  
 
*However, four interviewees see weak 
accountability for teaching as there is no 
quality measure in teaching linked to funding.  
-Interviewees also noted that although the QAA 
is supposed to check the quality of teaching, it 
checks a paper trail rather than the actual 
quality of teaching. 
 
*Internally in UoB 
*All interviewees agreed that there is much 
more accountability (control) and much less 
autonomy under the new financial model 
especially with colleges as a new level of 
administration.  
 
*All interviewees agreed that QAS include rules which 
guarantee achieving a strong dialogue of accountability 
but those rules are not activated for several reasons. 
-lots of the laws and regulations governing HE in Egypt 
contradict with and impede the proper implementation of 
QAS; 
-HEIs have no say on the massive numbers of students they 
are forced to accept every year which affects the quality of 
provision; 
-there is no activated accountability for academics because 
poor pay forces them to have additional jobs to secure their 
livelihood. 
*Almost all interviewees see that the project of linking an 
increase in academic pay to the performance of academics 
is a great failure and that it has not provided a solution to 
either pay or accountability as the project has linked the 
financial incentive to academics’ physical attendance rather 
than their performance. Moreover, the project failed to 
recognize that: 
-academics work most of the time even when they are at 
home; 
-lack of proper offices for academics; 
-the difficulty of monitoring academics’ attendance; 
-the financial incentive is not rewarding enough to secure 
the livelihood of academics. 
-there should be more trust in academics. 
*Only six interviewees see that universities began to have 
an accountability system for academics through linking a 
financial incentive to the performance of academics under 
QAAP but it just needs more time to be settled and be 
highly activated. They see that it is a step forward on the 
way of having a good accountability system for academics 
but they also ensured that it should be more linked to the 
quality of performance of academics rather than their 
physical attendance. 
*Nationally 
*Almost all interviewees agreed that there is a fair 
amount of accountability in the system in terms of quality 
of teaching and research in HE in the UK. 
-there are several layers of accountability in the UK HE; 
-RAE is considered to be a reasonable way of making 
universities accountable for QR money; 
-weak accountability for teaching; 
-accountability for teaching is there but probably  becoming 
relatively less; 
-QAA, as a means of assuring the quality of teaching, is just 
becoming a huge bureaucratic system; 
-there is another layer of accountability which is market 
accountability. 
*Internally in UoB 
*Almost all interviewees agreed that there is a reasonable 
amount of accountability in the system but they see that 
IQAS in UoB covers accountability more than 
enhancement.  
-there is a good dialogue between quality assurance 
committees in the university, colleges and coming down to 
the schools’ level; 
-there are different layers of accountability for assuring the 
quality of provision; 
-schools are becoming more accountable and less 
autonomous;  
-‘one-size fits all’ policy does not seem to work efficiently; 
-BIQAES seems quite bureaucratic, very time-consuming 
and not particularly effective; 
-on top of those layers of accountability, they have market 
accountability. 
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8.4 Efficiency 
Perceptions on efficiency in relation to funding and QAS are summarised in Table  8.3 with 
great differences between participants in Egypt and the UK. 
Whereas the majority of interviewees in Egypt see the system as inefficient in terms of 
funding, the majority in the UK see the system as reasonably efficient. It is believed that 
efficiency in Egypt is negatively affected because of line-item funding as well as inadequate 
funding, lack of flexibility and transparency; lack of proper up-to-date equipment and no 
incentives for efficiency gains. One of the most striking findings is that there is general 
agreement between senior managers, senior manager academics and academics about the 
inefficiency of the current system with no one suggesting it was efficient. Thus, line-item 
funding has negative impact on operating efficiency and internal efficiency as it lacks 
flexibility and does not provide incentives for efficiency gains (Bannock et al., 1972; Mingat 
and Tan, 1988; Barr, 2004b); and on external efficiency, as employers and students are 
displeased with the quality and efficiency of education and attest to its limited relevance 
(World Bank, 2002a; SPU, 2008). Providing education free for all students also has a negative 
impact on study and students‘ progress as there are no incentives for students to finish their 
degrees on time and be successful in the labour market (Bevc and Ursi, 2008). On the other 
hand, the block grant in the UK is seen to enhance efficiency as it provides universities with a 
reasonable degree of stability, flexibility and autonomy to decide appropriate ways of 
allocating resources and deciding priorities (Johnstone et al., 1998).  
However, an analysis of the issues shows there are other factors influencing 
efficiency. For instance, most of the issues identified in Egypt arise from the regulatory 
system, such as: providing higher education for free even for failing students; the mismatch 
between tuition fees and the real cost of teaching students; poor academic pay and lack of fair 
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competition between public and private universities. The issue of providing higher education 
for free, even for failing students, is seen as regressive, inefficient and unfair as most of the 
students join pre-higher education in private and language schools for very high tuition fees. 
Thus, almost all interviewees have recommended rationalising the policy of providing higher 
education free to enhance the efficiency of study, its equity and to allow fairer competition 
between public and private universities.  
This finding is consistent with Farag‘s (1999) survey of the social class and 
educational backgrounds of state university students which shows that, despite higher 
education being free, most students in high-status faculties attended prestigious private 
secondary schools. It also reflects World Bank reports (2002b; 2007) and Fahim and Sami‘s 
(2009) findings that public spending on higher education across different population quintiles 
favours the rich and is a subsidy to the middle class. Thus, free higher education is not 
necessarily achieving efficient or equitable outcomes as students from the rich and middle 
classes benefit more from tax funding, as is also reflected in the wider literature (Blondal et 
al., 2002; Greenway and Haynes, 2003; Goodman and Kaplan, 2003; Barr, 2004b; 
Psacharopolous and Patrinos, 2004; Chapman and Ryan, 2005; Wobman and Schutz, 2006; 
Johnstone and Marcucci, 2007). James (2007) added that free higher education creates a 
regressive tax situation in most nations as the middle and upper classes are overrepresented 
compared to lower classes.      
In the UK, the regulatory system and the diversified sources of funding were found to 
play an important role in enhancing efficiency. A market-driven system and diversified 
funding have brought more competition between universities, driving up the quality of 
provision. In addition, within that environment, the customer culture has made universities 
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more responsive to the needs of students and employers of graduates (Vossensteyn, 2004; Le 
Grand, 2007).  
Although the majority believe the funding system in the UK is reasonably efficient, 
they recognized some inefficiencies which should be addressed. These included worries about 
universities becoming underfunded due to the forthcoming reductions in funding; the different 
bands for different subjects which, for them, are questionable; the increasing bureaucracy of 
the system; the way research is funded pushes universities to give more concern for research 
than teaching and the huge amount of time, money and effort spent on RAE and QAS, which 
is becoming too bureaucratic. Internally, in UoB, the majority were unable to decide whether 
the system is efficient or not as the financial model in UoB is still new. Whereas nine 
interviewees see the financial model in UoB as reasonably efficient because it allows more 
strategic planning, a group of six sees it as inefficient as it is a disincentive, lacking 
transparency with colleges just adding an extra tier of bureaucracy.    
On QAS, whereas the majority of interviewees in Egypt cannot decide whether the 
system is efficient or not, the majority of interviewees in the UK see the system as reasonably 
efficient in terms of ensuring the quality of research but inefficient in terms of assuring 
quality in teaching. Participants‘ inability to give clear-cut answers about the efficiency of 
QAS in Egypt arises from the fact that the project is in a transitional phase and the culture is 
quite new, needing more time to settle down before being judged. A group of 11 interviewees 
sees that QAS are reasonably efficient for several reasons: raising awareness of the culture of 
QA; laying the necessary ground work for QAS; using SWOT analysis in self-studies 
evaluation; establishing student feedback systems, and establishing a link between evaluation 
and funding under CIQAP, which is an important factor in improving the dialogue of 
accountability and also an incentive for improving efficiency as reflected in QAAP final 
 245 
report (QAAP, 2008a). On the other hand, a group of seven interviewees sees that QAS are 
inefficient as there are several unresolved problems such as inadequate funding, lack of 
proper infrastructure, massive numbers of students, poor pay for academics and poor 
accountability for academics (Said, 2001; QAAP, 2008b); QAS are just about game-playing 
and QA criteria are not adapted to different contexts.   
In the UK, on the other hand, the system is believed to be reasonably efficient in terms 
of ensuring the quality of research but inefficient in terms of teaching quality. Whereas the 
NSS is seen as quite efficient as it represents the views of customers they have concerns about 
QAA in terms of bureaucracy and it  being a paper trail and box-ticking exercise, labour and 
resource intensive and a waste of much academic time and taxpayers‘ money. A few 
interviewees cannot decide whether QAS are efficient or not as they might be efficient in 
some senses and inefficient in others. Internally in UoB, 12 interviewees see that IQAS are 
reasonably efficient by moving to larger academic units - colleges - and allowing for better 
strategic planning with greater opportunity to spread best practice. However, they are not 
happy with its bureaucracy and the volume of paper work generated. It is also believed that 
Birmingham‘s IQAS, as with other universities, is over-influenced by the national QAA 
agenda. For a group of ten interviewees, IQAS in UoB are inefficient for several reasons: the 
centralisation and uniformity which IQAS imposes through an excess of codes of practice; 
BIQAES is labour and resource intensive with complex procedures for approving new 
modules/programmes. A few interviewees view IQAS as efficient in some respects and 
inefficient in others. 
These several concerns about QAA contradicts a literature which state that QAA 
institutional audits rely on self-regulation by institutions and thus imposes a significantly 
smaller burden than the earlier combination of subject reviews and audits (Clark, 2006; King, 
 246 
2006). This indicates that the QAA is not the intended lighter touch but a system which is still 
labour and resource intensive. The findings are also consistent with a literature which sees 
that QAA audits focused on systems and not on the quality of teaching itself (Vlasceanu et. 
al., 2007), as well as being retrospective and requiring conformity to externally imposed 
standards (Biggs and Tang, 2007). 
To sum up, it can be argued that most interviewees in UoB are more or less content 
with the efficiency of the RAE, where it is difficult to identify a more efficient way of 
assessing the quality of research other than peer review, whereas they are not content with the 
efficiency of QAA as it is time and resource intensive and neither assesses the quality of 
teaching nor informs the distribution of money for teaching. 
It is also clear that the reported perceptions in UoB show quasi-markets and new 
managerialism have a visible impact on the efficiency of the system. A market-driven system 
and diversified funding have brought more competition between universities, driving up the 
quality of provision. In addition, within that environment, the customer culture has made 
universities more responsive to the needs of students and employers and is why the NSS is 
seen as quite efficient as it represents the views of customers. The impact of new 
managerialism is visible through the concerns interviewees in UoB have on the uniformity 
and standardisation the government imposes on universities through codes of practice and 
guidelines with Birmingham‘s IQAS, as with other universities, seen as over-influenced by 
the national QAA agenda.  
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Table  8.3: Efficiency in Higher Education in Egypt and the UK   
Funding Mechanisms Quality Assurance Systems 
Egypt The UK Egypt The UK 
*The first group which forms a 
vast majority, 32 of 44 
interviewees, sees the system 
of funding as inefficient at all 
for several rationales  
-insufficiency of public funding; 
-lack of transparency; 
-lack of flexibility; 
-poor academic  pay; 
-providing HE free for all 
students; 
-quality of provision is always 
compromised; 
-tuition fees do not reflect the 
real cost of teaching students 
in HE; 
-the system does not provide 
incentives for students to finish 
their degrees on time and be 
successful graduates who are 
able to compete in the labour 
market; 
-Egypt provides HE free for 
failing students which adds to 
inefficiency; 
-practical learning becomes like 
theoretical learning because of 
lack of proper up-to-date 
equipment; 
-there is no fair competition 
between public and private 
universities. 
*The second group, 12 of 44 
interviewees, sees that the 
efficiency of the current 
system can be classified as 
poor or medium efficiency 
*Nationally 
*The majority of interviewees, 22/28, sees the system of funding as reasonably 
efficient  
-transparency achieved mainly through clarity of accountability; 
-the block grant provides universities with a good degree of stability, autonomy and 
flexibility; 
-diversified sources of funding and competition between universities drive up the 
quality of provision; 
-the customer culture made universities more responsive to students’ concerns for 
the quality of provision. 
*However, they also agreed that there are downsides/inefficiencies in the system 
which should be addressed: 
-universities are becoming underfunded because of the annual financial cuts; 
-the different bands for funding different subjects are questionable; 
-there is more bureaucracy in the system; 
-the way research is funded pushes universities to give more attention for research 
than for teaching; 
-the chances of being successful in getting research grants is becoming very low to a 
stage where it does not worth academics’ time and effort in preparing research 
proposals; 
-a lot of energy, time and money are spent on administrative exercises which are 
designed to maximize performance on either a teaching quality assessment or RAE. 
*The second group of 6 interviewees cannot decide whether the system of 
funding is efficient or not  
-the term efficiency is so broad and difficult to define and thus difficult to judge.  
*Internally in UoB 
*The majority, 13 interviewees, finds it quite difficult to decide whether the 
system is efficient or not  
- the financial model in UoB  is still new, not settled. 
*A second group of 9 sees the financial model in UoB as reasonably efficient  
-it allows for much better strategic planning for the whole institution; 
-the connection between the strategic decisions of the university’s executive board 
and the operationalization of those decisions. 
*A last group of 6 interviewees sees that it is inefficient  
-the college layer just adds an extra tier of bureaucracy; 
-the new financial model lacks transparency as it has no formula; 
-the new financial model is a disincentive.  
*The majority of interviewees, 22, finds 
it difficult to decide whether QAS are 
efficient or not  
-the project is incomplete yet and the 
culture of quality assurance is new to HEIs 
in Egypt and needs more time to settle 
down before being judged; 
-QAS in higher education are in their 
transitional phase. 
*A group of 11 interviewees sees that 
QAS are reasonably efficient but needs 
more time to be highly activated 
-documentation and paper work are quite 
crucial in a system which did not use to 
have any sort of documentation before; 
-QAAP has been reported to be successful 
in raising awareness of the culture of 
quality assurance in Egypt HE; 
-paper work is essential and can be an 
entry to development and improvement 
although not an end by itself; 
-using SWOT Analysis in the self study 
evaluation has been reported to be very 
beneficial; 
-the system of student feedback has also 
been reported to improve the efficiency 
and quality of provision; 
-establishing a link between evaluation 
and funding under CIQAP.  
*A group, of 7 interviewees, sees QAS as 
inefficient 
-there are several unresolved problems 
which make the system inefficient; 
-QAS are just about playing the game; 
-QAS are inefficient as all academics have 
tenure track so they do not care about it; 
-QA criteria are not adapted to different 
contexts. 
*Nationally 
*The majority of interviewees, 21, sees that QAS are reasonably 
efficient in terms of research but are inefficient in terms of teaching 
-RAE is  doing a reasonable job;  
-NSS is quite efficient; 
-QAA may be efficient as institutional audits take place once every six 
years. However, they have some concerns about the process: 
-it is just about paper trail and ticking boxes; 
-QAA is a total waste of academics’ time and taxpayers’ money; 
-QAA is still very labour and resource intensive; 
-‘Where do you put your energies?’ 
*The second group, only 7 interviewees, cannot decide whether QAS   
are efficient or not 
 -QA mechanisms for both teaching and research in HE might be 
efficient in one sense and inefficient in another. 
*Internally in UoB 
*The first group, 12, sees that IQAS in UoB are reasonably efficient 
-moving to larger academic units, colleges, allows for more strategic 
planning through BIQAES; 
-colleges allow much greater opportunity to spread best practice; 
-Birmingham’s IQAS, like any other university, is influenced by the 
national QAA’s agenda. 
*The second group, 10 interviewees, sees IQAS in UoB as inefficient 
for several reasons: 
-reforms in the university are becoming more centrally-driven; 
-‘one-size fits all’ policy does not work  as the varying structures and 
the variations in schools and departments are healthy and the 
university should encourage diversity more than uniformity; 
-BIQAES is  labour-intensive generating a lot of paperwork; 
-more bureaucracy and complexity in approving new 
programmes/modules; 
-the codes of practice which also keep being altered; 
-the whole college structure between schools and the university is just 
creating an awful amount of extra work; 
-‘Where do you put your energies?’ 
*The last group, only 6 interviewees, cannot decide whether IQAS in 
UoB are efficient or not as they might be efficient in one sense and 
inefficient in another sense. 
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8.5 Equity 
Table  8.4 summarises perceptions on equity in relation to funding and QAS.    
Whereas the majority of interviewees in Egypt cannot decide whether the system is 
fair or not in terms of funding, in the UK the majority see the system as reasonably fair. 
Uncertainty about fairness in Egypt goes back to the fact that there is no funding formula so 
interviewees do not have enough information about the criteria for distributing budgets among 
universities and faculties. Twelve interviewees see the system as unfair for several reasons: 
funding does not meet the real cost of teaching students; lack of fair competition between 
public and private universities and favouritism/lack of transparency. Eight interviewees, most 
of whom are senior managers, see it as quite fair as the distribution is based on the needs of 
universities within available resources for the sector. Although no clear-cut answers were 
given on equity, there was a general agreement that public funding is inadequate and that 
universities depend heavily on their self-generated income. 
Although the majority of interviewees in the UK see the system as reasonably fair in 
terms of transparency and adequacy, they have some concerns about research money. 
Although they agree it is fair for research money to be distributed according to the quality of 
research outputs, they see the system as favouring those institutions that have done well in the 
past and it may be unfair for new/post 1992 universities. Eleven interviewees could not decide 
whether the funding system is fair or not for a variety of reasons: because they lacked enough 
information on funding nationally; equity is a broad term which is too difficult to define and 
thus difficult to judge; funding may be fair in some senses and unfair in others; and what 
some consider fair might be criticised by others as unfair. Internally in UoB, the majority 
found it too difficult to decide whether the system is fair or not as the financial model in UoB 
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is still new. Five interviewees see the new financial model as unfair as it is not transparent and 
a disincentive, while five others see it as reasonably fair as it keeps the whole institution alive.        
The analysis identifies similarities and differences between the two cases, some of 
which are directly related to funding while others are related to broader governance issues. In 
Egypt, uncertainty on the fairness of funding goes back to lack of transparency as there is no 
funding formula for distributing budgets. There are also other reported issues which are 
believed to affect equity: inadequate funding; favouritism; and lack of fair competition 
between public and private universities. While inadequate funding is directly related to poor 
public funding, the other issues are related to broader governance and cultural factors. For 
instance, lack of fair competition between public and private universities arise from the 
duality of criteria and policies governing higher education in Egypt. While the government 
allows private universities to charge fees they choose, public universities can only charge 
nominal fees. It can also be argued that lack of a funding formula and favouritism might arise 
from the cultural environment where universities are treated as any part of the public sector. 
Thus, the public sector culture might be argued as having a greater negative impact on equity 
than funding. 
It is clear that issues of lack of fair competition between public and private 
universities, providing higher education free for all and the mismatch between tuition fees and 
the real cost of teaching students have been reported to harm the efficiency and equity of the 
system. This shows that concerns about efficiency and equity are closely inter-related and 
changes in one might affect the other (as discussed in section 8.4), all too likely as educational 
policy goals encompass efficient allocation and equitable distribution of costs and benefits 
(Woodhall, 2007; Barr, 2004a). 
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Among interviewees in the UK, the system is seen as fair as there is a funding formula for 
distributing teaching and research money and universities are adequately funded. However, 
the analysis shows there are issues affecting equity which are related to broader governance 
issues rather than funding alone, including: the system favours institutions that have done well 
in the past, based on unequal patterns of historical resource distribution, and that it might be 
unfair for new universities. Internally in UoB, uncertainty about the fairness of funding might 
arise from lack of transparency as it now lacks a funding formula.           
On QAS, the majority of interviewees in CU and UoB see that QAS are reasonably 
fair for HEIs, academics and students as they are all treated the same way. However, they 
have some similar concerns about the process. What is surprising about this finding is that the 
majority of respondents in both cases have the same perceptions of QAS although the system 
is well-established in the UK but quite new in Egypt.   
Whereas the majority of interviewees in CU see QAS as reasonably fair, they see it in 
need of improvement, including: concerns about the audit panels, most of whom are junior 
academics lacking managerial/administrative experience and limited experience of teaching 
and research; student feedback is not taken seriously by all students; participation in QAS is 
optional for academics; and administrative staff and students are not well involved. A group 
of 13 interviewees see QAS as unfair for several reasons: most external auditors were from 
small regional universities; auditors were unfair in their reports and concentrated on bad stuff; 
were sometimes very strict and other times lenient in auditing certain universities or faculties; 
the QA criteria are not well adapted to their context; and the system of student feedback is 
sometimes very subjective. Eight interviewees cannot decide whether QAS are fair or not as 
the culture of QA is quite new and many academics have not yet received a visit from an 
independent agency like NAQAAE. 
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In the UK, the system is seen as reasonably fair as it is transparent and all universities know 
its rules; students are well represented and their voice is heard; RAE is reasonably fair for 
assuring the quality of research; and QAS are fair in terms of ensuring the quality of teaching 
as all universities are treated the same way. However, they have some concerns about the 
QAA, most of which have been discussed in the efficiency section (section 8.4). They also 
have concerns about audit panels, the membership of which is reported to be mainly from new 
universities. A group of ten interviewees cannot decide whether QAS are fair or not as equity 
is a broad term which has several dimensions; QAS might be fair in some senses and unfair in 
others and what some people consider as fair might be criticized by others as unfair. Internally 
in UoB, there were no clear-cut answers on equity. Half of the respondents see IQAS as 
reasonably fair because BIQAES is transparent with much of the responsibility for managing 
quality in the hands of academics. However, they have concerns about the uniformity 
imposed by BIQAES, which are viewed as unhelpful. The other half of respondents cannot 
decide whether IQAS are fair or not as they might be fair in some respects, such as student 
representation systems but unfair in other respects, such as workload and promotion of 
academics.  
Some of the issues identified, here, are related to QAS while others are related to 
broader governance issues and cultural factors. The similarity of perceptions on QAS in both 
cases, in terms of being reasonably fair for HEIs, academics and students, is directly related to 
QAS as everyone is treated the same way. Moreover, the participation of British consultants 
in the establishment of QAS in Egypt might explain the similar concerns participants in both 
cases have about the process and audit panels (QAAP, 2007a). 
The issues and concerns identified in Egypt about audit panels might arise from the 
fact that the culture of QAS is new and the project is still in a transitional phase, needing more 
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time to build capacity through training more people with managerial experience and good 
experience of teaching and research. The concern about participation in QAS being optional 
for academics arises from the regulatory system developing the scheme of linking financial 
incentives to the performance of academics: their participation in QAS was used to increase 
academics‘ pay and enhance accountability. As the government does not have enough 
financial resources to increase pay for all academics through QAAP, academics‘ participation 
in QAS was meant to be optional. Fahim and Sami (2009) argued that the fact that 
participation in that scheme is optional for academics casts major doubts on its merit and 
whether it will actually have any impact on the performance of academics or the quality of 
education (Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression, 2008; Abo El-Naga, 2008). 
This is found to be the case as the general attitude of resentment and lack of cooperation 
towards this scheme may be due to cultural reasons. Concerns about the lack of involvement 
of administrative staff and students may also arise from the culture of QAS being new.  
Concerns about student feedback system not being taken seriously and sometimes 
being very subjective might arise from cultural factors, as students are not accustomed to a 
culture of feedback in earlier stages of their education. In addition, most do not believe their 
feedback would make any change, indicating students do not have trust in QAS. Moreover, a 
large number, especially in theoretical studies, do not attend regularly to be able to give 
feedback so it is not likely to be very reliable. The lack of adaptation of QA criteria to the 
Egyptian context might arise from the QA criteria being set at a higher standard/requirement 
than the capacity, resources and facilities of public universities, which is not the case in 
private universities, resulting in unfair competition. It may also be the case that the regulatory 
system impedes implementation of QAS, affirming that a ‗one-size fits all‘ policy does not 
work and QA criteria need to be adapted to context. This finding reflects Linn‘s (2003) 
argument that, while achieving a strong dialogue of accountability requires the setting of 
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ambitious performance standards and improvement targets, they must be ones that can 
reasonably be achieved given appropriate effort and available resources.          
In the UK, the language used to describe QAS as fair is related to transparency 
because all universities know the rules and are treated the same way, students are well 
represented and their voice is heard and the RAE is seen as reasonably fair. The concerns 
interviewees have about assuring the quality of teaching may arise from the cultural and 
regulatory environment where the emergence of QAS in higher education was based on lack 
of trust in professionals. This lack of trust has led to the adoption of new managerialism and 
quasi-market competition and more direct control through guidelines, standards and codes of 
practice. However, although QAA audits are seen as heavily paper work-driven, the game 
playing by ―ticking the box‖ and having a well prepared paper trail in place protects their core 
functions against external threats (Harvey and Newton, 2004). Nonetheless, QAS still puts 
extra pressure and workload on academics, diverting them from their core missions and this is 
perceived as unfair. Thus, while it is fair that universities should be accountable for the 
quality of their provision, ways of holding them accountable without the amount of time, 
money and effort required by QAS would be desirable. Thus, although interviewees agree that 
QAS are reasonably fair, they recommend it should be lighter touch and show more trust in 
professionals.  
Concerns about the audit panels, the members of which are mainly from post-1992 
universities, are based on the view that peer reviewers may fail to recognize that pre-1992 
universities have different approaches to teaching and research and give different weight to 
those activities than older universities. Thus, they recommend there should be a balance in the 
external audit teams to guarantee fairness.  
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The view that students are well represented and their voice is heard might go back, in 
part, to QAS‘ guidelines. However, it can be argued that they arise from cultural factors with 
the higher education environment becoming market-driven and this customer culture making 
universities more responsive to the needs of students, who are also becoming more 
demanding, especially as they carry an increasing share of the cost of their education. Thus, 
satisfying the needs of the customer/students becomes increasingly central to a more market-
driven environment. Internally in UoB, uncertainty about the fairness of IQAS might arise 
from the regulatory system, with the new college tier still in a transitional phase and also 
because equity is a broad term with several dimensions, as also reflected in the literature 
(David, 2004; Bevc and Ursi, 2008). Thus, the system might be fair in some senses and unfair 
in others and what some may consider fair may be criticised by others for unfairness. One of 
the good things reported about the fairness of IQAS in UoB is that much of the responsibility 
for ensuring quality of provision is in the hands of those who deliver and it is a characteristic 
of BIQAES that the best way of managing quality is by giving academics ownership of the 
process.  
The impact of quasi-markets and new managerialism on equity/fairness of the system 
is visible through the concerns interviewees in UoB have on the volume of time, money and 
effort QAS require; and the extra pressure and workload diverting academics from their core 
missions of teaching and research, all of which is perceived as unfair. While it is agreed that it 
is fair that universities should be accountable for the quality of their provision, there should be 
other ways of holding them accountable without the amount of time, money and effort QAS 
require. A preferred alternative would be making QAS lighter touch with greater trust in 
professionals. 
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Table  8.4: Equity in Higher Education in Egypt and the UK 
Funding Mechanisms Quality Assurance Systems 
Egypt The UK Egypt The UK 
*The majority, 24 interviewees, falls into the 
first group who cannot decide whether the 
funding system is fair or not.  
-they do not have enough information about the 
criteria of distributing funding among 
universities or faculties in the same university; 
-while they do not have enough information 
about the distribution of funding, they are sure 
that universities depend heavily on their self-
generated funds to cover poor public funding. 
*The second group, 12 interviewees, sees the 
funding system as unfair  
-it does not meet the real cost of teaching 
students which negatively affects the quality of 
provision; 
-there is no fair competition between public and 
private universities; 
-favoritism/lack of transparency. 
*The last group, 8 interviewees, sees it as quite 
fair 
-Distributing funding among different 
universities depends on the actual needs of 
universities and the available financial resources 
for the HE sector. 
-Although interviewees in this group agree that 
distributing funding among different universities 
is reasonably fair, in light of the available 
resources, they agree that it is inadequate and 
that universities depend heavily on their self-
generated funds.     
*Nationally 
*17 interviewees see that the funding system is 
reasonably fair  
-The system is transparent and HEIs are properly funded.  
-Although these interviewees agree that it is fair for 
research money to be distributed according to the quality 
of research outputs, they have some reservations: 
-the system in place favours institutions that have done 
well in the past; 
-the system might be unfair for new, post 1992, 
universities. 
*11 interviewees find it too difficult to decide whether 
the funding system is fair or not  
-lack of enough information on funding HE nationally; 
-equity is a broad concept which is too difficult to define 
and thus difficult to be judged; 
-funding might be fair in some senses and unfair in 
others. 
*Internally in UoB 
*The majority, of 18 interviewees, finds it quite difficult 
to decide whether or not the system is fair  
-the financial model in UoB is still new and not settled. 
*The second group of 5 interviewees sees the financial 
model in UoB as unfair  
-the financial model in UoB is unfair, as it is not 
transparent and disincentive. 
*The last group of 5 sees that it is reasonably fair 
-the financial model in UoB is reasonably fair as it can 
keep the whole institution alive.  
*The majority of interviewees, 19, sees QAS as 
reasonably fair 
-QAS are reasonably fair for HEIs, academics and 
students. 
*However, they also see that the system needs 
improvement and have some reservations:  
-the first reservation is about audit panels; 
-student feedback is not taken seriously by all 
students; 
-participation in QAS is optional for academics 
and administrative staff and students are not 
well involved. 
*13 interviewees see that QAS are unfair  
-the audit panels may not be fair in their reports 
and were concentrating on the bad stuff during 
their visits; 
-most external auditors (audit teams) were from 
small regional universities; 
-peer reviewers are sometimes very strict in 
auditing certain universities/faculties and lenient 
in others; 
-QA criteria are not well adapted to the Egyptian 
HE context; 
-the system of student feedback is unfair as it is 
sometimes very subjective.  
*8 interviewees find it too difficult to decide 
whether QAS are fair or not  
-the project is incomplete; 
-the culture of QA is new to HEIs in Egypt and 
that the project is in its transitional phase; 
-academics cannot decide if QAS are fair or not 
unless they receive an external visit from an 
independent agency like NAQAAE. 
*Nationally 
*The majority of interviewees, 18, sees  QAS   as reasonably fair 
-the system is transparent as all universities know the rules of the game; 
-QAS   are fair for students as they are well represented and their voice 
is heard; 
-RAE is perceived to be reasonably fair; 
-In terms of assuring the quality of teaching, they think that it is fair as 
all universities are treated the same way but they have some concerns 
about it: 
-QAA institutional audits are heavily paper work-driven; mainly game 
playing by ticking the box and having well prepared paper-work in place 
and universities learn how to play the game and can hide stuff which 
would not be to their credit during institutional audits; and the audit 
panels have been reported to be mainly from new universities.  
*The second group, 10 interviewees, finds it too difficult to decide 
whether QAS   are fair or not as equity is a broad term which includes 
several dimensions 
-QAS   might be fair in some senses and unfair in others. 
*Internally in UoB 
*Half of the respondents see that IQAS in UoB are reasonably fair for 
some reasons 
-BIQAES is transparent as all schools know how the system operates; 
-a lot of responsibility is placed in the hands of those who deliver. 
-Although they agreed that across the board, IQAS in UoB are reasonably 
fair, there are some concerns/worries about the sort of central 
uniformities which is viewed as pretty unhelpful. 
*The other half of respondents cannot decide whether IQAS in UoB are 
fair or not  
-QAS  might be fair in some senses and unfair in others;  
-BIQAES is fair for students as they are well represented and their voice is 
heard through the feedback system; 
-There are concerns about fairness in terms of workload and promotions 
of academics.   
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8.6 Concluding Remarks 
The above discussion shows that different funding mechanisms and QAS have variable 
impact on universities in terms of autonomy, accountability, efficiency and equity.   
However, it also was found that there are overlapping contextual factors of 
governance and culture that contribute to their impact and these are summarised in Table  8.5. 
The first set of factors is the way the wider regulatory framework - governance - influences 
the operation and effect of funding and QAS. In Egypt, the overly centralised system25 
burdened by an outmoded legislative framework of public sector administration, was found to 
have a serious impact on HEIs. This environment imposes excessive control over academic 
affairs, appointment of governing bodies and staff. Following public sector rules and 
practices, employment policies foster problems of staffing imbalances, promotion by years of 
service, poor pay and low productivity. This control and centralisation limits autonomy, 
flexibility, responsiveness, worsens the dialogue of accountability between universities and 
government and impedes strategic planning and management, both system-wide and by 
institutions (Said, 2001; World Bank, 2009; OECD and World Bank, 2010).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 The Egyptian higher education system is highly centralised, across segmented agencies and multiple layers of 
control, but it is not well planned. Legislative provisions have detailed specifications and various central 
agencies exercise highly interventionist powers over operational finer details (OECD and World Bank, 2010).   
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Table  8.5: Governance and Cultural Factors that Contribute to the Impact of Funding Mechanisms 
and QAS 
         Country             
Comparison     
Egypt The UK 
G
o
v
er
n
a
n
ce
 F
a
ct
o
rs
 
- The system is overly centralised. - The system is highly devolved/decentralised. 
- Universities are managed in the same 
regulatory environment as other parts of the 
public sector. 
- Universities are private institutions established as 
charities serving public benefit. 
- Universities are increasingly being run more like 
businesses. 
- Excessive control on academic affairs and on 
the appointment of governing bodies and staff. 
- No control on academic affairs or the appointment of 
governing bodies and staff. 
- Academic pay and promotion are based on 
seniority as they are treated as civil servants. 
- Academic pay and promotion are linked to 
performance. 
- Neither the quality of teaching nor the 
quality of research informs distribution of 
budgets among universities. 
- Quality of teaching does not impact distribution of 
funding whereas quality of research informs the 
distribution of QR money among universities. 
- Students pay very modest token registration 
fees and universities are not allowed to charge 
students higher tuition fees. 
- Universities are allowed to charge students higher 
tuition fees up to a certain cap decided by the 
government. 
- There is no competition between public 
universities as they have no say on the level of 
student recruitment and the nominal fees are 
the same in all universities. 
- Unfair competition between public and 
private universities due to the duality of 
criteria and policies governing higher 
education in Egypt.  
- There is a strong competition between universities in 
terms of student recruitment and variable tuition fees 
for postgraduate studies. 
- However, there are caps on student numbers and 
tuition fees for undergraduate students. 
C
u
lt
u
ra
l 
F
a
ct
o
rs
 
- The culture of the public sector/ Civil service 
inhibits innovation.   
- The culture of Quasi-markets encourages innovation. 
- Lack of trust between universities, 
government and the community.  
- Lack of trust in professionals to be self-regulating. 
- Great control over the system.  
- Direct control on student numbers and tuition fees 
and control on what universities do through QAS.  
- No competition. - Strong competition. 
- Universities are less responsive to the needs 
of students, employers and the community. 
 
- Universities are more responsive to the needs of 
students, employers and the community. 
 
- Rigid administrative accountability. - The customer culture & Market accountability. 
- All academics are on tenure track with very 
limited opportunities of movement between 
institutions. 
- Most academics are on open contracts and are able to 
move between institutions.  
- Weak accountability for academics. - Strong accountability for academics. 
- Student feedback system is not highly 
activated and sometimes is very subjective. 
- Students are well represented and their voice is heard. 
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Moreover, the system suffers from inefficient resource allocation mechanisms as 
budget allocations are not informed by sector policy or needs-based criteria. A more serious 
problem is that the tightly-controlled administrative system and rigid regulations provide 
insufficient incentives and flexibility for HEIs to use their limited resources more efficiently 
(Said, 2001; World Bank, 2002a; El-Baradei and El-Baradei, 2004; World Bank, 2009; 
OECD and World Bank, 2010) which, in turn, affects the quality of provision. Providing 
higher education free, even for failing students, and having no say on student intake also 
harms efficiency and equity as there is no competition between public universities. The 
duality of criteria and policies governing higher education in Egypt leave no space for fair 
competition between public and private universities.    
In the UK, by comparison, the system is highly decentralised as universities are 
private institutions/corporations established as charities serving public benefit. This regulatory 
framework allows universities a reasonable degree of autonomy to manage their academic 
affairs, appointment of their governing bodies and staff and pay and promotion, which are 
based on performance. Whereas the quality of research informs the distribution of QR money, 
the quality of teaching has no impact on the distribution of money and is why participants 
have recommended a link between the quality and funding so that there is more competition 
in teaching quality. Although there is strong competition between universities in terms of 
research money, student recruitment and variable tuition fees for post-graduate studies, the 
government still has a hand on HEIs through caps on student numbers and tuition fees for 
undergraduate students. However, there will be a shift towards variable undergraduate fees 
from 2012 based on the Browne‘s review of higher education funding and student finance 
(Browne, 2010) (published one year after completing the process of data collection). Thus, 
this regulatory system is found to enhance the autonomy of universities within a context of a 
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strong dialogue of accountability, providing incentives for efficiency and is also reasonably 
fair for HEIs, academics and students.    
The second set of factors relates to cultural context and influence governance. In 
Egypt, the culture of the public sector/civil service inhibits innovation and responsiveness of 
HEIs to the needs of students, employers and the community. There is lack of trust between 
universities, government and community. Whereas the culture provides security in terms of 
permanence of tenure to academics, it also leads to great control over the system, limiting 
autonomy and flexibility. It provides rigid administrative accountability, which neither puts 
outcomes into consideration nor provides incentives for efficiency, and provides weak or no 
accountability for academics, which negatively affects the quality of provision. The 
administrative control of public sector administration and lack of competition impedes 
responsiveness to changes in student demand and labour market needs, adding to the 
inefficiency of the system (OECD and World Bank, 2010). Student feedback system is not 
highly activated and sometimes very subjective as students are not accustomed to a feedback 
culture in earlier stages of their education and because most do not have trust in QAS.   
In the UK, cultural factors are prevalent in the loss of trust in professional integrity 
and how this has led to a range of changes, such as the competition embodied in quasi-
markets and was also accompanied with more direct control through caps on student numbers 
and tuition fees. The government also practiced control through standardisation, guidelines 
and codes of practice embodied in QAS. Thus, although the culture of quasi-market or market 
regulation allowed for innovation and stronger competition intended to make universities 
more responsive to the needs of students, employers and the community, there was also more 
direct control from the government. The quasi-market regulations allowed universities a 
reasonable amount of autonomy to manage their academic affairs and, on top of the layers of 
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administrative accountability provided by the government, market accountability, competition 
and the customer culture put students‘ satisfaction more at the centre of the higher education 
market.       
Thus, it is argued that funding mechanisms and QAS cannot be understood as stand-
alone ‗objective‘ phenomena as they are shaped and re-shaped by the regulatory and cultural 
environment. The analysis indicates that governance and cultural factors must also be 
understood as influencing autonomy, accountability, efficiency and equity.  
8.7 Conclusion 
The analysis and discussion were structured around the four themes which form the 
theoretical framework of the study. It is notable that on these themes, there are no significant 
differences in the perceptions of the different groups of senior managers, senior manager 
academics and academics in both cases. In Egypt, there is considerable agreement about the 
problems of funding mechanisms and QAS, most having clear answers on how funding and 
QAS affect the dialogue of accountability and autonomy. Views are less clear on efficiency 
and equity as they are seen as relative terms with several dimensions. Thus, funding 
mechanisms and QAS may be efficient and fair in some senses and inefficient and unfair in 
others, so what some consider as efficient and fair might be criticised by others as being 
inefficient and unfair.   
The perceptions of academics and administrators in Cairo University and University 
of Birmingham indicate that different forms of funding mechanisms and QAS have 
differential consequences for autonomy, accountability, efficiency and equity. However, it 
was also found that there are overlapping contextual factors of governance and culture that 
contribute to their impact. Thus, funding mechanisms and QAS cannot be understood as 
 261 
stand-alone ‗objective‘ phenomena as they are shaped and re-shaped by their regulatory and 
cultural environment. It also appears that, in relation to their significance and impact, there are 
contested perspectives between policy pronouncements and the experience of those working 
in the sector. While it may be argued that a successful funding mechanism and QAS 
should achieve a good balance between autonomy and accountability and between efficiency 
and equity, the evidence from this study suggests the balance is closer in the UK than Egypt.  
The implications of these for policy, practice and further research is considered in the 
final chapter.  
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9 CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION  
THE WAY AHEAD: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND 
PRACTICE  
9.1 Introduction 
This study sought to address five research questions.  
- Evidence on the first research question, What is an appropriate theoretical framework 
for examining the impact of funding and quality assurance systems on higher 
education?, was presented in chapter two.  
- Evidence on the second research question, How do funding mechanisms affect higher 
education in Egypt and the UK?, was presented in chapters three, six and eight.  
- Evidence on the third research question, How do Quality Assurance Systems affect 
higher education in Egypt and the UK?, was presented in chapters four, seven and 
eight.  
- This chapter provides evidence on the remaining research questions. Sections 9.2 and 
9.3 provide evidence on the fourth research question, In the context of findings from 
the empirical enquiry, what are the implications for funding and quality assurance 
systems of higher education in Egypt?, whereas evidence on the fifth research 
question, How do these implications meet key goals related to autonomy, 
accountability, efficiency and equity?, is presented in section 9.4.         
Based on the analysis and discussion of key findings in chapter eight, this chapter draws out 
their emergent implications for policy and practice. It is followed by a discussion on the value 
of a comparative perspective, a review of the strengths and limitations of the study and ideas 
for future research are presented. The chapter ends with some personal reflections.   
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The analysis has revealed problems of Egyptian higher education in terms of autonomy, 
accountability, efficiency and equity. These have been observed through an examination of 
financial mechanisms and quality assurance systems. Arising from this analysis, however, has 
been the recognition that governance and the cultural environment also influence how finance 
and QAS function. In terms of implications for policy and practice, what does this mean? 
It means that funding and QAS need to be altered and developed in ways that also 
address governance and culture and this chapter proposes a set of pilot projects to be trialled 
in a range of universities - old, regional and new - to test the feasibility and build support for 
change. Such pilots, ‗pathfinders‘, may then show the benefits of certain changes as well as 
learning what does and does not work and the required adaptations, if any. It is worth 
mentioning that funding mechanisms would need major changes as they were found to have a 
serious negative impact on universities whereas QAS would need incremental changes at 
present, as the culture of quality assurance is new to HEIs in Egypt and QAS are still in a 
transitional phase.   
While the study has identified several fundamental problems in the system that need to 
be addressed, the chosen approach is to suggest realistic ways forward in the form of pilot 
projects on: evolving a funding formula; cost-sharing; staffing; student representation systems 
and capacity building and training. 
9.2 Pathfinders: Pilot Projects 
9.2.1 Evolving a Funding Formula 
Having identified the severe negative impact of line-item funding on autonomy, 
accountability, efficiency and equity, replacing it with a block grant system would be 
appropriate. The proposal is justified by the positive impact of a block grant system on 
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institutional autonomy, the dialogue of accountability, efficiency and equity in the UK. It is 
also justified by the literature on the positive impact of block grant systems on resolving 
rigidities and inefficiencies in the public sector in different countries (Johnstone et al., 1998; 
Cheung, 2003; Jongbloed, 2004; Salerno, 2005; Jongbloed et al., 2008b) such as the 
significant reforms in higher education finance introduced in China including replacing line 
item budgets with block grants, letting HEIs to decide how to spend funds according to their 
own priorities. The Government exercised only audit and supervisory functions to ensure 
universities were accountable for the appropriate utilization of public resources (World Bank, 
1997; 1998).       
An option is to trial this system with a small number of universities, possibly Cairo 
University and one small regional university to test feasibility and build support for change. 
A block grant should be given to universities based on a funding formula for teaching and 
research to make the distribution of budgets among different universities more transparent.  
- For teaching, money could be based on the number of enrolled students across 
different subject bands, based on the estimated/actual cost of teaching different 
subjects.   
- Research money could be allocated through the Higher Education Enhancement 
Project (HEEP) competitive fund in combination with a performance-based funding 
mechanism -for investment projects- to raise competition between universities to 
produce cutting-edge research outputs and to promote priority policy objectives (as 
recommended by OECD and World Bank, 2010, in their review of higher education in 
Egypt). In the long run, there is a need to have a process for evaluating the quality of 
research outputs and allocate money accordingly. 
- An institution‘s block grant should also take into consideration three additional 
criteria: activities and money raised from other sources; an average of the institution‘s 
expenditure over the last three years to help setting expenditure level; and the 
institution‘s mission, aims and objectives.  
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Data on what the distribution decisions are based upon should be published as a means of 
building trust between HEIs, the government and society.    
These proposals require changing the steering paradigm of governance and finance in 
Egypt with the government devolving more responsibility to universities within a framework 
of accountability and agreed targets. Universities participating in this pilot study will also 
need to build capacity for effective and responsible self-management for their greater 
responsibilities. They should also be allowed to allocate resources according to their internal 
policies/their own priorities and be able to carry any budget surpluses into the following fiscal 
year. This would enhance the efficiency of the system as universities would have an incentive 
for efficiency gains through rationalising spending and being more cost-effective. Sharing this 
experience and the information generated with representatives from other universities and 
subject leaders could contribute to a more informed debate on how to decide upon suitable 
funding formulae and structures and processes of financial accountability. 
However, it should be noted that while replacing line item funding with block grants 
will have a positive impact on the system, it is found in the literature that block grants, as a 
form of autonomy, only increases the flexibility of internal funding allocation and the 
discretionary authority of managers. To gain institutional autonomy, as against internal 
autonomy, requires increased self-reliance in funding so that universities can pursue diverse 
missions without the same level of accountability and to reduce the overdependence on 
Government funds (Kaiser et al., 2001; Jongbloed, 2004).      
9.2.2 Cost-Sharing 
The cost of funding higher education in Egypt has several major problems, the principal 
issues being its: inadequacy, inefficiency and inequity, that most of university students come 
from the rich/middle class (Farag, 1999; Fahim and Sami, 2009; OECD and World Bank, 
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2010) and participation rates are likely to rise from 28% to 35% between 2006-2021. Thus, 
Egypt faces the problem of making trade-offs between the desire to expand the system and the 
problem of declining spending per student with its consequent threat to quality. These factors 
contribute to the view that the costs of higher education should be shared between taxpayers, 
graduates, students and their families, employers and other stakeholders as it is a worthwhile 
investment for both individuals and society (Johnstone et al., 1998; Barr, 2004a; Cheung, 
2003; Greenway and Haynes, 2003; Johnstone, 2004a, 2006; Vossensteyn, 2004; Salerno, 
2005; Woodhall, 2007; Johnstone and Marcucci, 2007; OECD, 2010a). Without such a 
change, the choice lies between rationing the number of students or allowing a decline of 
instructional quality. Thus, there is a need for sustainable diversified resources to finance 
expansion and improvement in a sustainable manner without compromising quality.  
The difficulty with change in this area is that charging fees in Egypt is one of the 
taboos and cost recovery is seen as unconstitutional and a violation of citizen rights. Thus, 
introducing a  system of cost-sharing will take time and is why the current study starts by 
proposing three pilot projects to be trialled in a few universities to test workability and, 
possibly more important, build support for change26. 
9.2.2.1 Charging Repeaters 
The first pilot project is focused on rationalizing the policy of free higher education which 
allows all eligible students to join higher education for free for the first year and continuing to 
be free for successful students. Failing - repeating - students should be charged 50% of the 
actual cost of the subject or programme when they fail the first time and full cost if they fail a 
                                                 
26
 Considerable attention should be given to winning public acceptance, understanding and support. One lesson 
of the international experience is that even the best models of cost-sharing will fail if the justification and 
advantages are not adequately communicated to students, their families, staff of HEIs and the wider community 
(Woodhall and Richards, 2006).  
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second time. This would enhance efficiency by encouraging students to make better 
enrolment decisions from the beginning based on their aims, abilities and interests and 
encourage them to finish their degrees on time (Johnstone, 2004a). Thus, the principle of 
equal opportunities is not compromised and higher education is still provided free for those 
who deserve it instead of wasting scarce financial resources on failing students. 
This proposal is consistent with Helal‘s (ex-minister of higher education) perception 
of how higher education should be funded as he stated "how can the university continue to 
provide education free of charge for a student who fails to obtain his degree in 10 years? Free 
education should not mean waste or open-ended opportunities" (Khalid, 2010b).     
This proposal is feasible especially in the light of having the external examiner system 
well established under the QAAP and its success requires fair and transparent systems of 
student evaluation. Universities participating in this pilot project should make sure that 
students get consistent treatment through fair assessment  and academics must ensure fairness 
is across the board by examining students, marking exam sheets, double checking and 
moderation. The external examiner system should be activated to ensure students receive 
equal treatment across the board. It also should be supported with an appeal system.  
The downside of such scheme is that it might not be fair for students joining those 
universities where the project is piloted to pay fees when they fail a certain 
subject/programme whereas students in other universities still study free of charge. However, 
the upside of trailing the project in a couple of universities to test workability and build 
support for change outweighs the risk of applying it across the whole system. To avoid the 
downside of this scheme, students might be given choice to join those universities or not and, 
if other students are interested in joining those universities, they can be allowed to apply 
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directly to those universities, rather than applying through the Admission Office of Egyptian 
Universities.                
9.2.2.2 Internationalization 
The second project is focused on the internationalization of higher education through 
establishing more partnerships between Egyptian public universities and accredited foreign 
universities to award joint international degrees in exchange for high fees to be shared 
between the partners. A good example is the Partnership between the Faculty of Commerce at 
Cairo University and Robinson College of Business at Georgia State University which 
commenced early 2007 to offer the Undergraduate Programme in Business27. The study 
recommends extending those partnerships to different universities as a way of attracting more 
international students to study in Egyptian universities, diversifying sources of funding and 
enhancing the quality of provision and the competitiveness of graduates in a global market.    
Another option for internationalization is recruiting more international students. One 
option is to develop postgraduate studies and academic research through establishing research 
universities or certain faculties/departments which are mainly for postgraduate studies with 
the introduction of new specializations (programmes/courses) that attract students from other 
Arab countries. 
9.2.2.3 Egyptian Higher Education Contribution scheme  
A third pilot project is to introduce income contingent loans as a means of assuring access and 
greater equality of opportunity, as higher education would still be free at the point of access 
because it would be graduates not students who pay (Barr, 2003; Barr, 2004a; Garcia-
Penalosa and Waldet, 2000; Greenway and Haynes, 2003; Barr, 2005; Barr and Crawford, 
                                                 
27 - Business Education Project Georgia State University and Cairo University (2007a; 2007b)  
    - American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt (2008)  
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2005; Chapman and Rayan, 2005). The study recommends this project to be called Egyptian 
Higher Education Contribution Scheme (EHECS) where higher education is still free at the 
point of access and graduates make a contribution to support adequately funding universities. 
The title of EHECS would be more acceptable as there is a cultural attitude uncomfortable 
with personal debt and loans. This proposal could be trialled in selected Faculties of 
Engineering or Medicine as graduates of such faculties have greater likelihood of securing 
jobs, providing insurance for repaying loans. The second reason is the ease and feasibility of 
convincing students in such faculties that paying a fair share of the cost of their education will 
help maintain and improve the quality of provision through up-to-date laboratories and 
equipment, libraries, greater contact hours, a reasonable student/staff ratio and updating 
curricular aligned with the market needs. The success of such project will require: 
- deciding tuition fees for different fields (Medicine and  Engineering in the first 
instance for the purpose of this project); 
- collecting accurate and up-to-date data on rates of return of graduate earnings in 
different fields to help decide and review fees accordingly; 
- the government should pay the tuition fees for the participating universities/faculties 
to fund enhanced provision; and 
- developing an efficient mechanism for collecting repayments, e.g. as a payroll 
deduction alongside income tax.          
Finally, the Government should devise a programme of need-based scholarships and student 
loans to support access by able students from low socio-economic backgrounds. This will 
help expand access to students from low socio-economic strata (Fahim and Sami, 2009). 
The extra resources generated from these pilot projects would be spent on enhancing 
the quality of provision and providing grants for students from disadvantaged backgrounds 
and thus help widening participation of HE, which is fairer and more efficient than providing 
HE free for all. Moreover, it would also make universities more accountable and more 
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responsive to students‘ concerns for quality as was found in the UK, where the customer 
culture has made universities more responsive to issues of quality.    
9.2.3 Staffing 
9.2.3.1 Academic pay 
Poor academic pay is contributing to low job satisfaction and a weak dialogue of 
accountability between academics, universities and government. A project to address this 
problem requires additional funds but also clear expectations of what academics should do in 
response to better pay. Thus, financial incentives and promotion should be linked to the 
performance of academics, particularly the quality of their teaching and research and their 
active engagement with the community, as well as generating funds. This would replace 
payment based on years of service, raise competition and drive up quality. The project would 
also set reasonable workload with less time for teaching and more time for research with 
professional development programmes and training for academics. 
The universities participating in this project would hold academics accountable for achieving 
agreed targets in areas such as: 
- getting papers published in top journals;  
- improving the quality of teaching; 
- developing curricula;  
- setting appropriate contact hours with students; 
- evaluating students in appropriate ways; 
- introducing quality assurance systems; 
- doing certain administrative work; 
- generating research income; 
- participating in national and international conferences; 
- and serving the surrounding community. 
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The government would need to provide additional funds to universities participating in this 
project and they will need systems for monitoring and evaluating the performance of 
academics so as to be able to link incentives with performance. These proposals are consistent 
with recommendations given by Said (2001); OECD and World Bank (2010). 
Academic pay should also reflect a balance between rights and duties. Achieving that 
balance would encourage academics to be innovative and creative in their work and assist 
develop a sound system of accountability, where quality could be achieved inherently. The 
evidence for this implication is the comparison of commitment by the same academics 
working in public and private universities, as reported earlier.  
9.2.3.2 Staff appointments 
Having found that limits on academic affairs and control of senior academic appointments 
have a negative impact on universities, a pilot project is proposed on allowing universities 
greater autonomy in the appointment of governing bodies and staff. 
The project would allow a couple of universities to be governed by a Board of 
Trustees with authority to oversee academic and operational affairs according to their mission 
and subject to appropriate accountabilities. This proposal is consistent with OECD and World 
Bank (2010) recommendations on allowing more flexible arrangements for universities, such 
as that given to the Suranaree University of Technology in Thailand which was given the 
designation of a ―public autonomous university‖ and receives a lump sum budget from the 
national government with discretion over the use of resources and is self-governing in terms 
of its personnel, operating outside the civil service. 
In the project, limited responsibilities would be delegated to these Board of Trustees 
concerning staff appointments and their evaluation, setting compensation for and power of 
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dismissal of senior staff with appointment, promotion, transfer, compensation and dismissal 
of all other academic staff. Appointments should be based on advertising vacant posts to 
enable fair competition between eligible applicants with decisions based on qualifications and 
relevant experiences rather than years of service. This would make the system more 
transparent and help enhance efficiency and the quality of provision by appointing the right 
person. It will also enhance equity with a more transparent system. OECD (2008) advocates 
that the transparency of these processes should be given particular attention, such as open 
competition for positions, selection on merit and external assessors for senior positions.   
Participating universities will need to build capacity for self-management and the 
government should provide resourcing for capacity building.        
9.2.4 Student Representation Systems 
Having found that student feedback system is not taken sufficiently seriously, a project on 
student representation and feedback systems is proposed.  
This project proposes empowering students through devising a sound student 
representation system where students are well represented at consultative groups and at 
quality assurance committees at all levels across the university. This system will allow the 
voice of students to be heard by feeding information on their learning and teaching experience 
to module tutors, programme coordinators and directors of studies. 
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Students should be trained on giving feedback and there should also be additional training at 
the university level to build trust between students, academics and the university28. Students 
will need evidence that their feedback is important and makes a real difference.  
A similar mechanism to the National Student Survey (NSS), adopted in the UK, can 
be introduced to provide information for potential customers (students and their parents) and 
enhance their choice decisions and to work as a market accountability mechanism for 
universities. It would raise competition between universities and make them more responsive 
to students‘ needs, driving up the quality of provision. 
An option is to trial this project with the same selected universities participating in the 
previous pilot projects where there would be big governance and cultural changes in the 
system. Building on this, students should also be represented in Boards of Trustees. All these 
changes would facilitate projects for cost-sharing as students will be getting higher quality 
provision. This is consistent with Goastellec‘s (2005) argument that implementing cost-
sharing never happens alone but is part of wider reforms of the higher education system. 
Indeed, higher education policies are path dependant so that their timing and sequencing are 
critical influences (Pierson, 2000). As a result, most tuition fee changes occur after a change 
of national government (e.g. UK, Vietnam, South Africa…). Thus, the current time of 
sweeping change in Egypt, after the revolution of 25 January, is the right time for 
implementation.                  
                                                 
28
 It can be argued that the recent ruling of police removal from Cairo University and replacing them with 
university employed civilian guards can be the starting point of independence of universities (Khalid, 2010c). 
Based on that ruling, there would be more freedom for students to participate in elections, establish societies and 
university newspapers without fear of repression by the police. Universities should make good use of this ruling 
by empowering students through sound representation and feedback systems. 
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9.2.5 Capacity Building and Training    
To achieve the proposed pilot projects and develop people for the governance and cultural 
changes that are needed, attention should be given to staff development and training. Thus, 
the study proposes a project on capacity building and training for academic and administrative 
staff in the same selected universities.  
This project is aimed at enabling universities become responsible for self-management with 
professional development of faculty and staff in different aspects: 
- understanding and managing budgets; 
- organisation and self-management; 
- monitoring and reviewing the quality of programmes; 
- teaching methods; 
- curriculum development; 
- research capabilities; 
- writing good research proposals; 
- research bids; 
- improving the students‘ university experience; 
- academic support for students; and 
- assessment and feedback. 
This project is consistent with OECD and World Bank (2010) view that capacity building is 
essential for institutions to receive increased autonomy.  
Moreover, the establishment of sustainable quality assurance systems and continuing 
enhancement in universities also requires continuous investment in capacity building and 
training. To address the concerns participants have about the fairness of institutional audits 
and audit panels, many of which have been undertaken by junior lecturers from regional 
universities, NAQAAE should build capacity through training more qualified 
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reviewers/auditors with managerial/administrative experience as well as good experience of 
teaching and research. The criteria for choosing peer reviewers should be transparent.  
The study recommends having a fixed committee of peer reviewers for each discipline 
to review all faculties within that discipline as a means of guaranteeing fairness. 
Consideration should be given to having diverse audit panel teams to make sure they are not 
mainly from old/big universities or from new/regional universities. There should be a balance 
in the external audit panels to guarantee fairness of the audit reports. 
9.3 Further Implications for Policy and Practice  
The proposed pilot projects can only be effective when the infrastructure for governance is fit 
for purpose and, in the meantime, existing laws and regulations suspended for the pilots. This 
is only a temporary arrangement as there are several fundamental problems that need 
addressing. It is worth mentioning that while the pilot projects are meant to address certain 
problems in the system, there are other fundamental problems that need to be addressed and, 
here, contemporary events must be considered.    
The first conference for the movement of ―academics for reform‖ was held on Friday 
15
th
 of April, 2011 in Cairo University in the presence of around a thousand academics from 
different universities to discuss the stability of universities after the revolution. The 
conference discussed several proposed reforms, the most important of which are: the 
independence of universities, modifying universities regulatory act/law, new mechanisms for 
the selection of university leaders through direct elections, increasing public funding for 
universities and enhancing academic pay (Academics for Reform, 2011a). The most 
surprising thing is the selection of the first dean of school of Medicine, Sohag University 
through election even before approving the proposed reforms by the conference or modifying 
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universities regulatory act/law (Sohagonline, 2011). This shows that the coming period may 
well witness remarkable change in higher education29.    
In the context of the opportunity for sweeping changes after the Egyptian Revolution 
of 25 January, the study identifies the following implications for policy and practice, some for 
the short run and others for the medium and long run. Some are concerned with governance 
and cultural issues and others with funding and QAS.        
9.3.1 Regulatory and Cultural Environment      
Having found that universities regulatory act/law and its executive regulations impede the 
implementation of current reforms, it needs to be adapted. Committees of the SCU, PMU and 
appropriate experts can work on this issue and, in consultation with academics, facilitate some 
key changes. The modifications should facilitate the following implications in the medium 
and long run, drawing on the lessons learned from the proposed pilot projects and their 
evaluation.  
Building on the foundations of Quality Assurance and Assessment projects, the 
government should devolve more academic, administrative and financial autonomy to 
accredited HEIs- particularly in matters of student selection, programme offerings, curricula 
and enrolments; staff appointment, promotion and remuneration; internal allocation of 
resources and carrying over budget surpluses into the following fiscal year - as HEIs are 
believed to be more effective in achieving their mission if they benefit from autonomy in the 
                                                 
29 A recent decision to replace the current heads of public universities and college deans has been issued by the 
Egyptian government. This decision has drawn angry reaction from these leaders, who deny having political 
links with the former regime. And academics have vowed to continue protesting until further demands are met 
(Khalid, 2011a; Sawahel, 2011). In response to academics‘ demands, the vice-chancellor, pro-vice-chancellors 
and all deans of faculties in Cairo University have resigned on 21/08/2011 (Academics for Reform, 2011b) and 
three other universities did the same so several of Egypt's 19 public universities prepare to elect their leaders for 
the first time (Khalid, 2011b).    
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area of human resource management. This implication is consistent with recommendations by 
NCERD (2008), OECD (2008) and OECD and World Bank (2010). However, this greater 
autonomy should be accompanied by appropriate accountability and agreed targets according 
to universities‘ mission, vision and objectives. In this context, the government should take the 
role of supervision rather than having more intervention in universities‘ affairs and national 
legislation should be on principles rather than specific processes. This should also facilitate 
moving universities from the status of state agencies or state-controlled institutions to state-
aided institutions or public corporations organised for public purposes (OECD and World 
Bank, 2010; Jongbloed, 2008a).     
Developing a unified legislation for HEIs to allow fair competition between public and 
private universities through providing a single framework for competition. If both public and 
private universities are required to provide high quality graduates who can compete in the 
labour market, the government should allow fair competition between them either by 
providing public universities with funding which reflects the actual cost of teaching or 
allowing them to charge students tuition fees which reflect a reasonable share of the actual 
cost of their education.  
9.3.2 Funding 
To address the issues of inadequate funding, poor infrastructure, poor academic pay, and 
massive numbers of students, consideration - in the medium and long run - should be given to 
increasing the share of education as a percentage of GDP with a proportional increase in the 
share of HE to accommodate the increasing needs of HEIs, the greater demand for higher 
education, enhance academic pay and provide sustainable resources to support QAS.  
In line with OECD and World Bank (2010) recommendations, consideration should be 
given to a one-off major capital injection and capacity building investment programme to be 
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implemented over the decade 2010-20, preceding the next demographically-driven enrolment 
surge into post-secondary education. The focus of such a programme could be on upgrading 
the material base of the public institutions, including their buildings, libraries and teaching 
and research equipment, as well as curriculum renewal and management improvement. 
To address the issue of greater demand for HE and demographic pressures, there 
should be well-planned expansion in private non-profit universities and Technical Education 
to complement public efforts to cater for the planned enrolment growth. Concurrently, the 
government should be attempting to use the mass media to inform people about the 
importance of these institutions and challenge the negative connotations people have about 
them as most private universities are perceived by many as institutions that ‗sell degrees to 
those who can afford them‘ and technical education is perceived by many as no more than 
‗academic parking lots‟ for surplus students (El Sebai, 2006) so that technical education 
graduates are perceived as inferior to their peers in universities. Moreover, there should be 
more investment in e-learning, beyond focusing on web-based teaching material. This can be 
achieved through having more interactive material and developing online evaluation and 
feedback systems to maximize the benefits of e-learning and reduce pressure on the 
overcrowded public universities. 
9.3.3 Quality Assurance Systems 
Good QAS should provide autonomy for HEIs to decide their own mission, policies, and 
objectives and, through that autonomy, hold HEIs accountable to all stakeholders. To achieve 
this, there is a need to develop new forms of accountability through reporting on performance 
and outcomes, as well as institutionally set targets for quality and performance. This is 
reflected in recent reports which advocate that universities should develop and work towards 
strategic visions to ensure that quality assurance systems serve both enhancement and 
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accountability purposes and approach a good balance between them (OECD, 2010a; OECD 
and World Bank, 2010). Moreover, there should be more trust in professionals through 
making quality assurance processes lighter touch as found in the literature and reported in the 
field work in both Egypt and the UK. Academics should have ownership of managing the 
quality of provision by engaging them in the process, decision making and problem solving.  
As a ‗one-size fits all‘ policy does not seem to work in higher education, there is a 
need to adapt QA criteria/regulations to suit the nature of different universities and faculties. 
It is neither efficient nor fair to apply the same QA criteria for both public and private 
universities because of the differences between them in terms of funding, infrastructure, the 
number of students and academic pay.  QAS should also not be so standardized/regimented as 
to restrict academics‘ creativity and the dynamics of teaching students. Thus, the system 
should encourage diversity rather than uniformity. 
Although it has been reported that QAAP has been successful in raising awareness of 
the culture of quality assurance, there is a continuing need to raise the awareness and 
involvement of academics, students, administrative staff and other stakeholders in many 
elements of the new QAS until they become part of the system and are reflected in everyday 
activities.  
Having laid the necessary groundwork for quality assurance systems, work remains to 
be done in moving beyond compliance to a quality culture. It should also be made clear that 
paper work is a means to facilitate institutional audits, not an end by itself. Raising awareness 
and embedding the quality assurance culture in the system should be an institutional 
responsibility of universities. 
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Having found that NARS have been developed in only ten academic sectors, more efforts 
should be exerted to develop NARS in the remaining sectors as soon as possible to provide 
the foundation for establishing internal quality assurance systems in the faculties and facilitate 
external audits for accreditation purposes. There is also a need to extend lessons learned in 
introducing quality assurance systems for undergraduate to postgraduate programmes. 
9.4 How These Implications Fit the Theoretical Framework of the Study 
Concerning the fifth research question of the study: How do these implications meet key goals 
related to autonomy, accountability, efficiency and equity? The proposed implications for 
policy and practice in Egypt are supposed to reform the system in ways which allow a level of 
autonomy for universities and academics so that they can do their job properly and be more 
responsive to the needs of students, employers and the community. They are to allow a 
stronger dialogue of accountability between the government, universities, academics, students 
and other stakeholders; make the system more efficient through incentives for efficiency gains 
and improvement; and making it fairer by having a transparent funding formula with more 
efficient and equitable cost-sharing and a fair and robust QAS. 
To sum up, it can be argued that the theoretical framework of the study - autonomy, 
accountability, efficiency and equity - has contributed effectively to the analysis, leading to its 
key findings and proposing implications for policy and practice.    
9.5 The Value of a Comparative Perspective  
The study drew upon wider international experience of higher education reform and examined 
their implications for Egypt and, for the insights from a comparative perspective, also the HE 
system in the UK. However, it is not a comparative study where both parts of the comparison 
are of equal importance. The purpose of the UK case study was to illuminate issues so as to 
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better assist the analysis of the Egyptian system. This section discusses how including the UK 
in the study helped the researcher develop his understanding of the Egyptian system and how 
it might be reformed.   
Including the UK in the study has been helpful to the enquiry into the Egyptian system 
in several aspects. As mentioned in the introduction and methodology chapters, one of the 
main reasons for choosing the UK is that HEIs are funded through block grants mechanism, 
contrasting with line-item funding in Egypt which many reports have recommended replacing 
with a block grant system to allow universities more autonomy and flexibility (Said, 2001, 
Fahim and Sami, 2009; OECD and World Bank, 2010). The value of in-depth investigation of 
the UK case is that I have found that the UK has a mixed economy of mechanisms (block 
grants, performance-based funding (RAE), competitive funding (RCUK), tuition fees and 
income contingent loans) with the bulk allocated as block grants, one for teaching and another 
for research. Moreover, the regulatory and cultural environment with universities treated as 
public corporations affects how those funding mechanisms work and add to their impact. 
What this means for Egypt is that replacing line-item funding with block grant is not a 
solution by itself. Unless the legislative context is altered, block grants alone would not end 
tight control and allow universities sufficient autonomy and flexibility. Thus, it has more to 
do with the regulatory and cultural environment which needs to be adapted to allow 
universities more autonomy and flexibility, have proper accountability systems and make it 
more efficient and more equitable. That is why several pilot projects and their implications on 
funding and the regulatory and cultural environment have been provided in this chapter. Had 
the researcher confined his study on reviewing the literature on global trends/reforms of 
funding higher education, he might not have come to the same conclusion and would have 
lost the insights from the comparative perspective.   
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Another benefit of in-depth study of the UK is that when considering options for reforming 
the system in Egypt, one should make good use of the reported problems in the UK. For 
instance, it is not just the case of building the funding formula for teaching based on student 
numbers and subject bands; as it alone would not solve the problem because in-depth 
investigation on the UK system shows it is not that straightforward. One of the main reported 
concerns in the UK case is the issue of unequal patterns of historical resource distribution 
which is viewed as a serious issue in distributing teaching and research funds, nationally and 
internally in UoB. Thus, while considering options for Egypt, attention should be given to the 
actual costs of teaching different subjects which should be considered through evidence-based 
investigation rather than historical resource distribution.          
The second reason for choosing the UK is that British consultants have been involved 
in establishing QAS in higher education in Egypt (QAAP, 2007a) and thus QAS have many 
similarities with the system in the UK. Thus, identifying the perceptions of UK participants 
on how QAS affect universities is thought to be helpful as QAS are well-established in the 
UK whereas they are still new in Egypt. So, when considering options for reforming the 
system in Egypt, attention has been given to the reported concerns on QAS for ensuring the 
quality of teaching in the UK. For instance, bearing in mind the reported concerns about QAS 
in terms of being very time and resource intensive and mainly concerned with accountability, 
the implication for Egypt is that both external and internal quality assurance systems should 
find balance between the two core objectives/functions, accountability and enhancement. 
More attention should be given to improving the actual quality of teaching rather than the 
processes and paper work which risk becoming an end in themselves. Having found that ‗one-
size fits all‘ policy does not work in the higher education context, both EQAS and IQAS 
should encourage more diversity rather than uniformity and regimentation, which are 
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perceived to be harmful to the whole system. It is enhancement of the quality of provision that 
really matters rather than compliance.         
Last, but not least, a very important aspect of in-depth study of the UK is the 
discussion about markets and trust. Although the emergence of quasi-markets in higher 
education was based on lack of trust in professionals to be self-regulating, the competition 
embodied in the quasi-market, the customer culture and market accountability made 
universities more responsive to the needs of students, employers and the community. Having 
found that market accountability matters more for universities than the several layers of 
administrative accountability provided by the government, it is recommended that QAS 
should be lighter touch and there should be more trust in academics for two main reasons. 
Firstly, the layers of accountability, different methods of audits, do not get under the skin of 
an institution and thus universities can hide the few things that would not be to their credit 
during institutional audits. Secondly, it is academics who do the teaching, evaluation and 
research as well as generating research income. Thus, there should be more trust in them as 
trust breeds trust and can save much of the time, money and effort spent on quality assurance 
processes. Moreover, managing academics is best done by giving them ownership of the 
process and engaging them in quality assurance and identifying solutions to any problems. 
Thus, the government should develop an accountability system which enhances rather than 
diminishes professionalism.  
The value of the British case study is that it illuminated those things and, therefore, in 
terms of reforming the system in Egypt, it is important not to go so far in the direction of 
markets and market accountability as has been reported in the UK; there is a need to have a 
lighter touch audit system, to generate market information for quasi-markets, accompanied by 
more trust in professionals and professional accountability.   
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9.6 Recommendations for Future Research 
The value of studies of this kind is that they not only provide evidence on specific research 
questions but the outcomes raise issues relevant for further enquiry.  
Many academics teaching in both public and private universities in Egypt take the view that 
private universities rather than providing the highest quality environments provide a less 
demanding environment for students. Thus, an investigation about the relationship between 
fees of private universities, the quality of provision and the value students get for their money 
would test the perception that many private universities ‗sell degrees to those who can afford 
them‘.   
As part of improving the impact of QAS on the quality of teaching and research in Egypt HE, 
a project on factors influencing their impact would be beneficial.   
An enquiry on indicators of improvement for assessing the quality of programmes, research 
activity, community involvement and the quality of teaching and learning would contribute to 
further development of management indicators for QAS. 
Building on the pilot project on EHECS, further research on investigating the launching of a 
student loans programme is needed.  
Drawing on the lessons learned from the pilots, further enquiry is needed into the growing 
segmentation within public institutions, between students who study free-of-charge and those 
who pay fees in various forms, such as foreign language programmes and dual track 
programmes - and how it affects social disparities (OECD and World Bank, 2010). Better 
understanding of these issues may assist policies on access and widening participation.   
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Professional first degrees such as engineering and medicine in Egyptian universities are 
generally one year and often two years longer than similar degrees in North America or some 
European countries. This represents a major social cost and an investigation is needed of the 
costs and benefits that arise from this additional year (OECD and World Bank, 2010).  
An investigation of the average requirements for academics - in light of the high inflation of 
prices in Egypt - should be conducted to decide a new scale of salaries through evidence-
based research.  
An investigation of the actual costs of teaching different subjects and how these differ 
between universities to help decide funding for different subject bands is desirable. 
Finally, as the pilot projects will be evaluated, they are themselves sources of further research 
evidence.    
9.7 Strengths and Limitations of the Study 
A strength of this study is its originality as the first in-depth empirical study covering such 
crucial issues of funding and quality assurance mechanisms in two different contexts and 
investigating their impact on autonomy, accountability, efficiency and equity. The 
methodology adopted is also a strength as its relatively open-ended method and large sample 
of 76 interviewees in two sites allowed several important issues to be considered in depth. It 
showed the value of a qualitative approach in understanding the ‗inside‘ of an issue. 
The ‗insider researcher‘ position is a third strength as the researcher went into the field 
with a good background about the problems facing higher education in Egypt and the reforms 
taking place in the sector, especially in terms of funding and quality assurance systems. This 
enabled the researcher to pursue and probe for novel and relevant information through 
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additional questions during the interviews. As an assistant lecturer in one of the public 
universities in Egypt, it also contributed to an openness and honesty from respondents during 
the interviews as this helped build trust and rapport with interviewees and facilitated the 
expression of views.        
A weakness is having only one case study from each country. The researcher would 
have liked to include another case study from Egypt, such as a regional university and another 
case study from the UK, such as a new/post 1992 university. This would have allowed further 
the investigation of differences arising from such different contexts. While this would have 
made the findings of the study more comprehensive, the limited time of a PhD and financial 
resources did not enable the researcher to do so. A second limitation is not surveying the 
perceptions of students as to how funding mechanisms and QAS affect them but this is also a 
limitation arising from time and resources. 
9.8 Researcher’s Personal Reflections 
I have to say that one reason I have enjoyed doing this research is because the higher 
education sector is one of vibrant change. First, several reforms are taking place in Egypt, 
many in a transitional phase with more reforms expected to follow. Second, the pace of 
change in the UK and UoB is also considerable, not least  the cuts in budgets for HEIs and 
raising the cap on tuition fees from £3,290 per year up to £9,000 from 2012, as well as 
changes in the approach to institutional audit. Third, UoB has altered its financial model from 
a devolved system to a more centrally managed one with a College structure from August 
2008. UoB has also evolved a new IQAS called BIQAES. This rapid change added to the 
difficulty and importance of the study.        
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Although I faced several challenges conducting the study (arranging and rescheduling 
interviewees; getting the required documents; transcribing interview data and translating most 
of the Egyptian interviews and documents), the outcome has been worthwhile, hopefully in 
respect of evidence-based implications for policy and practice for the researcher‘s country but 
certainly in terms of personal and professional development. Finally, a report of this thesis 
will be sent to the case study universities/countries with a summary of the findings going to 
all the participants who provided their e-mails.          
Having done this study and met 47 academic and administrative staff in Egypt, I 
would like to say that I am proud to be an Egyptian as, despite the hard conditions academics 
face in Egypt, they do their best to do high quality teaching and research to benefit their 
students, universities and society as a whole. However, I would like to see these hard 
conditions changing one day to motivate academics to provide higher quality teaching, 
research and community service and encourage the massive numbers of migrating highly 
qualified Egyptians to return to their beloved country and help it regain its glory and bright 
history, especially after the revolution which swept away the Mubarak regime in February, 
2011. 
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Appendix (1): Cairo University’s Interview Schedule 
[I] Cairo University’s Interview Schedule (English Version) 
(A) Funding Mechanisms 
 
1. What is your understanding of the means by which universities are funded? And 
what‘s your view about them? 
 
2. What would you identify as the main strengths and weaknesses of the existing system 
for funding higher education? 
 
3. The means by which universities are funded has recently been altered (e.g. 
competitive funding for research projects). Are you familiar with these changes? And, 
if so, what is your view of them? 
 
4. To what extent do you think the way universities are funded might affect the following 
issues: 
- Autonomy: institutional autonomy; academic freedom 
- Accountability 
- Efficiency 
- Equity 
 
5. There is a view that if universities diversified their sources of funding (and were less 
reliant on funding from the government) they would have greater freedom or 
autonomy.  What is your view?  
 
6. If you had the opportunity to alter the ways universities are funded, what changes 
would you make?  
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
(B) Quality Assurance Systems 
 
1. What is your understanding of the means by which the government assures the quality 
of (a) teaching and (b) research in universities? 
 
2. What would you identify as the main strengths and weaknesses of these systems of 
quality assurance for (a) teaching and (b) research? 
 
3. The means by which quality of teaching and research is assured has recently been 
altered (QAAP). Are you familiar with these changes? And, if so, what is your view of 
them? 
 
4. To what extent do you think systems of quality assurance might affect the following 
issues: 
- Autonomy: institutional; academic freedom 
- Accountability 
- Efficiency 
- Equity 
 
5. Do you think that systems of quality assurance cover both accountability and 
enhancement? 
 
6. How do you think the systems of Quality Assurance affect your approach to your own 
job (teaching & research)? 
 
7. If you had the opportunity to alter the ways by which government assures quality of 
teaching and research, what changes would you make? 
  iii
 )noisreV cibarA( eludehcS weivretnI s’ytisrevinU oriaC ]II[
 أولا: الأسئلة المتعلقة بأليبت تمويل التعليم الجبمعي بمصر
 ؟   ٓ خلاٌها حّىيً اٌجاِؼاث اٌّصشيتِا هى حمييّه اٌشخصي ٌٍطشق اٌخي يخُ ِ 
 
 ؟ٍيُ اٌجاِؼي ِٓ وجهت ٔظشنِا هي ٔماط اٌمىة و اٌضؼف في إٌظاَ اٌحاٌي ٌخّىيً اٌخؼ 
 
هً أٔج ِطٍغ ػٍي هزٖ  ، )FPEEH(ٍيُ اٌجاِؼي ٌمذ حذثج ِؤخشا بؼض اٌخطىساث في ِجاي حّىيً اٌخؼ 
  ٌها؟ و إرا واْ وزٌه فّا هى حمييّه ،اٌخطىساث
 
 :إٌي أي ِذي يّىٓ أْ يؤثش إٌظاَ اٌحاٌي ٌخّىيً اٌخؼٍيُ اٌجاِؼي ػٍي وً ِٓ 
 )واٌحىُ اٌزاحي حشيت إحخار اٌمشاس: اٌّؤسسي الاسخملاي(اٌحشيت الأواديّيت؛  -
  ثآٌّىافٔظُ اٌجزاءاث و ا/ اٌّساءٌت :ٔظُ اٌّحاسبت -
 اٌىفاءة -
   الإٔصاف /اٌّساواة -
 
اٌجاِؼاث يّىٕها اٌحصىي ػٍي لذس وبيش ِٓ اٌحشيت الأواديّيت إرا اسخطاػج أْ حٕىع "هٕان سأي يمىي بؤْ  
إٌي أي ِذي حخفك أو حخخٍف ِغ هزا " و أْ حمًٍ ِٓ إػخّادها ػٍي اٌخّىيً اٌحىىِي ،ِصادس اٌخّىيً اٌخاصت بها
 و ٌّارا؟, اٌشأي
 
فّا هي ٔىػيت اٌخغييشاث اٌخي حىد أْ ححذثها؟ , إرا أحيحج ٌه اٌفشصت ٌخغييش إٌظاَ اٌحاٌي ٌخّىيً اٌخؼٍيُ اٌجاِؼي 
 )ِا هي ِمخشحاحىُ ٌخحسيٓ ٔظُ حّىيً اٌخؼٍيُ اٌجاِؼي؟(
 
 
 
 
 
 
  vi
 ثبنيب: الأسئلة المتعلقة بنظم توكيد (ضمبن) الجودة و الإعتمبد ببلتعليم الجبمعي بمصر
 
 ؟ٌخىويذ اٌجىدة باٌجاِؼاث اٌّصشيتحٕخهجها اٌحىىِت ِا هى حمييّه اٌشخصي ٌٍطشق اٌخي  
 
 ؟ٍيُ اٌجاِؼي ِٓ وجهت ٔظشنِا هي ٔماط اٌمىة و اٌضؼف في إٌظاَ اٌحاٌي ٌخىويذ اٌجىدة باٌخؼ 
 
ِطٍغ ػٍي هزٖ هً أٔج  ، )PAAQ(ٌمذ حذثج ِؤخشا بؼض اٌخطىساث في ِجاي حىويذ اٌجىدة باٌخؼٍيُ اٌجاِؼي  
   ٌها؟ و إرا واْ وزٌه فّا هى حمييّه ،  اٌخطىساث
 
 :إٌي أي ِذي يّىٓ أْ يؤثش إٌظاَ اٌحاٌي ٌخىويذ اٌجىدة باٌخؼٍيُ اٌجاِؼي ػٍي وً ِٓ 
  )واٌحىُ اٌزاحي حشيت إحخار اٌمشاس: اٌّؤسسي الاسخملاي(اٌحشيت الأواديّيت؛  -
  ثآّىافٌأظُ اٌجزاءاث و /اٌّساءٌت  :ٔظُ اٌّحاسبت -
 ىفاءة اٌ -
 الإٔصاف /اٌّساواة -
          
 هً حؼخمذ أْ ٔظُ اٌجىدة حشوز ػٍي وً ِٓ ٔظُ اٌّحاسبت و ححسيٓ جىدة اٌخؼٍيُ ِؼا؟ 
 
 ؟)حذسيس و بحث ػٍّي(ويف أثشث ٔظُ اٌجىدة ػٍي ِّاسسخه ٌؼٍّه  
 
ّا هي ٔىػيت اٌخغييشاث اٌخي حىد أْ ف ،إرا أحيحج ٌه اٌفشصت ٌخغييش إٌظاَ اٌحاٌي ٌخىويذ اٌجىدة باٌخؼٍيُ اٌجاِؼي 
  ِا هي ِمخشحاحىُ ٌخحسيٓ ٔظُ ضّاْ اٌجىدة باٌخؼٍيُ اٌجاِؼي؟(ححذثها؟ 
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Appendix (2): University of Birmingham’s Interview Schedule 
University of Birmingham’s Interview Schedule 
(A) Funding Mechanisms 
Nationally (The UK) 
1. What is your understanding of the means by which universities are funded? And 
what‘s your view about them?   
2. What would you identify as the main strengths and weaknesses of the existing system 
for funding higher education? 
- Autonomy: institutional; academic freedom 
- Accountability 
- Efficiency 
- Equity 
3. There is a view that if universities diversified their sources of funding (and were less 
reliant on funding from the government) they would have greater freedom or 
autonomy. What is your view?  
4. If you had the opportunity to alter the ways universities are funded, what changes 
would you make?  
 
Internally (UoB) 
5. What is your understanding of how Schools/Departments are funded in the 
University? 
6. What do you think are the main strengths and weaknesses of this way of funding 
Schools/Department? 
- Autonomy: institutional; academic freedom 
- Accountability 
- Efficiency 
- Equity 
7. The means by which the university funds its Schools/Colleges is changing.  Are you 
familiar with these changes and, if so, what is your view of them? 
8. If you had the opportunity to alter the way the School/Department is funded, what 
changes would you make?  
 
 vi 
(B) Quality Assurance Systems 
Nationally (The UK) 
1. What is your understanding of the means by which the government assures the quality 
of (a) teaching and (b) research in universities?  
 
2. What would you identify as the main strengths and weaknesses of these systems of 
quality assurance for (a) teaching and (b) research? 
- Autonomy: institutional; academic freedom 
- Accountability 
- Efficiency 
- Equity 
 
3. If you had the opportunity to alter the ways by which government assures quality in 
teaching and research, what changes would you make?  
 
Internally (UoB) 
4. What is your understanding of how the University assures the quality of (a) teaching 
and (b) research in its Schools/Departments? 
 
5. What do you think are the main strengths and weaknesses of this way of assuring the 
quality of (a) teaching and (b) research? 
- Autonomy: institutional; academic freedom 
- Accountability 
- Efficiency 
- Equity 
 
6. If you had the opportunity to alter the way the University assures quality in teaching 
and research, what changes would you make? 
 
